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   i	  
ABSTRACT	  
	  
In	   this	   research	  dissertation	   I	  argue	  that	  Pieter	  Hugo's	  body	  of	  work	  titled	  Rwanda	  
2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  (2004)	  can	  be	  read	  according	  to	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime,	  
in	  particular	  those	  of	  terror	  and	  the	  unpresentable.	  I	  begin	  in	  chapter	  one	  by	  tracing	  
within	   the	   discourse	   of	   the	   sublime	   themes	   of	   terror	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	  
certain	   sociopolitical	  events	  can	  be	  understood	  as	   sublime	   instances	  of	   terror.	  The	  
essentially	  unpresentable	  nature	  of	  such	  occurrences	  is	  another	  important	  concern.	  
As	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  aesthetic	  produce	  of	  a	  visual	  artist	  in	  regards	  to	  such	  sublime	  
notions,	   I	   make	   reference	   to	   various	   other	   relevant	   artworks	   and	   appropriate	   art	  
theory.	  
	  
In	   chapter	   two	   I	   argue	   the	   case	   for	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   as	   a	   sublime	   political	  
event,	  an	  instance	  of	  incommensurable	  terror.	  In	  an	  examination	  of	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  
2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   I	   outline	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   his	   work,	   as	   an	  
aestheticization	   of	   such	   terror,	   thus	   embodies	   notions	   of	   the	   sublime.	   Via	   the	  
facilitated	   experience	  of	  witness,	   I	   note	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	   art	   spectator,	   in	  
response	   to	   such	  work,	  experiences	   something	  of	   the	   shock	  and	  horror	  associated	  
with	  the	  sublime.	  As	  a	  contemporary	  artist,	  engaging	  with	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  I	  am	  
careful	   to	  posit	  Hugo's	  work	  within	   the	  appropriate	  context	  of	   the	  postcolonial,	  as	  
well	  as	  (in	  regards	  to	  sublime	  theory)	  the	  postmodern.	  
	  
Chapter	   three	   examines	   a	   personal	   body	   of	   work,	   Murder	   on	   7th	   (2009)	   –	   an	  
investigation	  into	  the	  neurosis	  generated	  by	  the	  pervasive	  influence	  of	  violent	  crime	  
in	   South	   Africa.	   Having	   already	   argued	   the	   case	   for	   the	   sublime	   political	   event,	   I	  
propose	   for	   consideration	   certain	   social	   disorders	   like	   violent	   crime,	   as	   well	   as	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Introduction	  
	  
Terror,	  as	  established	  by	  Edmund	  Burke,	  is	  a	  primary	  concern	  within	  the	  discourse	  of	  
the	  sublime.	  As	  is	  the	  deferred	  terror	  of	  witness,	  of	  spectacle.	  Burke's	  notion	  of	  the	  
sublimity	   of	   terror	   applies,	   within	   the	   context	   of	   Romanticism,	   predominantly	   to	  
natural	  disasters	  and	  other	  such	  dramatic	  displays:	  the	  tempest,	  the	  earthquake,	  the	  
mountain	   precipice.	   In	   our	   witness	   of	   such	   terror,	   the	   psychological	   response	   of	  
astonishment,	   a	   sort	   of	   negative	   delight,	   is	   established	   by	   Burke	   as	   the	   principle	  
effect	  of	  the	  sublime.	  I	  will	  however	  in	  this	  study	  examine	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  
Burkean	  sublime	  –	  the	  notion	  of	  terror	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  essentially	  cognitive	  and	  
aesthetic	   (which	   is	   to	   say	  deferred)	  experience	  of	   the	   sublime	  –	   can	  be	  applied	   to	  
certain	   sociopolitical	   tragedies	   like	   the	   Holocaust,	   Hiroshima,	   and	   the	   Rwandan	  
Genocide.	   It	   is	   my	   intention	   in	   this	   study	   to	   examine	   the	   work	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo,	  
referencing	  his	  demanding	  photographic	  body	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  
(2004),	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime.	  Thus	  framed,	  I	  mean	  to	  establish	  
Hugo's	  work	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	   as	   an	  aesthetic	  presentation	  of	  
terror	  and	  the	  sublime.	  
	  
Sublimity	  as	  put	  forth	  by	  Immanuel	  Kant	  stresses	  notions	  of	  infinite	  size	  and	  infinite	  
power	  –	  our	  witness	  of	   the	  cosmos,	  our	  mental	  grappling	  with	   ideas	  of	   infinity,	  of	  
eternity,	  or	   the	   feeling	  of	  helplessness	  and	  powerlessness	  we	  feel	   in	  relation	  to	  an	  
overhanging	   cliff	   or	   the	   power	   of	   an	   avalanche.	   As	   with	   Burke,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  
display	  of	  terror,	  of	  power,	  Kant	   insists	  on	  a	  certain	  distance,	  a	  remove	  –	  affirming	  
the	  sublime	  as	  an	  act	  of	  witness,	  an	  application	  of	  mind	  to	  the	  spectacle	  of	  threat.	  
Fundamental	   to	   Kantian	   notions	   of	   the	   sublime	   is	   the	   role	   of	   reason,	   of	   moral	  
freedom,	  what	  he	   terms	   the	  supersensible	   faculty.	  Whilst	  Kant	   is	  a	  primary	  source	  
and	  reference	  to	  modern	  discourse	  on	  the	  sublime,	  this	   transcendental	  application	  
is,	   in	   contemporary	   theory,	   thrown	   into	   question	   by	   the	   general	   scepticism	   of	  
postmodernity.	   (Lyotard	   1989;	   Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	   1989)	   In	   an	   examination	   of	   Kant's	  
mathematical	  and	  dynamical	  sublime,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  such	  postmodern	  radicalisations,	  
I	  mean	   to	   establish,	   and	   later	   apply	   to	   the	  work	   of	   Pieter	  Hugo	   and	   the	  Rwandan	  
Genocide,	   themes	   of	   power,	   threat	   and	   the	   unpresentable.	   The	   writings	   of	   Jean-­‐
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Francois	   Lyotard	   are	   key	   to	   these	   contemporary	   notions	   of	   the	   unpresentable	   –	  
applied	  by	  him	  to	  the	  non-­‐representational	  work	  of	  artists	  like	  Kazimir	  Malevich	  and	  
Barnett	  Newman.	  However,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  directly	  representational	  photographic	  
works	   of	   Hugo,	   it	   is	   the	   resistance	   of	   sociopolitical	   events	   like	   the	   Holocaust	   to	  
presentation,	   suggested	   in	   his	   The	   Differend	   (1988),	   that	   is	   of	   particular	   interest.	  
Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   presenting	   as	   it	   does	   something	   of	   the	  
immeasurable	   and	   essentially	   unpresentable	   horror	   and	   tragedy	   of	   the	   Rwandan	  
Genocide.	  
	  
Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   is	   a	   graphic	   and	   documentary	   record,	   a	  
forensic	   view	   of	   remnants	   of	   genocide:	   the	   twisted	   and	   pained	   bodies	   of	   victims	  
preserved	  in	  lime,	  the	  debris	  of	  human	  bones,	  clothing	  and	  paraphernalia	  scattered	  
on	  floors	  of	  the	  sites	  of	  massacre,	  mass	  graves	  in	  the	  forests	  of	  Murambi.	  The	  jarring	  
and	   shocking	   nature	   of	   these	   images	   defy	   the	   balanced	   aesthetic	   of	   the	   merely	  
beautiful.	   Rather	   than	   pleasing	   in	   any	   positive	   sense,	   they	   evoke	   in	   the	   viewer	   a	  
negative	  pleasure	  –	  a	  horror,	  a	  sadness,	  a	  sense	  of	  helplessness.	  With	  reference	  to	  
established	  and	  more	  contemporary	  writings	  on	  the	  sublime,	  I	  intend	  in	  this	  study	  to	  
demonstrate	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   such	   a	   response,	   motivated	   by	   the	   shock	   of	  
deferred	  terror,	  corresponds	  to	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  As	  Jean-­‐Luc	  
Nancy	   notes	   of	   such	   aesthetic	   defiance,	   “...enough	   beauty	   already,	   we	   must	   be	  
sublime!”	  (Nancy	  1993:27)	  	  	  
	  
Having	   argued	   the	   case	   for	  Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   as	  mimesis	   of	   a	  
sublime	  political	  event	  –	  an	  aesthetic	  presentation	  of	  terror	  and	  the	  unpresentable	  –	  
I	  mean	  to	  examine	  my	  own	  practical	  body	  of	  work,	  Murder	  on	  7th	  (2009).	  As	  a	  visual	  
investigation	   into	   the	   trauma	   and	   neurosis	   associated	  with	   violent	   crime	   in	   South	  
Africa,	  the	  work	  engages	  with,	  if	  not	  an	  event	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  
a	   socio-­‐economic	   scenario	   which	   is,	   nonetheless,	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  
'everyday'	  South	  African,	  a	  seemingly	  overwhelming	  spectacle	  of	  terror.	  The	  manner	  
in	  which	  the	  deferred	  threat	  of	  terror	  threatens	  within	  the	  South	  African	  scenario	  of	  
suburban	  witness,	  to	  break	  into	  the	  real,	  to	  manifest	  as	  terror	  itself,	  will	  constitute	  a	  
particular	   focus.	   The	   shock	  of	   affect,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  unravelling	  phenomenon	  of	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violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  constitutes,	  as	  will	  be	  suggested,	  certain	  psychological	  
effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  It	  is	  my	  intention	  in	  so	  referencing	  Murder	  on	  7th	  to	  submit	  for	  
consideration	  certain	  social	  disorders	  –	  in	  this	  case	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa	  –	  as	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Chapter	  1:	  The	  Sublimity	  of	  Terror	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   examine	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   South	   African	   artist	   Pieter	   Hugo's	  
work,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	  Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   (2004),	   embodies	  
notions	  of	  sublimity.	  And	  in	  particular,	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror.	  Whilst	  the	  sublimity	  of	  
terror	  is	  traditionally,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Romanticism,	  associated	  with	  demonstrations	  
of	   nature,	   I	   will	   present	   and	   argue,	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   photographic	  
representations	   of	   Hugo,	   the	   case	   for	   its	   current	   relevance	   in	   regards	   to	   certain	  
sociopolitical	  upheavals,	  such	  as	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  of	  1994.	  
	  
It	  is	  my	  intention	  therefore	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  establish	  a	  valid	  (though	  by	  no	  means	  
exhaustive)	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  sublime	  –	  from	  its	  inception	  
in	  ancient	  Greek	  philosophy	  to	  more	  contemporary	  writings	  on	  the	  subject.	  And	  as	  it	  
is	  the	  particular	  focus	  of	  this	  study,	  trace	  and	  emphasise	  the	  development	  of	  terror	  
as	  a	   significant	   theme	  within	   the	  discourse	  of	   sublimity,	  as	  well	   as	   its	   relation	   in	  a	  
more	  current	  sense	  to	  the	  sociopolitical.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  I	  will	  consider	  theories	  of	  
the	   unpresentable,	   as	   applied	   to	   the	   sociopolitical	   catastrophe	   as	   aesthetic	  
phenomenon.	  As	   I	  will	   in	   the	   following	  chapter	  apply	  such	  notions	  and	  readings	  of	  
the	  sublime	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Pieter	  Hugo,	  a	  visual	  artist,	  I	  feel	  it	  necessary	  to	  include	  in	  
the	   establishment	   of	   such	   a	   theoretical	   framework,	   by	   means	   of	   examples	   and	  
discussion,	  the	  unique	  and	  relevant	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  sublime	  as	  a	  philosophical	  
concern	  has	  in	  various	  ways	  and	  forms	  been,	  and	  is,	  demonstrated	  within	  the	  arts.	  	  
	  
First	   century	   A.D	   Greek	   critic	   Dionysius	   Longinus’	   Peri	   Hupsos	   or	   On	   Sublimity	   is	  
widely	   accepted	   as	   the	   first	   theoretical	   treatise	   on	   the	   sublime.	   On	   Sublimity	   is	  
largely	   concerned	   with	   the	   art	   of	   rhetoric,	   the	   ability	   of	   an	   orator	   to	   employ	  
grandiose	   rhetorical	   devices	   to	   rouse	   or	   influence	   an	   audience.	   Stemming	   from	   a	  
long	  line	  of	  oratorical	  teachers	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  Latin	  poet	  and	  philosopher,	  Cicero,	  
Longinus	  sought	  “...to	  teach	  those	  oratorical	  devices	  that	  enable	  a	  speaker	  to	  move	  
or	   persuade	   an	   audience.”	   (Shaw	   2006:	   12)	   On	   Sublimity	   identifies	   these	   basic	  
oratorical	  contrivances	  -­‐	  such	  as	  inventio	  (subject	  matter)	  or	  dispositio	  (composition)	  
–	  meant	  to	  aid	  and	  instruct	  the	  speaker	  on	  how	  to	  achieve	  an	  elevated,	  or	  affecting	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form	  of	  speech.	  Speech	  that	  seeks	  to	  incite	  a	  state	  of	  ekstasis.	  “Unlike	  conventional	  
public	  speech,	  therefore,	  the	  sublime	  is	  a	  discourse	  of	  domination;	  it	  seeks	  to	  ravage	  
and	  intoxicate	  the	  audience	  so	  that	  a	  grand	  conception	  may	  be	  instilled	  in	  the	  mind	  
without	  any	  bothersome	  appeal	  to	  reason	  or	  justice.”	  (Shaw	  2006:	  14)	  Paramount	  to	  
his	   notion	   of	   the	   sublime	   is	   the	   emphasis	   on	   an	   indistinct,	   almost	   vague	   form	   of	  
speech	  or	  rhetoric.	   It	   is	   the	  representation	  as	   it	  were	  of	  the	  unrepresentable	  –	  the	  
unattainable	  –	   that	  which	  cannot	  be	   fully	  grasped.	   In	   this	   sense	   the	  sublime	   is	  not	  
learnt,	   it	   is	   caught	   like	   a	   divine	   contagion.	   (Shaw	   2006:13)	   By	   the	   use	   of	   subtle	  
rhetoric	   it	   is	   aroused,	   so	   that	   for	   the	   audience	   it	   becomes	   an	   all	   consuming	   and	  
overwhelming	   experience.	   Rather	   than	   persuading,	   the	   speaker	   transports	   the	  
listener	  into	  a	  sublime	  state.	  	  
	  
Without	  proposing	  a	  definition	  as	   such	   (of	   the	   sublime	   itself),	   the	   treatise	  outlines	  
rather	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime	  experience	  –	  upon	  the	  audience	  and	  as	  conjured	  by	  
the	   speaker:	   awe,	   wonder,	   astonishment,	   ecstasy.	   Longinus	   promotes,	   in	   the	  
evocation	   of	   the	   sublime,	   artistic	   ingenuity	   or	   genius,	   granting	   it	   precedence	   over	  
'the	  rules',	  over	  protocol	  and	  conventional	  practice.	  As	  Umberto	  Eco	  asserts	  “(it)	   is	  
(for	  Longinus)	  an	  effect	  of	  art,	  and	  not	  a	  natural	  phenomenon.”	  (Eco	  2004:278)	  The	  
sublime	  then,	   in	  Longinus'	  view,	   is	  the	  shock	  and	  wonder,	  the	  ecstasy	  generated	  in	  
the	   audience,	   awoken	  within	   them,	  not	  by	  means	  of	   the	  merely	  persuasive	   (Shaw	  
2006:13),	   the	   sensibilities	   of	   reason,	   but	   by	   a	   rhetoric	   meant	   to	   ravish	   and	  
overwhelm.	   To	   illicit	   in	   them	  a	   grand	   and	   overriding	   apprehension,	   and	   so	   exhibit	  
“the	  orator's	  whole	  power	  at	  a	  single	  blow”.	  (Shaw	  2006:13)	  From	  the	  outset	  then,	  
the	   relationship	   between	   the	   sublime	   as	   a	   philosophical	   notion	   and	   the	   arts	   is	  
evident.	  	  
	  
It	   was	   not	   until	   the	   late	   seventeenth	   century	   that	   the	   sublime	   experienced	   a	  
resurgence	   of	   interest,	   with	   Despreaux	   Boileau’s	   translation	   of	   Longinus’	   On	  
Sublimity	   in	   1674	   availing	   it	   to	   a	   wider	   audience.	   And	   nowhere	   was	   it	   more	  
enthusiastically	  received	  than	  in	  England.	  Echoing	  as	  it	  did	  the	  zeitgeist	  of	  the	  age	  –	  
the	  age	  of	  Enlightenment	  –	   the	  sublime	  emerged	  as	  a	  distinct	  category	  of	  western	  
thought	   and	   culture.	   No	   longer	   content	   with	   describing	   only	   the	   effects	   of	   the	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sublime,	   the	  ecstatic	   raptures	  Longinus	  sought	  to	   induce	  upon	  the	  audience,	  many	  
opted	  instead	  to	  encounter	  the	  sublime	  within	  nature	  itself.	  Lonely,	  desolate	  places,	  
vast	  and	  rugged	  peaks	  became	  as	  it	  were	  the	  amphitheatre	  of	  the	  natural	  sublime;	  a	  
discourse	  Eco	  	  dubs	  the	  poetics	  of	  mountains.	  (Eco	  2004:282)	  	  
	  
For	  eighteenth	  century	   theorists	  such	  as	   literary	  critic	   Joseph	  Addison,	   the	  sublime	  
was	  to	  be	  accessed	  through	  the	  sensory	  experience	  of	  sight.	  Rather	  than	  the	  rhetoric	  
of	  Longinus,	  ocular	  perception	  –	  a	  witness	  of	  the	  spectacle	  of	  nature	  –	  allowed	  for	  
and	  encouraged	  the	  imagination's	  delight	  in	  the	  sublime.	  
	  
Such	   are	   the	  Prospects	   of	   an	  open	  Champian	  Country,	   a	   vast	   uncultivated	  Desart,	   of	   huge	  
Heaps	  of	  Mountains,	  high	  Rocks	  and	  Precipices,	  or	  a	  wide	  Expanse	  of	  Waters,	  where	  we	  are	  
not	  struck	  with	  the	  Novelty	  or	  Beauty	  of	  the	  Sight,	  but	  with	  that	  rude	  kind	  of	  Magnificence	  
which	   appears	   in	  many	  of	   these	   stupendous	  Works	   of	  Nature.	   (Spectator	   412,	  Monday	   23	  
June	  1712;	  quoted	  in	  Shaw	  2006:35)	  	  	  
	  
True	  to	  this	  natural	  sublime	  and	  no	   longer	  content	  with	  only	  the	   illustration	  of	  the	  
sublime	  effect,	  Addison	  attempts	  to	  identify	  rather	  the	  origin	  and	  source	  of	  sublimity	  
itself.	   It	   is	   for	  him	   that	   ‘rude	  kind	  of	  Magnificance’,	   the	  majestic	  natural	  object.	   In	  
other	  words,	  what	  we	  perceive	  (as	  sublime)	  is	  inspired	  by	  what	  we	  see.	  But	  why	  find	  
such	   pleasure	   in	   these	   vistas,	   ‘high	   rocks	   and	   precipices',	   the	   'wide	   Expanse	   of	  
Water’?	   From	   Addison’s	   perspective	   (and	   again	   this	   is	   reflective	   of	   the	   age),	   one	  
delights	   in	   such	   sights	   for	   being	   emblematic	   of	   the	   divine	   omniscience	   of	   God.	  
“Because,	   therefore,	   a	   great	   part	   of	   our	   happiness	   must	   arise	   from	   the	  
contemplation	   of	   his	   Being,	   that	   he	   might	   give	   our	   souls	   a	   just	   relish	   of	   such	   a	  
contemplation,	  he	  has	  made	  them	  naturally	  delight	   in	  the	  apprehension	  of	  what	   is	  
great	  or	  unlimited.”	   (Kirwan	  2005:8)	  Thomas	  Burnet,	  a	  contemporary	  of	  Addison’s,	  
further	  expounds	  on	  this	  transcendant	  understanding	  of	  the	  sublime.	  In	  The	  Sacred	  
Theory	  of	  the	  Earth	  Burnet	  records	  his	  own	  response	  to	  natural	  phenomena:	  
	  
(T)here	   is	  nothing	  I	   look	  upon	  with	  more	  Pleasure	  than	  the	  wide	  Sea	  and	  the	  Mountains	  of	  
the	  Earth.	  There	  is	  something	  august	  and	  stately	  in	  the	  Air	  of	  these	  things,	  that	  inspires	  the	  
Mind	  with	  great	  Thoughts	  and	  Passions;	  we	  do	  naturally,	  upon	  such	  Occasions,	  think	  of	  God	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and	  his	  Greatness:	  And	  whatsoever	  hath	  but	  the	  Shadow	  and	  Appearance	  of	  the	  INFINITE,	  as	  
all	  Things	  have	  that	  are	  too	  big	  for	  our	  Comprehension,	  they	  fill	  and	  overbear	  the	  mind	  with	  
their	  Excess...	  (Sacred	  Theory,	  1776;	  quoted	  in	  Shaw	  2006:29)	  	  
	  
As	   visual	   reference,	   one	   cannot	   but	   think	   of	   Caspar	   David	   Friedrich's	   epitomist	  
Wanderer	  Above	  a	  Sea	  of	  Fog	  (1818).	  A	  painting	  often	  cited	  as	  an	  emblem	  of	  the	  age,	  
Friedrich's	  piece	  encapsulates	  this	  eighteenth	  century	  phenomenon	  –	  the	  desire	  for	  
the	   sublime	   landscape:	   wild,	   hostile	   and	   yet	   alluring	   –	   imbued	   with	   a	   sense	   of	  
mystery.	   The	   lonely	   wanderer	   stands	   in	   rugged	   defiance,	   his	   back	   to	   the	   viewer,	  
surveying	  from	  a	  precipitous	  outcrop	  the	  boundless	  scene;	  hills	  and	  forests	  shrouded	  
in	  mist.	  Captured	  here	  the	  epitome	  of,	  as	  Eco	  puts	  it	  “...an	  age	  of	  travellers	  anxious	  
to	  get	  to	  know	  new	  landscapes	  and	  new	  customs...in	  order	  to	  savour	  new	  pleasures	  
and	  new	  emotions.”	  (Eco	  2004:	  282)	  	  
	  
For	  Neoplatonic	   thinkers	   such	   as	  Addison	   and	  Burnet	   the	   sublime	   therefore,	   in	   its	  
pure	  form,	  is	  symbolic	  of	  the	  divine	  and	  creative	  force	  of	  God.	  As	  Frances	  Reynolds	  
adds,	   an	   essentially	   religious	   experience.	   For	   Reynolds,	   the	   sublime	   is	   that	   critical	  
point	   at	   which	   the	   mind	   reaches	   the	   limits	   of	   conception.	   Significantly,	   Reynolds	  
holds	  that	  the	  sublime	  is	  essentially	  a	  mental	  exercise;	  in	  that	  whilst	  by	  analogy	  the	  
eternal	  can	  be,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  expressed	  in	  an	  object,	  a	  natural	  spectacle	  or	  in	  
words,	   it	   is	   the	   enquiring	  mind's	   acknowledgment	   of	   the	   essential	   insufficiency	   of	  
nature,	  or	   language	  –	  of	  any	  such	  analogy	  –	  that	  establishes	  the	  true	  sublime.	  This	  
limit	  of	  conception,	  as	  by	  analogy	  the	  mind	  engages	  with	  these	  notions	  of	  divinity,	  is	  
for	  Reynolds	  and	  her	  contemporaries	  the	  frontier	  of	  the	  sublime	  experience.	  Of	  this	  
she	  states:	  
It	  is	  a	  pinnacle	  of	  beatitude,	  bordering	  upon	  horror,	  deformity,	  madness!	  An	  eminence	  from	  
whence	   the	  mind,	   that	  dares	   to	   look	   further	   is	   lost!	   It	   seems	   to	   stand,	  or	   rather	   to	  waver,	  
between	   certainty	   and	   uncertainty,	   between	   security	   and	   destruction.	   It	   is	   the	   point	   of	  
terror,	  of	  undetermined	  fear,	  of	  undetermined	  power!	  (Enquiries	  Concerning	  the	  Principles	  of	  
Taste,	  1785;	  quoted	  in	  Shaw	  2006:46)	  
	  
It	   is	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  sublime	  that	   is	   in	  question	  here.	  Not	  the	  sublime	  effect	  of	  
Longinus,	  regulated	  by	  rhetorical	  device,	  but	  the	  transformational	  power	  of	  language	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itself.	   As	   outlined	   in	   John	   Baillie's	  An	   Essay	   on	   the	   Sublime	   (1747),	   its	   capacity	   by	  
analogy	   to	   somehow	  conjoin	   the	  physical	  and	  mental	  object	  –	   to	  uplift	  a	   thing,	  by	  
association	  with	   the	  divine,	   the	  boundless,	   the	   limits	  of	  human	   conception,	   to	   the	  
ruling	  class	  of	  the	  sublime.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  experience	  is	  sublime	  only	  on	  account	  of	  
it	  being	  described	  as	  such	  –	  in	  the	  mind's	  recognition	  of	  this	  limit.	  And	  the	  resultant	  
experience	  of	  such	  a	  'terror',	  this	  'undetermined	  power'.	  (Shaw	  2006:46)	  
	  
It	  was	  however	  with	  Edmund	  Burke	  in	  his	  seminal	  work,	  A	  Philosophical	  Enquiry	  into	  
the	  Sublime	  and	  Beautiful	  (1757),	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  terror	  was	  established	  as	  a	  primary	  
concern	   within	   the	   notion	   of	   sublimity.	   As	   a	   text	   of	   	   greater	   scope	   and	   historical	  
influence	  than	  those	  of	  Baillie,	  Reynolds	  and	  the	  other	  Neo-­‐Platonics,	  and	  as	  it	  is	  my	  
intention	   to	   examine	   the	  work	   of	   artist	   Pieter	  Hugo	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   sublimity	   of	  
terror	   (albeit	   in	   a	   contemporary	   sense,	   and	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   socio-­‐political),	   an	  
understanding	  and	  more	  detailed	   investigation	  of	   the	  Burkean	  sublime	   is	  critical	   in	  
the	  establishing	  of	  a	  relevant	  theoretical	  framework.	  
	  
Burke	   dedicates	   much	   of	   his	   treatise	   to	   differentiating	   between	   beauty	   and	   the	  
sublime	   –	   engendering	   these	   two	   according	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   their	   respective	  
qualities.	   In	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   two,	   Burke	   puts	   forth	   two	   remote	   and	  
distinguishable	  concepts,	  allying	  beauty	  with	  femininity,	  lightness	  and	  grace,	  and	  the	  
sublime	  with	  masculinity,	  darkness	  and	  scale.	  	  
	  
For	  sublime	  objects	  are	  vast	  in	  their	  dimensions,	  beautiful	  ones	  comparatively	  small;	  beauty	  
should	   be	   smooth,	   and	   polished;	   the	   great,	   rugged	   and	  negligent;	   beauty	   should	   shun	   the	  
right	   line,	   yet	   deviate	   from	   it	   insensibly;	   the	   great	   in	  many	   cases	   loves	   the	   right	   line,	   and	  
when	  it	  deviates,	  it	  often	  makes	  a	  strong	  deviation;	  beauty	  should	  not	  be	  obscure;	  the	  great	  
ought	   to	   be	   dark	   and	   gloomy;	   beauty	   should	   be	   light	   and	   delicate;	   the	   great	   ought	   to	   be	  
solid,	  and	  even	  massive.	  (Burke	  2004:157)	  	  
	  
In	   this	   sense	   his	   reading	   of	   the	   two	   terms,	   beauty	   and	   the	   sublime,	   is	   not	   that	  
dissimilar	   to	   that	   of	   his	   Neoplatonic	   predecessors	   –	   however,	   what	   does	   set	   him	  
apart	   is	  a	   certain	   shift	   in	   focus.	  As	  opposed	   to	  confining	  his	   reading	   to	   the	  natural	  
object	  alone,	  Burke's	  analysis	  “shifts	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  sublime	  away	   from	  physical	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things	   and	   towards	   mental	   states.”	   (Shaw	   2006:49)	   As	   an	   advocate	   of	   Empiricist	  
thought	  Burke's	  approach	   is	  more	  secular;	  rather	  than	  the	  Neo-­‐Platonic	  concept	  of	  
nature	   as	   analogy	   of	   the	   divine,	   his	   concern	   is	   the	   cognitive	   nature	   of	   a	   sensory	  
sublime.	  The	  sublime	  experience	  is	  to	  be	  attained	  through	  the	  senses.	  This	  revision	  
of	  Burke's	  was	  to	  prove	  critical	  as	  it	  shifted	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  purely	  natural	  
sublime	   towards	   this	   'cognitive'	   sublime	   –	   that	   is	   a	   dialogue	   concerning	   the	  
conscious	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  spectator.	  And	  so	  the	  emergence	  of	  terror	  as	  a	  
cognitive	  experience	  of	  sublimity.	  Central	  to	  Burke's	  concept	  of	  a	  cognitive	  sublime,	  
attained	   through	   the	   senses	   (experience	   rather	   than	   object)	   is	   the	   notion	   of	  
astonishment.	  “The	  passion	  caused	  by	  the	  great	  and	  sublime	  in	  nature,	  when	  those	  
causes	  operate	  most	  powerfully,	  is	  Astonishment;	  and	  astonishment	  is	  that	  state	  of	  
the	  soul,	  in	  which	  all	  its	  motions	  are	  suspended	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  horror.”	  (Burke	  
2004:101)	  Emphasising	  the	  mental	  experience	  of	  the	  viewer,	  Burke	  introduces	  what	  
can	   be	   termed	   the	   psychological	   effects	   of	   the	   sublime	   –	   the	   cognitive	  
'repercussions'	   or	   violent	   agitation	   of	   the	   emotions	   necessary	   to	   the	   sublime	  
experience.	   Reason	   is	   suspended	   in	   favour	   of	   terror	   and	   horror.	   “In	   this	   case	   the	  
mind	   is	   so	  entirely	   filled	  with	   its	  object,	   that	   it	   cannot	  entertain	  any	  other,	  nor	  by	  
consequence	  reason	  on	  that	  object	  which	  employs	  it.”	  (Burke	  2004:101)	  In	  so	  doing,	  
he	   identifies	   the	   source	   of	   the	   sublime	   as	   being	   none	   other	   than	   that	   of	   terror.	  
“Whatever	  is	  fitted	  in	  any	  sort	  to	  excite	  the	  ideas	  of	  pain,	  and	  danger,	  and	  that	  is	  to	  
say,	   whatever	   is	   in	   any	   sort	   terrible,	   or	   is	   conversant	   about	   terrible	   objects,	   or	  
operates	   in	   a	   manner	   analogous	   to	   terror,	   is	   a	   source	   of	   the	   sublime...”	   (Burke	  
2004:86)	  Thus	  Burke	  establishes	  the	  notion	  of	  terror	  as	  fundamental,	  as	  being	  within	  
the	  mental	  experience	  of	   the	  viewer,	   the	  essence,	   the	  source	  and	  stimulant	  of	   the	  
sublime	  experience.	  	  
	  
Having	  established	  this	  primary	  source	  of	  terror,	  Burke	  proceeds	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  
required	   position	   of	   the	   viewer.	   The	   spectator	   of	   the	   sublime	   happening	   is	  
established	   as	   one	   of	   relative	   safety	  within	   the	   context	   of	   their	   inherent	   sense	   of	  
self-­‐preservation.	   For	   when	   pain	   and	   danger	   –	   what	   Burke	   refers	   to	   as	   ruling	  
passions	  of	  the	  sublime	  –	   intervene	  too	  closely	  on	  the	  sublime	  exploit,	  or	  threaten	  
too	  nearly	  the	  notion	  of	  self,	  the	  sublime	  experience	  is	  disrupted.	  He	  insinuates	  that	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the	  idea	  of	  pain	  or	  danger	  is	  sufficient	  to	  satisfy	  sublimity.	  And	  even	  be	  a	  source	  of	  
delight.	   “When	   danger	   or	   pain	   press	   too	   nearly,	   they	   are	   incapable	   of	   giving	   any	  
delight,	   and	   are	   simply	   terrible;	   but	   at	   certain	   distances,	   and	   with	   certain	  
modifications,	   they	  may	  be,	  and	   they	  are	  delightful...”	   (Burke	  2004:86)	  Or	  as	   Jean-­‐
Francois	  Lyotard	  notes,	  in	  his	  succinct	  commentary	  on	  the	  Burkean	  sublime,	  “In	  pain	  
the	  body	  affects	   the	   soul.	  But	   the	   soul	   can	  also	  affect	   the	  body	  as	   though	   it	  were	  
experiencing	   some	   externally	   induced	   pain,	   by	   the	   sole	  means	   of	   representations	  
that	   are	   unconsciously	   associated	   with	   painful	   situations.	   This	   entirely	   spiritual	  
passion,	  in	  Burke's	  lexicon,	  is	  called	  terror.”	  (Lyotard	  1988:35)	  In	  order	  to	  appreciate	  
the	  sublime	  spectacle,	  this	  spiritual	  passion	  of	  terror,	  it	  must	  be	  viewed	  from	  a	  safe	  
distance,	   that	   is,	   by	  means	  of	   representation.	   The	  howling	  gale	   storm	  or	   terrifying	  
blizzard	   becomes	   capable	   of	   inducing	   the	   sublime	   when	   viewed	   from	   a	   place	   of	  
safety	  in	  its	  mere	  suggestion	  at	  pain	  or	  danger;	  this	   is	  what	  qualifies	  as	  a	  source	  of	  
the	  sublime.	  Only	  then	  is	  the	  spectator	  able	  to	  appreciate	  the	  sublimity	  inherent	  in	  
such	  a	  natural	  spectacle,	  causing	  them	  to	  delight	   in	   it	  and	  appreciate	  the	  safety	  of	  
self.	   Lyotard	   emphasises	   this	   relative	   safety	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   to	   the	   sublime	  
experience,	  the	  'delight'	  we	  take	  in	  it.	  “(F)or	  this	  terror	  to	  mingle	  with	  pleasure	  and	  
with	   it	   to	   produce	   the	   feeling	   of	   the	   sublime,	   it	   is	   also	   necessary	   that	   the	   terror	  
causing	  threat	  be	  suspended,	  kept	  at	  bay,	  held	  back.”	  (Lyotard	  1988:35)	  Maintaining	  
that	   such	  a	  distancing	  of	   threat,	  of	  actual	  danger,	  encourages	  a	  kind	  of	  pleasure	  –	  
not	  a	  positive	  one,	  that	  of	  satisfaction,	  but	  rather	  of	  relief.	  “Burke	  distinguishes	  this	  
pleasure	  of	  secondary	  privation	  from	  positive	  pleasures,	  and	  he	  baptizes	  it	  with	  the	  
name	  delight.”	  (Lyotard	  1988:35)	  	  
	  
Whilst	  various	  paintings	  and	  artworks	  contemporaneous	  with	  the	  writings	  of	  Burke	  
could	  serve	  as	  valid	  representations	  of	  this	  sublime	  experience,	  I	  feel	  that	  Walter	  De	  
Maria's	  The	   Lightning	  Field	   (1977),	   a	   long-­‐term	  site	   specific	   installation	   in	  Western	  
New	  Mexico,	  presents	  a	  particularly	   relevant	  visual	  and	  experiential	   illustration	   -­‐	  a	  
modernist	   embodiment	   of	   the	   Burkean	   sublime.	   As	   a	   seminal	   land	   art	   piece,	   a	  
performance	  of	   nature	   as	   it	  were,	   the	  piece	   is	   uniquely	  qualified	  –	  not	   so	  much	  a	  
representation	  as	  an	  actual	  (though	  facilitated)	  event.	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The	  Lightning	  Field,	  first	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Dia	  Art	  Foundation	  in	  the	  late	  1970's	  
can	   still	   be	   viewed	   today.	  An	  exhaustive	   search	   for	   the	  exact	   location	  of	   the	  work	  
was	  conducted	  before	  de	  Maria	  settled	  on	  a	  site.	  “The	  states	  of	  California,	  Nevada,	  
Utah,	  Arizona	  and	  Texas	  were	  searched	  by	  truck	  over	  a	  five-­‐year	  period	  before	  the	  
location	   in	  New	  Mexico	  was	   selected.”	   (de	  Maria	   1980:118)	  His	   requirements:	   flat	  
horizontal	   planes,	   seclusion,	   and	   of	   course,	   an	   area	   known	   for	   its	   frequent	   and	  
spectacular	  lightning	  strikes.	  The	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  site	  -­‐	  desolate,	  vast	  and	  prone	  to	  
such	   natural	   theatrics	   –	   establishes	   from	   the	   start	   something	   of	   the	   romantic	  
scenario.	  Dramatic	   in	  scale,	   the	  work	  consists	  of	   four	  hundred	  stainless	  steel	  poles	  
with	   pointed	   tips,	   arrayed	   in	   a	   rectangular	   grid	   measuring	   one	   kilometer	   and	   six	  
hundred	  meters	   by	   a	   kilometer	   and	   six	  metres	   –	   each	   pole	   spaced	   approximately	  
sixty	  seven	  metres	  apart.	   If	  each	  of	   the	   four	  hundred	  poles	  were	   to	  be	   laid	  on	  the	  
ground	  head	  to	  head,	  they	  would	  form	  a	  horizontal	  pillar	  measuring	  over	  two	  and	  a	  
half	  kilometres.	  The	  combined	  steel	  used	  to	  cast	  the	  poles	  weighs	  up	  to	  seventeen	  
thousand	   kilograms.	   Colossal,	   not	   only	   in	   scale	   and	   weight,	   The	   Lightning	   Field	  
embodies	   the	   very	   essence	   of	   the	   sublime	   natural	   spectacle,	   as	   put	   forward	   by	  
Burke.	  As	  de	  Maria	  himself	  noted,	  “The	  land	  is	  not	  the	  setting	  for	  the	  work	  but	  a	  part	  
of	   the	   work.”	   (de	   Maria	   1980:	   118)	   This	   coalescence	   of	   nature	   and	   installation	  
produces	  a	  lightning	  extravaganza	  of	  monumental	  proportions.	  
	  
Arid,	  lonely	  and	  desolate,	  difficult	  to	  access,	  a	  visit	  to	  The	  Lightning	  Field	  may	  only	  be	  
procured	  through	  the	  Dia	  Art	  Foundation.	  In	  an	  essay	  titled	  Some	  Facts,	  Notes,	  Data,	  
Information,	  Statistics	  and	  Statements	   first	  published	   in	   'Artforum'	   (April	  1980)	   	  de	  
Maria	   recorded	  what	   he	   felt	   to	   be	   the	  most	   ideal	   conditions	   for	   experiencing	  The	  
Lightning	  Field:	  
	  
It	   is	   intended	  that	  the	  work	  be	  viewed	  alone,	  or	   in	  the	  company	  of	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  
people,	  over	  at	   least	  a	  24-­‐hour	  period.	  The	  original	   log	  cabin	   located	  200	  yards	  beyond	  the	  
mid	  point	  of	  the	  northern-­‐most	  row	  has	  been	  restored	  to	  accommodate	  visitors'	  needs...The	  
cabin	  serves	  as	  a	  shelter	  during	  extreme	  weather	  conditions	  or	  storms.	  The	  climate	  is	  semi-­‐
arid;	  eleven	  inches	  of	  rain	  is	  the	  yearly	  average.	  Some-­‐times	  in	  winter,	  The	  Lightning	  Field	  is	  
seen	   in	   light	   snow.	   Occasionally	   in	   spring,	   30-­‐	   to	   50-­‐mile-­‐an-­‐hour	   winds	   blow	   steadily	   for	  
days.	  The	  light	  is	  as	  important	  as	  the	  lightning.	  The	  period	  of	  primary	  lightning	  activity	  is	  from	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late	  May	  through	  early	  September.	  There	  are	  approximately	  60	  days	  per	  year	  when	  thunder	  
and	  lightning	  activity	  can	  be	  witnessed	  from	  The	  Lightning	  Field.	  (de	  Maria	  1980:120)	  
	  
The	   language	   of	   de	   Maria,	   albeit	   somewhat	   matter-­‐of-­‐fact,	   in	   establishing	   this	  
dramatic	  (although	  intrinsically	  modernist)	  spectacle	  and	  scene,	  is	  inflected	  with	  the	  
grandiloquent	  sublime	  as	  put	  forth	  by	  Burke,	  that	  of	  the	  natural	  sublime	  as	  cognitive	  
experience.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  vast	  and	  hostile	  environment	  of	  New	  Mexico	  that	  is	  
The	  Lightening	  Field,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  lightning	  itself	  (the	  'storm')	  act	  as	  
agents	   of	   terror;	   that	   primary	   source	  of	   the	   sublime.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	   lightening	  
especially,	  there	  is	  in	  us	  a	  natural	  trepidation,	  a	  fear.	  Lightening	  is	  dangerous,	  has	  the	  
capacity	   to	   injure	  or	  kill.	  Our	   sense	  of	   self-­‐preservation	   is	   threatened.	  However,	   in	  
The	  Lightening	  Field,	  by	  means	  of	  certain	  interventions	  –	  a	  safe	  viewing	  distance,	  the	  
shelter	  of	   the	   log	   cabin	  –	  our	   fears	   are	   allayed,	   the	   actual	   threat	  of	   pain	  or	  death	  
distanced.	   This	   established	   position	   of	   relative	   safety,	   allows	   in	   the	   viewer	   an	  
intensification	   of	   emotion,	   a	   cognitive	   experience	   of	   the	   sublime.	   In	   viewing	   The	  
Lightning	  Field	  the	   imagination	   is	  assaulted	  by	  pure,	  unadulterated	  nature	   in	  all	   its	  
terrifying	  glory.	  A	  spectacle	  which,	  appreciated	  as	  it	  is,	  becomes	  for	  us	  what	  Lyotard	  
calls	  a	  source	  of	  pleasure.	  Yet	  not	  a	  pleasure	  in	  the	  positive	  sense,	  but	  rather	  a	  sense	  
of	  	  acute	  relief,	  as	  the	  actual	  threat	  of	  danger	  is	  kept	  at	  bay.	  What	  Burke	  refers	  to	  as	  
the	  passion	  of	  astonishment	  –	  that	  strange	  delight.	  “(T)hat	  state	  of	  the	  soul,	  in	  which	  
all	  its	  motions	  are	  suspended	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  horror.”	  (Burke	  2004:101)	  	  
	  
In	   establishing	   terror	   as	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   the	   sublime,	   Burke	   introduces	   critical	  
thematic	  concerns:	  pain,	  death,	  privation.	  “Terrors	  are	  linked	  to	  privation:	  privation	  
of	  light,	  terror	  of	  darkness...privation	  of	  language,	  terror	  of	  silence...privation	  of	  life,	  
terror	   of	   death”	   (Lyotard	   1988:35)	   Burke	   refers	   to	   these	   as	   the	   passions	   of	   self-­‐
preservation,	  which	  when	  experienced	   in	   an	   indirect	   sense,	   are	   sublime	   in	  nature.	  
“The	  passions	  which	  belong	  to	  self-­‐preservation,	  turn	  on	  pain	  and	  danger;	  they	  are	  
simply	  painful	  when	  their	  causes	  immediately	  affect	  us;	  they	  are	  delightful	  when	  we	  
have	   an	   idea	   of	   pain	   and	   danger,	   without	   being	   actually	   in	   such	  
circumstances...Whatever	   excites	   this	   delight,	   I	   call	   sublime”	   (Burke	   2004:97).	   It	   is	  
therefore	   the	   idea,	   rather	   than	   the	   actual	   experience,	   that	   is	   sublime.	   The	   idea	  of	  
	   13	  
death	  –	  pain	  being	  simply	  an	  “emissary	  of	  this	  king	  of	  terrors”	  (Burke	  2004:86)	  –	   is	  
for	  Burke	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  sublimity.	  	  
	  
The	  notions	  of	  death	  and	  of	  self-­‐preservation	  as	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  are	  crucial	  
to	  my	   proposed	   reading	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo's	  Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide,	  a	  
photographic	   project	  which	   is	   in	   essence	   a	   dramatic	   representation	   of	   death.	   An	  
elegy,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   posthumous	   documentation	   of	   genocide.	   This	  
preoccupation	  with	  death,	  the	  idea	  of	  death,	  imbues	  the	  work	  with	  something	  of	  the	  
Burkean	  sublime,	  evoking	  in	  the	  removed	  experience	  of	  the	  viewer	  a	  sense	  of	  horror,	  
and	  also	  of	  relief.	   I	  will	   in	  chapter	  two	  examine	  the	  manner	   in	  which	  the	  Rwandan	  
Genocide	   itself,	   as	   a	   calamitous	   event	   and	   spectacle	   of	   horror	   (as	   presented	   in	  
Hugo's	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide)	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  relevant	  source	  of	  
terror	   and	   the	   sublime.	   Presenting	   his	   body	   of	   work	   as	   an	   appropriate	   visual	  
representation	   of	   the	   sublimity	   of	   terror,	   a	   facsimile	   by	   which	   the	   viewer	  
experiences	  on	  a	  cognitive	  level,	  and	  in	  regards	  to	  a	  sociopolitical	  event,	  something	  
of	   that	   same	   astonishment,	   negative	   pleasure,	   'delight'.	   The	   visual	   arts	   having	   as	  
they	   do	   the	   capacity	   to	   “...transfuse	   their	   passions	   from	   one	   breast	   to	  
another...capable	   of	   grafting	   a	   delight	   on	   wretchedness,	   misery	   and	   death	   itself.”	  
(Burke	  2004:	  91)	  
	  
Immanuel	  Kant's	  contribution	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  sublime	  is	  significant	  –	  a	  central	  
theme	  in	  his	  Critique	  of	  Judgement	  (1892).	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  empirical	  and	  secular	  
approach	  of	  Burke,	  Kant	  stresses	  the	  a	  priori	  nature	  of	  the	  sublime,	  insisting	  on	  the	  
pre-­‐eminence	   of	   reason,	   “....his	   assumption	   that	   objects	   must	   conform	   to	   our	  
cognitions,	   rather	   than	   our	   cognitions	   to	   objects”	   (Shaw	   1998:73).	   Or	   as	   Jacques	  
Derrida	  puts	  it,	  “There	  are	  natural	  objects	  that	  are	  beautiful,	  but	  there	  cannot	  be	  a	  
natural	  object	  that	  is	  sublime.	  The	  true	  sublime...relates	  only	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  reason.”	  
(Derrida	  1978:44)	  
	  
In	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   relevant	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   the	   sublime,	   Kant's	  
offering	  is	  fundamental	  –	  his	  influence	  on	  our	  general	  understanding	  of	  sublimity	  as	  
well	   as	   subsequent	   and	   even	   contemporary	   theorising	   cannot	   be	   ignored.	   Whilst	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Burke	   deals	   more	   blatantly	   with	   notions	   of	   terror,	   self-­‐preservation	   and	   death	   in	  
regards	   to	   the	   sublime,	   Kant	   applies	   notions	   of	   the	   supersensible	   vocation	   –	   the	  
mastery	   of	   reason,	   and	   all	   that	   implies.	   His	   contribution	   is	   critical	   to	   any	   valid	  
historical	   framework	   of	   the	   sublime,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   particular	  
contemporary	  readings	  of	  the	  sublime,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror	  in	  regards	  
to	  the	  sociopolitical.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  I	  have	  drawn	  from	  what	  I	  believe	  
to	  be	  two	  especially	  clear	  and	  concise	  readings	  of	  Kant's	  philosophy	  of	  the	  sublime,	  
namely:	  Philip	  Shaw's	  The	  Sublime	  (2006),	  and	  James	  Kirwan's	  Sublimity	  (2005).	  
	  
Like	  Burke,	  Kant	  draws	  a	  line	  between	  beauty	  and	  the	  sublime;	  beauty	  necessitating	  
a	  state	  of	  serene	  meditation,	  whilst	  the	  sublime	  is	  distinguished	  by	  a	  certain	  mental	  
agitation	   “...a	  movement	   of	   the	   mind	   connected	   with	   the	   judging	   of	   the	   object.”	  
(Kirwan	   2005:53).	   The	   sublime	   for	   Kant	   is	   classed	   in	   two	   predominant	  
manifestations:	  the	  mathematically	  sublime	  being	  that	  derived	  from	  perception,	  and	  
the	   dynamically	   sublime	   that	   from	   desire.	   Of	   these	   two	   categories,	   the	  
mathematically	   and	   dynamically	   sublime,	   the	   former	   pertains	   to	   the	   mind's	  
conception	  of	  infinite	  size,	  the	  latter	  to	  that	  of	  infinite	  power.	  Both	  are	  put	  forth	  as	  
arousing	   a	   similar	   sentiment,	   a	   mental	   conception	   brought	   on	   however	   by	   two	  
differing	  intuitions.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  mathematical,	  our	  reason	  informs	  us	  of	  what	  is	  
in	   fact	   beyond	   us	   –	   that	   is,	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   our	   sense	   or	   imagination.	   The	  
dynamical	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	   the	   individual's	   confrontation	  with	   some	  or	  other	  
spectacle	  of	  power	  or	  greatness,	   subjects	   the	   reason	   to	   the	  humiliation	  of	   its	  own	  
insignificance,	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reaffirming	  the	  essentially	  elevated,	  superior	  
nature	  of	   reason	   itself.	  Our	  humiliation	   is	   “...compensated	   for	  by	   the	   sense	  of	  our	  
moral	  greatness,	  against	  which	  the	  forces	  of	  nature	  are	  powerless.”	  (Eco	  2004:206)	  
	  
The	  mathematically	  sublime	  is	  represented	  as	  that	  which	  equates	  to	  whatever	  gives	  
the	  impression	  of	  overwhelming	  immenseness,	  an	  incommensurability	  of	  sorts.	  The	  
subject,	   at	   the	   receiving	  end	  of	   this	   greatness,	   is	  not	  able	   to	  measure	   the	   sublime	  
'thing'	  according	  to	  any	  given	  set	  of	  rules,	  in	  other	  words	  by	  empirical	  thought;	  but	  
rather	  by	  means	  of	  their	  own	  perception,	  as	  the	  mind	  tries	  to	  grapple	  with	  and	  make	  
sense	   of	   this	   confrontation.	   It	   is	   therefore	   a	   purely	   subjective	   measurement,	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determined	  not	  by	  a	  mathematical	   calculation,	  but	  by	  our	  own	   intuition.	   “It	   is	   this	  
that	  Kant	  believes	  justifies	  situating	  the	  sublime	  not	  in	  things	  themselves	  'but	  only	  in	  
our	   own	   ideas'.”	   (Kirwan	   2005:	   54)	   Thus,	   the	   mathematical	   manifestation	   of	  
sublimity	  comes	  about	   in	  an	  intuitive	  and	  cognisant	  realisation.	  Nature	   is	  therefore	  
sublime,	  in	  that	  its	  sheer	  magnitude	  defies	  being	  quantified	  or	  gauged,	  coercing	  the	  
imagination	   into	   a	   state	   of	   incomprehension.	   Take	   for	   instance	   an	   attempt	   to	  
mentally	   internalise	   the	   vastness	   of	   space,	   the	   cosmos.	   Turning	   to	   some	   unit	   of	  
measurement	  or	  object	  of	   reference,	   the	   length	  of	  a	  blue	  whale	   for	   instance	  –	  the	  
largest	   creature	  known	   to	  man	  –	  and	  by	   it	  determining	  how	  many	   lengths	  of	  blue	  
whale	   it	  would	  take	  to	  traverse	  the	  diameter	  of	  the	  earth,	  the	  distance	  to	  the	  sun,	  
and	  so	  forth.	  According	  to	  Kirwan	  “The	  subject's	  imagination	  can	  only	  take	  in	  part	  of	  
the	  whole	   at	   a	   time,	   for,	   in	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   complete	   an	  apprehension	  of	   this	  
whole,	  what	  was	  first	  apprehended	  is	  no	  longer	  present	  to	  the	  imagination,	  'and	  the	  
comprehension	   is	   never	   complete.”	   (Kirwan	   2005:	   54)	   This	   frustrated	   attempt	   of	  
intuition	   is	  compensated	   for	  by	   the	  mind's	   realisation	  that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   incapable	  of	  
fully	  apprehending	  the	  incommensurable,	  the	  cosmos	  in	  this	  instance.	  	  
	  
Of	   course	   whilst	   nature	   and	   the	   universe	   present	   the	   classic	   exemplars	   of	   this	  
mathematical	   sublime,	   can	   it	   not	  be	  applied	   to	   the	   socio-­‐political	   as	  well,	   to	   gross	  
and	   calamitous	   societal	   events,	   the	   scale,	   the	   sheer	   magnitude	   and	   devastating	  
implications	   of	   which	   we	   find	   ourselves	   unable	   to	  measure	   or	   fully	   comprehend?	  
Viewing	   for	   example	   Santu	   Mofokeng's	   poignant	   visual	   portrait	   of	   Landscapes	   of	  
Trauma	   (1997)	   one	   is	   assaulted	   on	   a	   cognitive	   level	   by	   this	   haunting	   background	  
conglomerate	  of	  horror,	  the	  sheer	  enormity	  and	  emotional	  incalculability	  of	  such	  an	  
event.	   Who	   can	   visualise	   for	   instance	   a	   mound	   of	   over	   six	   million	   bodies,	   or	  
comprehend	  the	  compounded	  tragedy	  of	  such	  an	  occurrence?	  As	   it	   is	  my	   intent	  to	  
apply	  notions	  of	  sublimity	   to	  Pieter	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  –	  
concerned	   as	   it	   is	   with	   another	   monumental	   and	   grievous	   loss	   of	   life	   –	   such	   an	  
application	  of	  Kant's	  mathematical	  sublime	  is	  I	  believe	  of	  particular	  relevance.	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The	   dynamically	   sublime	   occasions	   a	   similar	   experience	   to	   that	   of	   the	  
mathematically	   sublime,	   although	   in	   this	   case,	   an	   encounter	   with	   the	   notion	   of	  
infinite	  power.	  Kant	  paints	  the	  following	  picture:	  	  
	  
(B)old,	  overhanging	  and,	  as	  it	  were,	  threatening	  rocks,	  thunderclouds	  piling	  up	  in	  the	  sky	  and	  
moving	   about	   accompanied	   by	   lightning	   and	   thunderclaps,	   volcanoes	   with	   all	   their	  
destructive	   power,	   hurricanes	   with	   all	   the	   devastation	   they	   leave	   behind,	   the	   boundless	  
ocean	  heaved	  up,	  the	  high	  waterfall	  of	  a	  mighty	  river,	  and	  so	  on.	  Compared	  to	  the	  might	  of	  
any	  of	   these,	  our	  ability	   to	   resist	  becomes	  a	   significant	   trifle.	   (Critique	  of	   Judgement	   1987;	  
quoted	  in	  Shaw	  2006:81-­‐82)	  
	  
Kant's	  proposed	  sublimity,	  the	  dynamical,	  resembles	  that	  of	  the	  Burkean	  concept	  of	  
the	  sublime	  natural	  object.	  An	  encounter	  with	  the	  spectacle	  of	  nature	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  
source	  of	   terror	  –	   to	  be	  viewed	   from	  a	  safe	  distance,	  and	  so	  comprehended	  as	  an	  
experience	  of	   the	   sublime.	   “It	   is	   aroused	  by	  our	   contemplating,	   from	  a	  position	  of	  
safety,	  an	  object	  that	  expresses	  the	  potentially	  lethal	  power	  of	  what	  is	  outside	  us...”	  
(Kirwan	  2005:54).	  As	  with	  Burke,	  the	  natural	  event	  acts	  as	  the	  source	  of	  terror	  –	  the	  
hurricane,	  the	  mighty	  river	  –	  necessitating	  that	  certain	  distance,	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  
safety,	  allaying	  any	  direct	  threat	  and	  so	  allowing	  for	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  
sublime.	  Which	   according	   to	   Kant	   is	   the	  dynamical	   sublime.	  Again,	   de	  Maria's	  The	  
Lightning	  Field	   is	  an	  apt	  demonstration.	  However,	  as	   it	   is	  my	   intention	   in	  exploring	  
Hugo's	   engagement	   with	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   to	   establish	   the	   notion	   of	   the	  
sublimity	  of	  terror	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  sociopolitical,	  it	  is	  my	  proposition	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  
concern	   of	   various	   contemporary	   theorists)	   that	   in	   such	   a	   case	   the	   sociopolitical	  
event	   (being	   as	   it	   is	   of	   sufficient	   significance	   and	   drama)	   supersedes	   the	   more	  
traditional	   natural	   event	   or	   disaster,	   the	   lightning	   and	   thunderclaps.	   “In	   the	  
twentieth	   century,	   the	   genocidal	   catastrophes	   of	   human	   making	   displaced	   the	  
natural	  disaster	  as	  the	  source	  of	  sublime	  feelings	  and	  effects...	  ”	  (Ray	  2005:5)	  In	  this	  
sense	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Burkean	   sublime,	   as	   well	   as	   Kant's	   dynamical	  
sublime,	   can	   be	   assigned	   in	   a	   contemporary	   sense	   to	   particular	   sociopolitical	  
happenings	  –	  such	  as	  the	  Holocaust,	  Hiroshima,	  and	  as	  it	  is	  my	  intention	  to	  insist,	  the	  
Rwandan	  Genocide.	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In	   both	   cases,	   the	   mathematical	   and	   dynamical,	   Kant	   stresses	   the	   role	   and	   pre-­‐
eminence	  of	  reason,	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  awakening	  of	  the	  supersensible	  faculty.	  
The	  mind's	   realisation	   that	   it	   cannot	   fathom	  or	  measure	   the	   infinitely	  great,	  whilst	  
being	   an	   admission	   of	   its	   own	   inability,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   elevates	   reason,	   and	  
establishes	   it	  as	  outside,	  other.	  The	  dominion	  of	  reason	  over	  nature.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  
infinite	  power	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  our	  own	  powerlessness,	  and	  yet	  once	  again	  in	  such	  a	  
realisation,	   by	  means	   of	   this	  awakening,	   establish	   the	   distinction	   between	   reason	  
and	  nature.	  “Sublimity	  is	  a	  revelation	  of	  our	  capacity	  to	  assert	  our	  independence	  in	  
the	   face	   of	   the	   immeasurability	   or	   irresistibility	   of	   nature.”	   (Kirwan	   2005:56)	   The	  
sublime	   therefore	   “...arises	   from	   the	   superiority	  of	   the	   rational	  over	   the	   sensible”.	  
(Kirwan	  2005:63)	  For	  Kant,	  the	  sublime,	  be	  it	  mathematical	  or	  dynamical,	  is	  a	  purely	  
mental	  experience:	  a	  priori,	  a	  product	  of	  the	  supersensible.	  	  
	  
The	  supersensible	  faculty	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  Kantian	  sublime,	  stressing	  absolutely	  
the	   role	   and	   primacy	   of	   human	   reason	   –	   distinguishing	   as	   he	   does	   between	   the	  
nature	   of	   things	   as	   they	   are,	   in	   themselves	   (noumena),	   and	   things	   as	  we	  perceive	  
them	  (phenomena).	   In	  this	  sense,	   the	  overhanging	  cliff	   is	   imbued	  with	  the	  sublime	  
by	   the	   projections	   of	   reason,	   as	   in	   our	   imagining	   of	   its	   ruinous	   collapse,	   and	   the	  
accompanying	   sense	   of	   overwhelming	   helplessness,	   the	   supersensible	   faculty	   is	  
engaged.	  So	  too,	  the	  vastness	  of	  space	  is	  sublime	  only	  on	  account	  of	  our	  inability	  to	  
fully	  comprehend	  it,	  and	  our	  cognition	  of	  this.	  The	  rational	  efforts	  of	  the	  individual,	  
though	   essentially	   insufficient	   and	   incapable,	   achieve	   a	   mastery	   over	   nature	   by	  
means	  of	  their	  preeminence.	  The	  elevated	  state	  of	  reason	  that	  is	  the	  supersensible	  
faculty,	  assigns	   to	   the	  notion	  of	   sublimity	  a	   transcendental	  element.	   “Sublimity	   for	  
Kant	   is	   the	   feeling	   that	   arises	   whenever	   we	   as	   subjects,	   become	   aware	   of	   the	  
transcendental	   dimensions	   of	   experience.	   The	   sublime	   occurs,	   that	   is,	   whenever	  
ideas	  exceed	  the	  application	  of	  a	  concept:	  at	  such	  moments	  the	  mind	  becomes	  alive	  
to	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   faculty	   of	   reason	   transcending	   the	   limits	   of	   our	   sensual	  
existence.”	  (Shaw	  2006:88)	  	  
	  
This	   transcendental	   element	   of	   the	   mathematical	   and	   dynamical	   sublime	   is	  
grounded	  in	  Kant's	  distinction	  between	  sensibility	  and	  reason	  –	  a	  disparity	  within	  the	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individual,	   between	   consciousness	   and	   the	  physical,	   and	  a	   sense	  of	  priority,	  which	  
has	   direct	   moral	   implications.	   For	   Kant	   the	   sublime	   is	   achieved	   by	   means	   of	   the	  
supersensible,	   which	   is	   to	   say	   the	   domination	   of	   reason	   over	   nature,	   and	   thus	  
sensibility.	  It	  is	  the	  establishment	  of,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  domination	  of	  reason	  over	  the	  
sensual,	  a	  fundamental	  ought,	  rooted	   in	  Kant's	  notion	  of	  morality	  –	  the	  categorical	  
imperative.	  	  
	  
To	  understand	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  sublime	  bears	  on	  questions	  of	  morality	  we	  must	  recall	  
one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  conditions	  of	  the	  sublime:	  that	  it	  is	  a	  quality	  of	  mind,	  not	  of	  nature.	  
In	  other	  words,	  in	  stressing	  'freedom'	  of	  the	  will,	  Kant	  is	  not	  saying	  'do	  as	  though	  wilt',	  since	  
this	   implies	   conformity	   to	  natural	  appetite,	  but	   rather	   'do	  as	   though	  should'	   in	  accordance	  
with	  the	  moral	  law.	  The	  dynamical	  sublime,	  in	  which	  consciousness	  realises	  its	  independence	  
from	   nature,	   thus	   compels	   us	   to	   sacrifice	   our	   pleasures,	   substituting	   self-­‐interest	   for	   the	  
disinterested	  love	  of	  the	  good.	  (Shaw	  2006:84)	  
	  
So	  whilst	  an	  example	  of	  a	  sublime	  act	  would	  centre	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice	  
in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  good	  –	  the	  crucifixion,	  the	  total	  stranger	  who	  throws	  himself	  in	  
front	  of	  a	  lorry	  to	  save	  a	  child,	  the	  activist	  who	  endures	  hardship	  and	  persecution	  on	  
account	   of	   their	   political	   ideals	   –	   it	   is	   within	   the	   Kantian	   sublime,	   the	   intended	  
supremacy	   of	   reason	   itself	   over	   sensibility,	   or	   nature,	   that	   implies	   this	   moral	  
dimension.	  Thus,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  secular	  and	  empirical	  approach	  of	  Burke,	  Kant's	  
insistence	   on	   the	   transcendental	   nature	   of	   the	   supersensible,	   and	   the	   associated	  
maxim	   of	   the	   universal	   good,	   attaches	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   sublimity	   a	   certain	  moral	  
obligation	  or	  moral	  element.	  Whilst	  it	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  argue	  for	  
or	  against	  the	  merits	  of	  Kant's	  categorical	  imperative,	  or	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  ideal	  and	  
fundamental	  moral	   law,	   I	  do	  however	  believe	   that	   in	   investigating	   the	  sublimity	  of	  
terror	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   sociopolitical,	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   we	   engage	   with	  
notions	  thereof,	  issues	  of	  morality	  are	  certainly	  worthy	  of	  consideration.	  Do	  we	  not	  
feel	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Holocaust	  a	  total	  contradiction	  of	  our	  inherent	  sense	  of	  what	  
should	  be,	  the	  basic	  tenants	  of	  human	  rights?	  Most	  people	  would	  agree,	  regardless	  
of	   their	   stated	   views	   on	   morality	   or	   the	   transcendental,	   that	   such	   a	   politically	  
engineered	  act	  of	  mass	  violence	  was	  essentially	  wrong.	  Interacting	  with	  imagery	  and	  
documentation	  of	  such	  an	  event,	  or	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  for	  that	  matter,	  our	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response	   is	   underpinned	   by	   a	   sense	   of	  moral	   duty.	   In	   this	   sense,	   our	   response	   of	  
astonishment	  and	  horror	  is	  prompted,	  as	  Kant	  suggests,	  by	  the	  supersensible	  faculty	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  dynamical	  sublime.	  
	  
As	  a	  main	  proponent	  of	  German	  Idealism,	  and	  an	  advocate	  of	  Kant,	  Friedrich	  Schiller	  
in	  his	  own	  works	  and	  writings	  on	  sublimity	  as	  a	  philosophical	  and	  aesthetic	  concern	  
builds	  on	   these	  notions,	   renaming	   to	  his	  own	  purpose	  both	   the	  mathematical	   and	  
dynamical	  sublime.	  	  
	  
In	  regards	  to	  the	  mathematical	  sublime,	  what	  Schiller	  calls	  the	  theoretically-­‐sublime,	  
emphasis	  is	  placed	  upon	  an	  encounter	  with	  that	  which	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  hinder	  or	  
frustrate	   the	  mind's	   faculty	  of	  understanding.	   “The	   theoretical-­‐sublime	   is	  a	   subject	  
matter,	  insofar	  as	  it	  bears	  with	  itself	  the	  conception	  of	  infinity,	  whose	  representation	  
the	  power	  of	  imagination	  feels	  itself	  unequal	  to.”	  (Schiller	  2001:2).	  Thus	  in	  Schiller's	  
estimation	   it	   arises	   from	   the	  mind's	   awareness	  of	   its	   own	   inability,	   an	   imaginative	  
inability	  manifesting	  “...through	  the	  frustration	  of	  the	  'cognitive	  instinct',	  that	  is,	  the	  
instinct	  to	  represent	  things	  to	  ourselves.”	  (Kirwan	  2005:70)	  Like	  Kant,	  Schiller	  brings	  
attention	   to	   the	   faculty	   of	   reason	   –	   so	   engaged,	   the	  mind's	   recognition	   that	   it	   is	  
unable	   to	   fully	   comprehend,	   imagine,	   and	   yet	   on	   account	   of	   this	   realisation	   the	  
assertion	  of	  its	  own	  superiority.	  
	  
To	  the	  dynamical,	  he	  applies	  the	  term	  practically-­‐sublime,	  surfacing	  from	  a	  disparity	  
between	  an	  object	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  privation.	  For	  Schiller	  “The	  practical-­‐sublime	  is	  a	  
subject	  matter,	  insofar	  as	  it	  bears	  with	  itself	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  danger,	  which	  our	  
physical	   strength	   feels	   itself	   unable	   to	   overcome.”	   (Schiller	   2001:2)	   Thus,	   in	   the	  
instance	   of	   the	   practically-­‐sublime,	   emphasis	   is	   placed	   on	   this	   instinct	   for	   self-­‐
preservation,	  being	  as	   it	   is	   triggered	  by	  an	  encounter	  with	  a	   threatening	  object	  or	  
scenario.	   In	   distinguishing	   these	   two	   particular	   types	   of	   sublimity,	   Schiller	   ordains	  
the	  practically-­‐sublime	  as	  being	  the	  more	  eminent	  of	  the	  two,	  seeing	  as	  it	  emerges	  
from	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  one's	  person.	  Arguing	  that	  as	  a	  mental	  experience	  it	  is	  that	  
much	   more	   intense	   on	   account	   of	   its	   engagement	   with	   our	   innate	   sense	   of	   self-­‐
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preservation	   –	   for	   nothing	   he	   insists	   is	   closer	   to	  man,	   as	   a	   physical	   and	   sensuous	  
being,	  than	  his	  concern	  for	  his	  own	  wellbeing,	  his	  existence.	  	  
	  
But	  precisely	  on	   this	  account,	  because	   the	   frightful	   subject	  matter	  acts	  upon	  our	   sensuous	  
nature	   more	   forcefully	   than	   the	   infinite	   one,	   so	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   sensuous	   and	   the	  
transcendental	  capability	  is	  also	  felt	  all	  the	  more	  ardently,	  so	  the	  superiority	  of	  Reason	  and	  
inner	  freedom	  of	  the	  heart	  become	  all	  the	  more	  prominent.	  That	  the	  entire	  essence	  of	  the	  
sublime	   is	   founded	  upon	   the	  consciousness	  of	   this,	  our	   rational	   freedom,	  and	  all	  delight	   in	  
the	  sublime	  is	  grounded	  directly	  on	  this	  consciousness	  alone...	  that	  the	  frightful	  must	  needs	  
touch	   the	   aesthetic	   imagination	   more	   ardently	   and	   pleasantly	   than	   the	   infinite,	   and	   that	  
therefore	  the	  practical	  sublime	  takes	  a	  very	  great	  priority	  over	  the	  theoretical	  in	  strength	  of	  
feeling.	  (Schiller	  2001:3)	  	  
	  
In	   summary	   Schiller	   states,	   “The	   theoretical-­‐sublime	   contradicts	   the	   conception-­‐
drive,	   the	  practical	   sublime	  the	  preservation-­‐drive.”	  –	  and	  once	  more,	   in	  particular	  
justification	  of	  the	  practical-­‐sublime,	  “With	  the	  first	   is	  but	  a	  single	  manifestation	  of	  
the	   sensuous	   conceptual	   power	   challenged,	   but	  with	   the	   second	   is	   challenged	   the	  
final	   basis	   of	   all	   possible	  manifestations	   of	   same,	   namely	   the	   existence.”	   (Schiller	  
2001:3).	  	  
	  
Schiller	  thus	  adheres	  to	  both	  Burkean	  and	  Kantian	  notions	  of	  sublimity,	  in	  particular,	  
Kant's	   dynamical	   sublime.	   Regarding	   Burke,	   in	   his	   evocation	   of	   fear	   and	   privation	  
(emptiness,	  silence,	  darkness),	  his	  confirmation	  of	  terror	  or	  any	  threat	  to	  our	  sense	  
of	  self-­‐preservation	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  the	  sublime.	  As	  with	  Burke,	  he	  stresses	  
however	  the	  requirement	  of	  some	  or	  other	  modification;	  of	  distance,	  safety,	  etc...	  It	  
is,	  implicit	  in	  such	  a	  display	  of	  terror	  and	  power,	  a	  purely	  token	  threat.	  “As	  sublime	  
as	  a	  tempest	  may	  be,	  considered	  from	  the	  shore,	  those	  who	  find	  themselves	  upon	  
the	  ship	  that	   is	  demolished	  by	  same,	  may	  be	  to	  the	  same	  degree	   little	  disposed	  to	  
pronounce	   this	   aesthetic	   judgement	   over	   it.”	   (Schiller	   2001:5)	   However,	   apropos	  
Kant's	  dynamical	  sublime,	  it	  is	  for	  Schiller	  the	  individual's	  ability	  by	  reason's	  mastery	  
of	  the	  senses	  (the	  supersensible)	  to	  transcend	  the	  'token	  threat',	  and	  so	  establish	  it's	  
unique	   individuality,	   that	   qualifies	   the	   sublime	   nature	   of	   the	   experience.	   “To	  
experience	   the	   sublime	   it	   is	   thus	   absolutely	   required,	   that	   we	   see	   ourselves	   fully	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isolated	   from	   every	   physical	   means	   of	   resistance,	   and	   seek	   succour	   in	   our	   non-­‐
physical	  self.”	  (Schiller	  2001:4).	  The	  sublime	  experience	  is	  therefore	  facilitated	  by	  an	  
established	   position	   of	   physical	   safety,	   or	   as	   Schiller	   adds,	   a	  moral	   safety	   –	   apart	  
from	  nature,	  the	  inner	  refuge	  of	  faith.	  The	  experience	  itself	  is,	  according	  to	  Schiller,	  
three	   part:	   firstly	   an	   apprehension	   of	   terror,	   the	   power	   of	   nature;	   secondly,	   the	  
imagined	   influence	   of	   such	   a	   power	   over	   our	   physical	   strength;	   and	   thirdly,	   it's	  
relation	  to	  us	  as	  moral	  beings.	  
	  
Elaborating	   on	   the	   practical	   sublime,	   or	  what	   he	   also	   refers	   to	   as	   the	   sublimity	   of	  
power,	  Schiller	  identifies	  two	  predominant	  forms	  derived	  from	  the	  practical	  sublime,	  
namely	   the	   contemplative	   and	   the	   pathetic.	   The	   contemplative	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	  
classic	   scenario	   of	   the	   spectacle	   of	   nature;	   tempests,	   storms,	   hurricanes,	  
overhanging	  rocks,	  witnessed	  from	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  safety,	  so	  that	  the	  “mental	  
transformation	  of	   this	   object	   into	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   instinct	   of	   self-­‐preservation,	   and	  
the	  subsequent	  exaltation	  of	  the	  moral	  person	  within	  us,	  is	  thus	  merely	  voluntary.”	  
(Kirwan	  2005:72).	  In	  the	  pathetically	  sublime,	  he	  proposes	  what	  he	  believes	  to	  be	  a	  
generally	  more	   accessible	   and	   common	  manifestation.	   The	   pathetically	   sublime	   is,	  
according	   to	   Schiller,	   conjured	   when	   the	   dramatic	   and	   devastating	   effects	   of	   the	  
displayed	  power,	  the	  token	  threat,	  are	  visually	  or	  by	  some	  other	  means	  presented	  to	  
the	   subject,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   contemplative	   in	   which	   such	   consequences	   are	  
visualised	  imaginatively.	  This	  direct	  presentation	  of	  calamity,	  of	  disaster,	  introduces	  
to	  Schiller's	  pathetic	  sublime	  (and	  so	  to	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror)	  the	  notion	  of	  tragedy.	  
	  
On	   account	   of	   this	   presentation	   (of	   tragedy)	   Kirwan	   explains:	   “The	   observer	   now	  
must	   refer	   the	  power	   to	   the	  preservation-­‐instinct,	   and,	  potentially	  at	   least,	   “suffer	  
sympathetically”	  with	   the	   one	  who	   is	   threatened.	   Thus	   the	   pathetically	   sublime	   is	  
constituted	  by	   the	   “image	  of	   another's	   suffering,	   combined	  with	   (the)	  emotion	   (of	  
sympathy)	   and	   the	   consciousness	   of	   the	   moral	   freedom	   within	   us”.	   	   (Kirwan	  
2005:72)	  Or	   in	   Schiller's	   own	  words,	   “The	   conceptualization	  of	   a	   foreign	   suffering,	  
bound	   to	   an	   affective	   state	   and	   the	   consciousness	   of	   our	   inner	  moral	   freedom,	   is	  
pathetically-­‐sublime.”	   (Schiller	   2001:11)	   For	   the	   experience	   to	   qualify	   as	   being	  
pathetically-­‐sublime	  it	  must	  therefore	  incorporate	  these	  two	  principles.	  First,	  that	  in	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the	   presentation	   of	   suffering	   and	   calamity	   we	   feel	   in	   ourselves	   a	   sense	   of	  
compassion,	   or	   more	   specifically	   a	   'co-­‐suffering'	   –	   a	   suffering	   not	   directly	  
experienced	   but	   inferred,	   the	   involuntary	   emotional	   response	   of	   natural	   law.	   It	   is	  
essential	   however,	   that	   the	   aroused	   feeling	   of	   sympathy,	   this	   co-­‐suffering,	   not	  
overwhelm	   the	   subject,	   nor	   press	   too	   closely,	   so	   as	   to	   elicit	   personal	   feelings	   of	  
distress.	  And	  secondly,	  the	  voluntary	  resistance	  of	  reason	  to	  this	  'co-­‐suffering',	  which	  
is	   to	  say	  the	  realisation	  and	   implementation	  of	  our	  moral	   freedom	  in	  regards	  to	   it.	  
Our	   rising	   above	   the	   purely	   natural	   response	   (of	   co-­‐suffering),	   by	   means	   of	   the	  
supersensible	   faculty,	   the	   “inner	   freedom	   of	   the	   heart.”	   (Schiller	   2001:12).	   A	  
freedom	  which	  enables	  us	  to	  transcend	  the	  latent	  threat,	  elevating	  our	  minds	  above	  
the	  exhibition	  of	   tragedy.	   The	   first	   then	  establishes	   the	   subject	  matter	   as	  pathetic	  
whilst	  the	  second	  qualifies	  the	  experience	  as	  sublime.	  
	  
Schiller's	  focus	  on	  co-­‐suffering,	  or	  compassion,	  is	  something	  of	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  
strictly	   empirical	   Burkean	   sublime,	   in	   which	   the	   emotional	   and	   psychological	  
response	   to	   the	   spectacle	   of	   terror,	   that	   astonishment,	   is	   described	   as	   a	   derived	  
sense	  of	  personal	  relief.	  Informed	  by	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  Kant's	  dynamically	  sublime,	  
and	  the	  supersensible	  faculty,	  Schiller	  applies	  to	  the	  spectacle	  of	  terror,	  of	  calamity,	  
the	  two-­‐fold	  response	  of	  compassion	  and	  moral	  freedom,	  our	  sense	  of	  responsibility.	  
These	  developments	  within	  the	  discourse	  of	  sublimity,	  and	  particularly	  the	  sublimity	  
of	   terror	   –	   from	   the	   Burkean	   sublime,	   to	   the	   dynamical	   sublime	   of	   Kant,	   and	  
Schiller's	  sublimity	  of	  power	  –	  are	  crucial,	  informing	  as	  they	  do,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  our	  
general	   understanding	   of	   the	   term.	   As	   it	   is	  my	   intention	   in	   this	   paper	   to	   apply	   to	  
Pieter	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  notions	  of	  sublimity	  in	  regards	  to	  
terror,	   these	   principles	   form	   the	   fundamental	   theoretical	   framework	   of	   such	   an	  
enterprise.	  	  
	  
Schiller's	  contribution	  to	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  sublime	  is	  of	  further	  interest	  in	  that	  as	  
a	   poet	   he	   applies	   to	   it	   aesthetic	   concerns.	  His	   pathetically-­‐sublime	  being	   as	   it	   is	   a	  
derived	  experience,	  our	  emotional	  and	  cognitive	  response	  to	  a	  represented	  calamity,	  
the	  portrayed	  ramifications	  of	  power	  –	  claiming	  as	  he	  does,	  that	  from	  the	  principles	  
thereof	   	   “...flow	   both	   the	   fundamental	   laws	   of	   all	   tragic	   art.”	   (Schiller	   2001:12)	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Schiller	  here	  presents	  the	  tragic	  work	  as	  a	  valid	  facsimile	  of	  suffering,	  of	  calamity	  and	  
terror,	   capable	   of	   engaging	   the	   viewer	   in	   that	   co-­‐suffering	   and	   facilitating	   the	  
sublime	  qualities	  of	  reason	  and	  moral	  freedom.	  Art	  in	  this	  sense,	  and	  as	  a	  product	  of	  
German	   Romanticism,	   “...endeavours	   therefore...to	   bridge	   the	   gulf	   between	  
noumena	  and	  phenomena...”	  (Shaw	  2006:	  92)	  This	  condoning	  of	  art	  practice,	  in	  the	  
tragic	  sense,	  as	  an	  effective	  conduit	  and	  means	  of	  representation	   in	  regards	  to	  the	  
sublime	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  here.	  For	  whilst	  it	  applies	  in	  the	  Romantic	  context	  to	  
works	   like	   J.M.W	   Turner's	  Wreck	   of	   a	   Transport	   Ship	   (1810)	   or	   Francisco	   Goya's	  
politically	   induced	   scenario	  of	   tragedy	  and	   the	  horrors	  of	  war,	   Third	  of	  May,	   1808	  
(1814),	   so	   in	   a	   contemporary	   sense	   it	   surely	   applies	   to	   works	   like	   Hugo's	  
photographic	   elegy	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   –	   a	  work	  which	  engages	  
with	  themes	  of	  overwhelming	  tragedy,	  terror	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  power.	  Such	  an	  
application	  of	  the	  sociopolitical	  to	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror	  is	  I	  feel	  fundamental	  to	  an	  
appropriate	  reading	  of	  such	  a	  work	  –	  a	  notion	  to	  be	  further	  examined.	  
	  
As	   with	   Schiller	   and	   the	   German	   Idealists,	   the	   embodiment	   of	   the	   sublime	   in	  
literature	   and	   art	   was	   a	   major	   concern	   of	   the	   English	   Romantics,	   who	   sought	   in	  
poetry	   especially	   “...to	   bring	   the	   supersensible	   back	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   sensuous	  
representation.”	   (Shaw	   2006:92)	   In	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	   Neo-­‐Platonics,	   Burke	   and	  
Kant,	  and	  charged	  by	   the	  cult	  of	  nature	  as	  championed	  by	   Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau,	  
theirs	  was	  an	  age	  of	  idealism;	  of	  the	  travelling	  voyeur	  transfixed	  by	  the	  spectacle	  of	  
grandeur,	   sensing	   therein	   intimations	   of	   divinity,	   eternity.	   A	   Romantic	   sublime	  
“...related	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  nature...the	  savage,	   incomprehensible	  power	  outside	  
ourselves.”	  (Clark	  1969:217).	  	  
	  
	   The	  immeasurable	  height	  
Of	  woods	  decaying,	  never	  to	  be	  decayed,	  
The	  stationary	  blasts	  of	  water-­‐falls,	  
And	  everywhere	  along	  the	  hollow	  rent	  
Winds	  thwarting	  winds,	  bewildered	  and	  forlorn,	  
The	  torrents	  shooting	  from	  the	  clear	  blue	  sky,	  
The	  rocks	  that	  muttered	  close	  upon	  our	  ears,	  
Black	  drizzling	  crags	  that	  spake	  by	  the	  way-­‐side	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As	  if	  a	  voice	  were	  in	  them,	  the	  sick	  sight	  
And	  giddy	  prospect	  of	  the	  raving	  stream,	  
The	  unfettered	  clouds	  and	  regions	  of	  the	  heavens,	  
Tumult	  and	  peace,	  the	  darkness	  and	  the	  light	  
Were	  all	  workings	  of	  one	  mind,	  the	  features	  
Of	  the	  same	  face,	  blossoms	  upon	  one	  tree,	  
Characters	  of	  the	  great	  Apocalypse,	  
The	  types	  and	  symbols	  of	  Eternity,	  
Of	  first	  and	  last,	  and	  midst,	  and	  without	  end.	  
	  
William	  Wordsworth,	  The	  Prelude,	  Book	  Six,	  lines	  556-­‐72	  (Wordsworth	  2004:	  245)	  
	  
With	  Keats,	  Coleridge,	   the	  Byronic	  Hero,	   the	  egotistical	  or	  Wordsworthian	   sublime	  
“the	  writing	  of	  this	  period	  practically	  codifies	  the	  sublimity	  of	  nature	  for	  us.”	  (Kirwan	  
2005:120).	  As	  a	  poet	  and	  philosopher	  (like	  Schiller),	  Samuel	  Taylor	  Coleridge,	  whose	  
thoughts	   on	   the	   sublime	   grounded	   in	   Christian	   theology	   and	   the	   notion	   of	   the	  
embodied	  word	  (the	  Word	  as	  flesh),	  referenced	  very	  much	  those	  of	  Kant,	  insisted	  on	  
“...the	  ability	  of	   imagination	   to	   regard	  objects	  of	   sense	  as	   symbolic	  of	   the	  eternal”	  
(Shaw	  2006:94)	   Explaining	   further	   he	  presents	   the	   example	  of	   a	   circle;	  which	   as	   a	  
shape,	  perfect	  and	  pleasing,	  is	  merely	  beautiful.	  And	  yet	  before	  it	   in	  contemplation	  
of	   eternity,	   the	   experience	   is	   sublime.	   As	   in	   this	   sense	   the	   sublime,	   though	   itself	  
formless	  and	   informed	  only	  by	  the	   imagination,	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  mountain	  
range,	  storm	  or	  other	  sensory	  object/experience	  (a	  circle	  even),	  so	  Coleridge	  sought	  
in	   the	   idiom	   of	   poetry	   to	   represent	   the	   sublime.	   In	   his	   allusion	   to	   the	   eternal,	   to	  
facilitate	  the	  sublime	  experience.	  	  
	  
Rejoicing	   almost	   in	   the	   inability	   of	   words	   themselves	   to	   convey,	   to	   capture	   the	  
unrepresentable,	  he	  presents	   the	  poem	  as	  symbol,	  a	  metaphor	  of	   the	  sublime.	  His	  
intention	  as	  poet	  being	  “...the	  substitution	  of	  a	  sublime	  feeling	  of	  the	  unimaginable	  
for	  a	  mere	   image.”	   (Shaw	  2006:98).	  As	  with	  Kant,	  and	  Schiller	   for	   that	  matter,	   the	  
sublime	   for	   Coleridge	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   feeling,	   a	   sort	   of	   elevation	   as	   reason	  
encounters	   the	   limit	   of	   its	   own	   understanding.	   The	   capacity	   however	   in	   this	  
engagement	  of	  the	  imagination	  of	  poetry	  to	  act	  as	  symbol,	  as	  metaphor,	  in	  regards	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to	   the	   sublime	   –	   as	   would	   the	   natural	   spectacle	   –	   is	   of	   particular	   significance.	  
Reinforcing	   as	   it	   does	   the	   idea	   of	   art	   as	   a	   valid	   means	   of	   representation	   and	  
mediation	  within	  the	  sublime	  experience.	  Coleridge	  and	  his	  poet	  contemporaries,	  in	  
conjunction	  with	   the	  visual	  output	  of	   the	  age	  –	  Turner,	   Friedrich,	  Gericault	  et	  al	   –	  
demonstrates	  within	  the	  arts	  such	  an	  embodiment	  of	  sublimity.	  
	  
After	   something	   of	   a	   hiatus,	   interest	   in	   the	   sublime	   resumed	   in	   the	   1940's	   with	  
Barnett	  Newman	  and	  the	  New	  York	  School.	  A	  product	  of	  the	  modernist	  ideology	  of	  
Abstract	   Expressionism,	   shared	   by	   painters	   like	   Mark	   Rothko,	   Ad	   Reinhardt	   and	  
Robert	  Motherwell,	  Newman's	  essay	  The	  Sublime	  is	  Now	  (1948)	  argues	  the	  case	  for	  
sublimity	   in	   non-­‐representational	   art.	   Whilst	   reinforcing	   this	   special	   relationship	  
between	   the	   sublime	   and	   art	   practice,	   Newman	   rejects	   the	   'redundant'	  
representational	  devices	  of	  Western	  European	  painting,	  “...the	  obsolete	  props	  of	  an	  
outmoded	   and	   antiquated	   legend”	   in	   favour	   of	   “images	   whose	   reality	   is	   self-­‐
evident.”	   (Newman	   1948:27).	   In	  works	   such	   as	  Vir	  Heroicus	   Sublimis	   (1951),	   large	  
(2.42	  x	  5.42m)	  and	  bereft	  of	  any	  realist	  subject,	  with	  none	  of	  the	  dramatic	  content	  of	  
the	   Romantic	   sublime,	  Newman	  did	   however	   consciously	   intend	   in	   his	   use	   of	   vast	  
fields	  of	  colour	   to	  create,	   though	   in	  accordance	  with	  a	  more	  contemporary	  model,	  
work	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   a	   'tragic'	   or	   'sublime'	   art,	   as	   established	   by	   Schiller	   and	  
others.	   Though	   essentially	   abstract,	   “...the	   subject	   was	   to	   be	   tragic	   and	   timeless,	  
cosmic	   in	   its	   import,	   filled	  with	  an	  almost	  religious	  mystery.”	   (Salcman	  2002:01)	  As	  
critic	  Arthur	  Danto	  notes	  of	  the	  negative	  pleasure	  derived	  from	  such	  abstraction,	  “(It	  
is)	   something	   deeper	   than	   pleasure	  which	   holds	   us	   in	   front	   of	   the	   paintings,	   as	   if	  
waiting	   for	   the	   disclosure	   of	   a	   possibly	   shattering	   truth.”	   (quoted	   in	   McEvilly	  
2001:169)	  Thus	  of	  Newman's	  modernist	  application	  of	   the	  sublime,	  Lyotard	  states,	  
“(W)hen	  he	   seeks	   sublimity	   in	   the	   here-­‐and-­‐now	  he	  breaks	  with	   the	   eloquence	  of	  
romantic	  art	  but	  he	  does	  not	  reject	  its	  fundamental	  task,	  that	  of	  bearing	  pictorial	  or	  
otherwise	  expressive	  witness	  to	  the	  inexpressible.”	  (Lyotard	  1991:92,93)	  	  
	  
Unsympathetic	  as	  he	  is	  to	  the	  romantic	  project,	  Newman	  in	  his	  quest	  for	  the	  sublime	  
does	   not	   look	   to	   heroic	   verse	   nor	   the	   spectacle	   of	   nature	   but	   rather	   the	   painting	  
itself	   as	   (art)	   object,	   and	   nothing	   beyond	   its	   ‘sublime’	   borders.	   The	   ability	   of	   the	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work	  itself	  to	  render	  the	  viewer	  stunned,	  into	  what	  Lyotard	  would	  designate	  a	  state	  
of	   ‘agitation’	   or	   ‘shock’	   -­‐	   a	   suspension	   of	   reason.	   Newman's	   presentation	   of	   as	   it	  
were	  a	  complete	  blankness,	  a	   threatening	  and	  ominous	  nothingness,	  marks,	   in	   the	  
Burkean	  sense	  of	  deferred	  privation,	  the	  sublime	  experience.	  The	  viewer,	  confronted	  
by	  the	  spectacle	  (of	  privation)	  that	  is	  the	  art	  object,	  feels	  in	  the	  resultant	  'shock'	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  supersensible	  experience	  of	  Kant)	  an	  experience	  of	  the	  sublime	  not	  
unlike	  the	  astonishment	  of	  Burke.	  
	  
The	   titles	   of	   many	   of	   his	   works	   further	   indicates	   this	   desire	   to	   resist	   the	  
transcendental:	  Here	  I,	  Here	  II,	  Here	  III	  and	  others	  such	  as	  Not	  Over	  There,	  Here	  and	  
Now.	  Lyotard	  identifies	  Newman's	  preoccupation	  with	  time,	  the	  ‘now’,	  as	  that	  which	  
“...dismantles	  consciousness,	  what	  deposes	  consciousness,	   it	   is	  what	  consciousness	  
cannot	  formulate...Or	  rather,	  and	  more	  simply,	  that	   it	  happens...Not	  a	  major	  event	  
in	  the	  media	  sense,	  not	  even	  a	  small	  event.	  Just	  an	  occurrence.”	  	  (Lyotard	  1991:90)	  
The	   non-­‐representational	   painting	   points	   to	   itself,	   and	   it	   is	   the	   painting	   as	  
occurrence	   which	   allows	   for	   the	   sublime.	   Lyotard	   elaborates,	   “The	   art-­‐object	   no	  
longer	   bends	   itself	   to	   models,	   but	   tries	   to	   present	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   an	  
unpresentable...”	  (1991:101)	  For	  Lyotard,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  Newman’s	  bare	  colour	  
fields	  signal	  an	  ‘absolutely	  other’	  in	  their	  resistance	  to	  form	  and	  subject.	  Anna’s	  Light	  
(1968)	   captures	   something	   of	   this	   indeterminacy	   of	   form.	   A	   large	   plane	   of	   red	  
(measuring	   2.76	   by	   6.11	   metres)	   flanked	   by	   white	   ’zips’	   -­‐	   with	   little	   or	   no	   tonal	  
variance	   in	   areas.	   The	   vista	   of	   red	   renders	   the	   viewer	   ‘stunned’.	   According	   to	  
Lyotard,	  Newman’s	  work,	   and	   in	   this	   case	  Anna’s	   Light	   (1968)	   “...leaves	   us	  with	   a	  
profound	   sense	   of	   its	   fragility,	   of	   a	   sense	   of	   being	   teetering	   on	   the	   edge	   of	  
nothingness.	   The	   boundary	   separating	   something	   from	   nothing,	   the	   pleasure	   of	  
creation	  from	  the	  terror	  of	  privation,	  is	  slight,	  but	  it	  is	  enough...to	  make	  us	  feel	  the	  
sublime.”	  (quoted	  in	  Shaw	  2006:122)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	   this	   sense	  of	   'privation'	   the	  work	  of	  Newman,	   the	  art	  object	   as	   such,	   is	   imbued	  
with	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror.	  Significant	  to	  this	  study	   is	  the	  fundamental	  role	  of	  the	  
artwork	   in	   this,	   being	   as	   it	   is	   the	   primary	   source	   of	   terror	   and	   the	   sublime	  
experience.	   Though	   achieved	   by	   Newman	   within	   the	   purely	   abstract,	   I	   will	   later	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examine	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   same	   may	   apply	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Hugo,	   a	  
photographer	   whose	   portrayals	   of	   genocide	   (as	   art	   objects)	   are	   in	   themselves	  
representations	  of	  as	   it	  were	  the	  unrepresentable,	  though	  in	  a	  sociopolitical	  sense.	  
Visual	  documentation	  which	  becomes	   like	  Newman's	  art	  object	  a	  vehicle	  of	   terror.	  
Of	  further	  import	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Newman's	  sublimity	  of	  the	  now	  heralds	  the	  
transition	  of	  the	  sublime	  as	  a	  concern	  from	  the	  romantic,	  to	  the	  modernist	  and	  into	  
the	   postmodern	   era.	   “Like	   Newman's	   painting...postmodernity	   does	   not	   work	   to	  
confirm	   the	   familiar	   or	   to	   reveal	   the	   transcendental	   but	   rather	   to	   precipitate	   the	  
emergence	   of	   the	   'now'”	   (Shaw	   2006:123),	   and	   it	   is	   in	   this	   'now'	   that	   the	  
unrepresentable	  is	  manifest	  as	  sublime.	  
	  
The	   difference	   between	   Romanticism,	   modernism	   and	   postmodernism	   can	   therefore	   be	  
measured	  in	  their	  contrasting	  attitudes	  to	  the	  unpresentable.	  Where	  Romantic	  art	  tends,	  on	  
the	   whole,	   to	   link	   the	   unpresentable	   with	   ideas	   of	   the	   divine	   or,	   in	   its	   humanist	  
manifestation,	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  mind,	  postmodern	  culture	  endeavours	  to	  retain	  a	  sense	  
of	  the	  unpresentable	  as	  absolutely	  other.	  (Shaw	  2006:115-­‐116)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
This	  revision	  of	  the	  postmodern	  is	  upheld	  in	  Jacques	  Derrida's	  The	  Truth	  in	  Painting	  
(1978,87).	  Derrida's	  argument,	  a	  modification	  of	  Kant,	  and	  in	  reference	  to	  his	  notion	  
of	  parergon,	  centres	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  limit,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  requirement	  of	  a	  
frame.	   In	   regards	   to	   infinity	   for	   example,	   the	   limit	   of	   imagination	   to	   grasp	   its	  
entirety,	   and	   yet	   on	   account	   of	   the	   unbounded	   nature	   of	   reason,	   our	   ability	   to	  
present	  or	  as	  he	  puts	   it	   'frame'	  this	   limit.	  “It	   is	   'the	  ability	  thus	  to	  present	  our	  very	  
inability	   to	   comprehend'	   that	   constitutes	   the	   true	   sublime.”	   (Shaw	   2006:116).	   For	  
Derrida	   the	   sublime	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   double-­‐edged;	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   limited	   on	  
account	   of	   the	   inability	   of	   imagination	   to	   present	   the	   unpresentable,	   and	   on	   the	  
other,	   unlimited	   on	   account	   of	   reason's	   presentation	   of	   the	   unpresentable.	   The	  
sublime	  –	   this	   limit	  of	   conception/imagination	   framed	  by	   reason	  –	   links	  as	   it	  were	  
“the	   disparate	   yet	   interconnected	   realms	   of	   pure	   and	   practical	   reason.”(Shaw	  
2006:119)	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Essentially,	   Derrida's	   reading	   holds	   to	   Kantian	   principles	   of	   the	   sublime	   as	   neither	  
strictly	  material	   nor	   immaterial,	   of	   the	   bounded	   nor	   the	   unbounded,	   but	   rather	   a	  
product	   of	   reason,	   the	   structure	   or	   philosophical	   framework	   required	   for	   the	  
coalescence	  of	  the	  two.	  “That	  the	  sublime	  should	  not	  be	  pure	  or	  practical,	  formal	  or	  
material,	   outside	   or	   inside,	   suggests	   again	   that	   it	   is	   a	   framing	   effect...”	   (Shaw	  
2006:120).	   It	   is	  however	   in	   the	  application	  of	  his	  deconstructive	  methodology	   that	  
Derrida	   deviates	   from	   the	   proto-­‐Romantic	  model	   of	   Kant.	   In	   his	   treatment	   of	   the	  
sublime	  as	  a	  construct,	  a	  philosophical	  system	  –	  what	  Shaw	  (2006:120)	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  
'textual	   supplement'	   –	   Derrida	   denies	   the	   supersensible	   dynamic	   of	   the	   Kantian	  
sublime,	   delineating	   it	   as	  mere	   by-­‐product,	   the	   resultant	   spin-­‐off	   of	   the	   discourse	  
itself	   and	   thus	   ostensibly	   transcendental.	   Derrida	   reflects	   here	   the	   general	   and	  
overarching	   scepticism	   of	   postmodernism	   in	   regards	   to	   meta-­‐narratives	   such	   as	  
'nature,	  the	  divine	  or	  reason'	  –	  holding,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  sublime,	  to	  Romantic	  and	  
Kantian	  notions	  of	  the	  unpresentable,	  and	  yet	  no	  longer	  seeking	  to	  temper	  these	  by	  
reference	  to	  the	  supersensible	  faculty	  or	  noumenal	  other.	  (Shaw	  2006:115)	  
	  
Lyotard	  too	  insists	  that	  the	  sublime	  in	  the	  postmodern	  context	  is	  rather	  than	  a	  total	  
break	   from	   the	   Kantian	   model,	   a	   radicalisation	   of	   it.	   Illustrating	   as	   it	   does	   “the	  
incommensurability	  of	  reality	  to	  concept	  which	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  Kantian	  philosophy	  
of	  the	  mind.”	  (Shaw	  2006:116)	  He	  stresses	  the	  postmodern	  agenda,	  in	  regards	  to	  art	  
and	  the	  sublime,	  as	  that	  of	  demonstrating	  the	  unpresentable	  as	  presentation	  itself	  –	  
citing	   in	  example	  Kazimir	  Malevich's	  Suprematist	  Painting	   (1917-­‐18).	  For	  Lyotard,	  a	  
work	   of	   total	   abstraction	   has,	   as	   such	   a	   presentation	   of	   the	   unpresentable,	   the	  
sustained	   capacity	   to	   shock,	   and	   so	   encourage	   in	   the	   viewer	   the	   suspension	   of	  
reason.	   This	   wow!	   of	   the	   now	   marks	   as	   Kirwan	   notes	   a	   shift	   in	   Lyotard's	   thinking	  
from	   his	   'highly	   selective'	   reading	   of	   Kant	   to	   a	   more	   contemporary,	   postmodern	  
application	   of	   the	   Burkean	   sublime;	   demanding	   of	   art	   a	   'greater	   immediacy'.	   The	  
avante-­‐garde	   in	   its	   practice,	   flouting	   'taste',	   dismantling	   the	   pleasing	   mould	   of	  
established	   aesthetics,	   of	   beauty	   that	   is,	   in	   favour	   of	   an	   ever	   greater	   capacity	   to	  
shock.	  (Kirwan	  2005:147).	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Shock	   is,	   par	   excellence,	   the	   evidence	   of	   (something)	   happening,	   rather	   than	   nothing,	  
suspended	  privation...	  (The	  avant-­‐garde)	  attempts	  combinations	  allowing	  the	  event.	  The	  art-­‐
lover	  does	  not	  experience	  a	  simple	  pleasure,	  or	  derive	  some	  ethical	  benefit	  from	  his	  contact	  
with	   the	   art,	   but	   expects	   an	   intensification	   of	   his	   conceptual	   and	   emotional	   capacity,	   an	  
ambivalent	  enjoyment.	  Intensity	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  ontological	  dislocation.	  The	  art-­‐object	  
no	  longer	  bends	  itself	  to	  models,	  but	  tries	  to	  present	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  an	  unpresentable.	  
(Lyotard	  1991:100)	  	  
	  
The	  object	  of	  the	  sublime	  is	  thus	  qualified	  by	  its	  resistance	  to	  the	  mind,	  this	  ability	  to	  
shock:	   “It	   is	   presence	   as	   unpresentable	   to	   the	   mind,	   always	   withdrawn	   from	   its	  
grasp.	   It	   does	   not	   offer	   itself	   to	   dialogue	   and	   dialectic.”	   (Lyotard	   1991:142)	   In	   his	  
essay	   After	   the	   Sublime,	   the	   State	   of	   Aesthetics	   (1991),	   Lyotard	   points	   to	   the	  
paradoxical	   nature	   of	  what	   he	   calls	   'sublime	  matter'	   –	   referring	   to	   this	  manner	   in	  
which	   the	   sublime	   'object'	   resists	   both	   form	   and	   concept.	   As	   an	   object	   (matter)	  
becomes	  material	   only	   on	   account	   of	   the	   processes	   of	  mind	   (reason),	   so	   sublime	  
matter	  is	  thus	  immaterial,	  occupying	  the	  liminal	  space	  of	  the	  sublime	  happening	  (the	  
suspension	  of	  reason).	  “The	  matter	   I'm	  talking	  about	   is	   'immaterial',	  an-­‐objectable,	  
because	  it	  can	  only	  'take	  place'	  or	  find	  its	  occasion	  at	  the	  price	  of	  suspending	  these	  
active	  powers	  of	  the	  mind.”	  (Lyotard	  1991:	  140)	  These	  radicalisations	  of	  the	  Kantian	  
and	   Burkean	   sublime	   link	   directly	   to	   his	   commentary	   on	   Newman's	   treatise	   The	  
Sublime	  is	  Now	  (1948)	  –	  reinforcing	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  art	  object	  in	  its	  presentation	  of	  
the	  unpresentable	  as	  a	  valid	  mode	  of	  the	  postmodern	  sublime.	  	  
	  
And	   so	   Lyotard	   presents	   the	   avante-­‐garde	   art	   object	   as	   sublime	   matter;	   able	   to	  
present	  the	  unpresentable,	  and	  in	  the	  paradox	  of	  so	  doing,	  in	  the	  resultant	  shock	  of	  
privation,	   the	   happening,	   sustain	   the	   suspension	   of	   reason	   that	   is	   the	   sublime.	  
Having	  in	  the	  Kantian	  sense	  a	  more	  mathematical	  approach	  (concerned	  as	  he	  is	  with	  
the	  incommensurability	  of	  object	  and	  idea)	  Lyotard	  considers	  in	  the	  purely	  abstract,	  
in	   the	   non-­‐representational	   art	   objects	   of	   Malevich,	   Newman	   and	   others,	   this	  
presentation	   of	   the	   unpresentable.	   However,	   as	   it	   is	  my	   intention	   in	   this	   study	   to	  
examine	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	  work	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo,	   and	   in	   particular	  Rwanda	  
2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   (a	   purely	   representational	   photographic	   body)	  
embodies	  within	   this	   postmodern	  milieu	   (these	   radicalisations	   of	   Burke	   and	   Kant)	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similar	   notions	   of	   the	   sublime,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	   the	   manner	   in	   which	  
certain	  sociopolitical	  happenings	  qualify	  as	  being	  in	  themselves,	  on	  account	  of	  their	  
scale,	   and	   the	   incomunicable	   horror	   involved,	   inherently	   unpresentable.	   And	   how	  
the	   'aestheticising'	   of	   such,	   by	   means	   of	   the	   art	   object,	   can	   be	   seen	   (in	   a	   more	  
dynamical	  sense)	  as	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  unpresentable.	  
	  
If	  there	  was	  a	  politics	  of	  the	  sublime,	  Lyotard	  claimed	  it	  would	  be	  one	  of	  terror	  –	  the	  
inevitable	  crisis	  of	  attempting	  to	  embody	  within	  the	  object	  of	  a	  political	  system,	  the	  
indeterminate	  notion	  of	   justice.	   In	  Nazism	  for	   instance,	  being	   just	  such	  an	  attempt	  
and	   resultant	   display	   of	   terror,	   “the	   spectator	   is	   struck	   with	   astonishment,	   is	  
rendered	   'dumb,	   immobilised,	   (and)	   as	   good	   as	   dead.'”	   (Shaw	   2006:126)	   Thus	   for	  
Lyotard,	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   environment,	   the	   universal	   ideals	   of	   Kant,	   the	   Romantic	  
synthesis	   of	   Schiller	   and	   others	   –	   figures	   like	   poet	   Matthew	   Arnold	   (1822)	   who	  
championed	   in	   regards	   to	  an	  appreciation	  of	   the	  sublime	  the	  State	  as	   just	   such	  an	  
embodiment,	  an	  “organ	  of	  our	  collective	  best	  self...	  (our)	  national	  right	  reason”	  (Ryle	  
2002:45)	  –	  are	  essentially	  misguided.	  Lyotard	  counters	  such	  attempts	  to	  embody	  and	  
to	   synthesise	   the	   empirical	   and	   indeterminate	   (idea	   and	   object),	   by	   means	   of	   an	  
understanding	   of	   “an	   aesthetic	   of	   the	   sublime	   in	   politics.”	   (Shaw	   2006:126).	   He	  
substantiates	  this	  in	  his	  insistence	  that	  for	  ideas	  as	  such,	  being	  indeterminate,	  there	  
are	   no	   objects	   of	   true	   representation,	   only	   analogy.	   Such	   analoga	   allow	   ideas	   –	  
which	   being	   the	   product	   of	   intuition,	   resist	   objectification	   –	   to	   be	   judged	   (by	  
analogy)	   as	   though	   they	   were	   determinate,	   objectified.	   In	   this	   sense	   the	  
unpresentable	  notion	  of	  a	  supreme	  being	  is	  presented	  allegorically,	  symbolically,	  by	  
reference	   to	  God	  as	  Father.	   In	   application	   to	   the	  political,	   Lyotard	   refers	   to	  Kant's	  
reflections	   on	   the	   French	   Revolution,	   in	   which	   he	   establishes	   the	   feeling	   of	  
enthusiasm	   invoked	   in	   those	   witnessing	   the	   event,	   as	   sublime	   –	   being	   as	   it	   is	   a	  
manifestation	   of	   a	   transcendental	   idea,	   that	   of	   human	   progress.	   “The	   enthusiasm	  
they	  feel	   'is	  a	  modality	  of	  the	  sublime	  feeling'	  by	  which,	   in	  Lyotard's	  terms,	  we	  are	  
called	  to	  supply	  'a	  presentation	  for	  the	  unpresentable	  and	  thus,	  in	  terms	  of	  Ideas,	  to	  
go	  beyond	  anything	  that	  can	  be	  presented'.”	  (Shaw	  2006:127)	  Thus	  for	  Lyotard	  there	  
can	  be	  no	  presentation	  of	  the	  event	  as	  an	  embodiment	  of	  an	  indeterminate	  idea	  like	  
'the	  progress	  of	  man'	  –	  due	  to	  the	  irreconcilability	  of	  idea	  and	  object	  –	  but	  only	  the	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sublime	  feeling	  thereof,	   incited	  by	  the	  event	   itself.	  On	  account	  of	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  
the	  sublime	  in	  politics	  (this	  understanding	  of	  analogy)	  the	  feeling,	  this	  enthusiasm,	  is	  
itself	  the	  presentation,	  the	  symbol,	  the	  sign	  of	  history.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Lyotard	  applies	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  sublime	  
in	   politics	   by	   the	   addition	   of	   his	   notion	   of	   the	   differend	   –	   the	   idea	   that	   of	   such	  
horrific	  events	  as	  Hiroshima	  and	  the	  Holocaust,	  no	  current	  mode	  of	  expression	  exists	  
by	   which	   to	   properly	   express	   them.	   “In	   terms	   of	   the	   sublime,	   the	   pain	   of	   the	  
Holocaust	   is	  such	  that	   it	  exceeds	  our	  ability	  to	  supply	  a	  concept.”	   (Shaw	  2006:128)	  
Or	  as	  Susan	  Sontag	  notes	  of	  World	  War	   I,	   “...the	  daily	  slaughter	   in	   the	   trenches	  of	  
the	   Western	   Front	   seemed	   to	   many	   to	   have	   exceeded	   the	   capacity	   of	   words	   to	  
describe.”	   (Sontag	   2004:22)	   So	   it	   goes	   that	   the	   sublime	   feeling	   (of	   pain,	   horror)	  
generated	   by	   such	   apocalyptic	   sociopolitical	   occurrences	   can	   only	   be	   expressed	   in	  
such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  acknowledge	  this	  lack.	  The	  lack	  being	  in	  this	  case	  the	  analogy,	  the	  
sign.	  As	  it	  is	  argued,	  “(T)he	  Holocaust	  is	  'known'	  only	  by	  refusing	  to	  phrase	  it	  in	  terms	  
of	   a	   judgement	   of	   understanding;	   for	   what	   the	   Holocaust	   signifies	   is	   nothing	   less	  
than	  the	  impossibility	  of	  such	  knowledge.”	  (Shaw	  2006:128)	  In	  his	  differend	  Lyotard	  
suggests	  that	  sociopolitical	  events	  of	  sufficient	  magnitude	  and	  horror	  can	  indeed	  be	  
understood	  as	  unpresentable	  –	  beyond	  our	  ability	  to	  phrase	  or	  in	  their	  tragic	  entirety	  
encapsulate.	  Returning	  to	  Mofokeng's	  Landscapes	  of	  Trauma,	  which	  document	  with	  
removed	   sobriety	   remnant	   scenes	   of	   Auschwitz,	  we	   are	   in	   this	   sense	  made	   aware	  
that	   such	   pictorial	   'phrasing'	   presents	   only	   in	   part	   the	   full	   nightmare	   of	   the	  
Holocaust,	   being	   as	   it	   were	   surrounded	   by	   the	   inexpressible,	   incomprehensible	  
horror	   of	   the	   event	   in	   full.	   Thus,	   as	   Jacques	   Rancière	   notes,	   the	   unrepresentable	  
“inscribe(s)	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  art	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  ethical	  detour.	  The	  ethics	  of	  the	  
unrepresentable	  might	  still	  be	  an	  inverted	  form	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  promise.”	  (Rancière	  
2007:69)	  	  	  
	  
In	   his	   book,	   Terror	   and	   the	   Sublime	   in	   Art	   and	   Critical	   Theory	   (2005),	   Gene	   Ray	  
establishes	  a	  more	  direct	  application	  of	  the	  sublime	  to	  the	  sociopolitical	  –	  assigning	  
it,	   the	   event	   of	   horror,	   to	   the	   traditional	   spectacle	   of	   the	   natural	   sublime	   (an	  
assignation	   he	   feels	   to	   be	   broadly	   accepted).	   “In	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   the	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genocidal	  catastrophes	  of	  human	  making	  displaced	  the	  natural	  disaster	  as	  the	  source	  
of	  sublime	  feelings	  and	  effects...”	  (Ray	  2005:5)	  So	  where	  in	  the	  Burkean	  sublime	  and	  
the	  dynamical	  sublime	  of	  Kant	  we	  have	  the	  storm,	  the	  tornado,	  the	  natural	  disaster	  
as	   the	   primary	   source	   of	   terror,	   the	   trigger	   of	   the	   sublime	   experience,	   in	   a	  
contemporary	  sense,	  for	  Ray,	  the	  Romantic	  natural	  spectacle	  is	  usurped	  by	  political	  
calamities	  like	  the	  Holocaust	  and	  the	  killing	  fields	  of	  Cambodia.	  “After	  Auschwitz	  and	  
Hiroshima,	  however,	  we	  have	  had	  to	  recognise	  such	  sublime	  effects	  among	  our	  own	  
responses	   to	   this	   demonstrated	   human	   potential	   for	   systematic	   and	   unbounded	  
violence.	   After	   this	   history,	   human-­‐inflicted	   disaster	  will	   remain	  more	   threatening,	  
more	  sublime,	  than	  any	  natural	  disaster.”	  (Ray	  2005:19)	  
	  
Of	  9/11,	  Margaret	  Weigel	  presents	  a	  sociopolitical	  spectacle	   in	  place	  of	  the	  natural	  
disaster	  –	  citing	  Burke	  in	  her	  evocation	  of	  a	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  sublimity	  of	  terror	  
and	  astonishment.	  In	  her	  article	  Terror	  and	  the	  Sublime,	  or	  Why	  We	  Keep	  Watching,	  
in	  posing	  the	  question	  why	  it	  is	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  the	  broadcast	  of	  such	  calamity	  
glued	   to	   our	   screens,	   Weigel	   attributes	   such	   morbid	   fascination,	   our	   collective	  
experience	  in	  the	  mediated	  witness	  of	  such	  an	  event	  to	  this	  negative	  pleasure	  of	  the	  
sublime.	   She	   speaks	   also	   of	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   such	   sublime	   political	   events	  
highlight	  our	  own	  fragility	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  horror	  and	  threat	  –	  an	  idea	  reminiscent	  
of	   Kantian	   notions	   of	   the	   dynamical	   sublime,	   and	   for	   that	   matter,	   the	   pathetic	  
sublime	   of	   Schiller.	   “The	   sublime	   overwhelms	   us,	   too,	   by	   reminding	   us	   of	   our	  
smallness	   and	   our	   mortality.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   such	   force,	   we	   are	   rendered	   puny,	  
insignificant,	  helpless,	  vulnerable,	  as	  we	  cry	  out	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  disaster,	  'What	  can	  I	  
do	   to	   help?'.”	   (Weigel	   2001)	   Jean	   Baudrillard's	   commentary	   on	   9/11	   similarly	  
establishes	   “the	   terroristic	   event	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   phenomenon	   analogous	   to	   the	  
category	   of	   terror	   in	   aesthetic	   theories	   of	   the	   sublime,	   as	   in	   Edmund	   Burke	   and	  
Kant.”	  (Boehmer	  2010:12)	  
	  
Allowing	  for	  this	  shift,	  what	  Slavoj	  Žižek	  terms	  our	  “...materialist	  stress	  on	  sublimity	  
as	  (an)	  effect	  of	  appearances...”	  (Shaw	  2006:148),	  the	  passive	  viewer	  watching	  from	  
the	   comfort	   and	   safety	   of	   their	   homes	   the	   news	   on	   September	   11th	   2001,	   Roland	  
Joffé's	  hard-­‐hitting	  epic	  The	  Killing	  Fields	  (1984),	  or	  a	  documentary	  on	  Hiroshima	  or	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the	  Holocaust,	  is	  witness	  to	  an	  'aesthetic	  phenomenon',	  a	  source	  of	  deferred	  terror.	  
For	  as	  Simon	  Morley	  notes,	  “(S)pectacle	  and	  mass	  media	  have	  given	  the	  sublime	  a	  
new	  if	  not	  unproblematic	  home.”	  (Morley	  2010:21)	  Or	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Susan	  Sontag,	  	  
	  
Being	   a	   spectator	   of	   calamities	   taking	   place	   in	   another	   country	   is	   a	   quintessential	  modern	  
experience...Wars	   are	   now	   also	   living	   room	   sights	   and	   sounds.	   Information	   about	   what	   is	  
happening	  elsewhere,	  called	  'news',	  features	  conflict	  and	  violence	  –	  'If	  it	  bleeds,	  it	  leads'	  runs	  
the	   venerable	   guideline	  of	   tabloids	   and	   twenty-­‐four-­‐hour	  headline	  news	   shows	  –	   to	  which	  
the	  response	  is	  compassion,	  or	  indignation,	  or	  titillation,	  or	  approval,	  as	  each	  misery	  heaves	  
into	  view.	  (Sontage	  2004:16)	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  calamities	  of	  the	  scale	  and	  horror	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  or	  the	  shock	  and	  
spectacle	  of	   a	   terror	   event	   like	  9/11,	   the	  engaged	   individual	   in	   their	   spectatorship	  
feels	   in	   themselves	   (as	   is	   argued	   here)	   the	   psychological	   effects	   of	   the	   sublime.	  
Astonishment,	   shock,	   the	   suspension	   of	   reason	   –	   what	   Baudrillard	   terms,	   in	  
reference	  to	   the	  visual	   sensation	  of	  9/11,	  a	  “sensation	  of	  spellbound	   fear	  amongst	  
the	  public.”	  (Boehmer	  2010:12)	  Such	  an	  emotional	  state,	  derived	  from	  the	  mediated	  
spectacle	  is,	  as	  Lyotard	  suggests,	  the	  true	  (if	  not	  unproblematic)	  analogy,	  the	  lonely	  
talisman	  of	  the	  sublime.	  
	  
In	  this	  postmodern	  application	  of	  the	  sublime	  to	  the	  sociopolitical	  catastrophe,	  Ray	  
notes	  with	  reference	  to	  Kant	  and	  the	  supersensible	  what	  he	  believes	  to	  be	  a	  further	  
and	  significant	  consequence	  (of	  this	  shift).	  	  
	  
In	   bourgeois	   aesthetics,	   exemplified	   by	   Kant's	   1790	   Critique	   of	   Judgement	   the	   pain	   of	  
imagination's	   failure	   before	   the	   power	   or	   size	   of	   raw	   nature	   was	   compensated	   for	   by	  
reason's	   reflection	   on	   its	   own	   supersensible	   dignity	   and	   destination.	   Nature's	   threat	   to	  
dominate	  the	  human	  was	  contained	  by	  human	  capacities	  for	  self-­‐admiration.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  
Aushwitz	  and	  Hiroshima,	  however,	   the	   ruined	  dignity	  and	  destiny	  of	  human	   reason	  and	   its	  
moral	   law	   can	   offer	   no	   compensatory	   pleasure.	   The	   terror	   of	   the	   sublime	   becomes	   a	  
permanent,	  ghastly	  latency,	  compounded	  by	  the	  anguish	  of	  shame.	  (Ray	  2005:5)	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  dynamical	  and	  mathematical	  sublime,	  the	  spectacle	  of	  infinite	  size	  or	  power,	  
threatening	  to	  overwhelm	  the	  individual,	  was	  tempered	  by	  the	  ascendency	  of	  reason	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–	  the	  mind's	  capacity	  to,	   in	  recognition	  of	  this,	  establish	  its	  own	  independence	  and	  
moral	  freedom.	  In	  the	  context	  however	  of	  such	  events,	  being	  essentially	  products	  of	  
'human	   progress',	   supposed	   implementations	   of	   'moral	   law',	   Ray	   argues	   that	   the	  
'compensatory	   pleasure'	   achieved	   by	   the	   supersensible	   faculty	   is	   thus	   nullified.	  
Marking	  as	  it	  does	  a	  rupture	  in	  the	  historical	  framework	  of	  Romantic	  Enlightenment	  
or	   as	  Arnold	   professed,	   the	   “universal	   good	   and	   repository	   value”	   of	   culture	   (Ryle	  
2002:1).	  Instead	  of	  the	  acquired	  sense	  of	  freedom,	  of	  'destiny',	  we	  are	  left	  rather,	  in	  
the	  wake	  of	  the	  sublime	  sociopolitical	  happening,	  with	  nothing	  but	  a	  sense	  of	  horror	  
and	  disillusionment	  -­‐	  'the	  anguish	  of	  shame'	  (Ray	  2005:5).	  In	  this	  assertion	  Ray	  turns	  
to,	   amongst	   others,	   Adorno	   who	   claimed	   of	   Auschwitz:	   “(T)he	   irreversible	   and	  
unanswerable	   repudiation	   of	   culture's	   traditional	   claim	   to	   ennoble	   and	   improve	  
humanity.”	   (Ray	   2005:64)	   Where	   Kant	   speaks	   of	   the	   French	   Revolution	   and	   the	  
sublime	   feeling	   of	   enthusiasm	   felt	   in	   those	   spectating	   it,	   ascribing	   to	   it	   the	  
supersensible	   notion	   of	   human	   progress,	   we	   have	   instead,	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   these	  
modern	   day	   terrors,	   	   a	   sense	   of	   its	   frightful	   collapse.	   In	   this	   Ray	   references	  
something	  of	   Lyotard's	   concept	   of	   the	   sublime	   feeling	   (here	   a	   'ghastly	   latency')	   as	  
sign,	   as	   analogy,	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   reaffirms	   the	   general	   scepticism	  and	  wariness	   of	  
postmodern	  theory	  in	  regards	  to	  overarching	  themes,	  or	  again	  as	  Adorno	  states	  'the	  
traditional	   claims	   of	   culture'	   (Ray	   2005:64).	   Be	   it	   the	   progress	   of	   man,	   or	   the	  
elevated	   superiority	   of	   reason.	   Establishing	   a	   sublimity	   of	   terror,	   derived	   from	  
sociopolitical	   events	   like	  Hiroshima	  or	   the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  –	  but	  on	  account	  of	  
this,	  stripped	  of	  the	  idealism	  and	  compensation	  of	  the	  supersensible.	  
	  
Of	   the	   terror	   event,	   the	   political	   spectacle,	   Ray	   speaks	   of	   the	   'hit'	   –	   a	   sudden	  
disruption	   of	   the	   everyday,	   a	   violent	   and	   shattering	   incursion.	   A	  moment	   of	   total	  
astonishment,	   of	   stupefaction.	   The	   nature	   of	   the	   'hit'	   being	   such	   that	   it	   is	   forever	  
missed,	   beyond	   any	   one	   moment	   of	   intuition	   so	   that	   we	   feel	   compelled	   to	  
compulsively	  watch,	  rewind,	  replay.	  The	  same	  obsessive	  viewership	  Weigel	  notes	  of	  
9/11.	   “Overpowered,	   lacking	   the	   means	   to	   confront	   and	   interpret	   the	   hit	   as	  
experience,	   the	   subject	  misses	   the	  appointment.”	   (Weigel	  2005:1)	  What	   follows	   in	  
the	  wake	  of	  such	  a	  blow,	  this	  'hit',	  is	  a	  dizzied,	  disorientated	  attempt	  to	  assimilate,	  to	  
make	  sense	  of	  the	  event.	  In	  retrospect	  a	  vain	  effort	  to	  cognate,	  to	  put	  together	  from	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shattered	   bits	   the	   missed	   encounter	   –	   what	   Ray	   establishes	   as	   the	   mechanics	   of	  
trauma.	  Trauma	  being,	   in	   this	   context,	   the	  violated	   frontier	  of	   sensory	  experience.	  
The	   result,	   the	   sublime	   feeling	   as	   such,	   being	   that	   of	   mourning.	   “This	   movement	  
after	  the	  hit	   is	  what	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  calls	  mourning.”	  (Ray	  2005:1)	  A	  state	  of	  
disillusionment,	  the	  entropic	  cycle	  of	  self-­‐evaluation.	  Thus	  the	  'hit'	  presents	  itself	  as	  
a	  primary	  source	  of	  terror,	  instigating	  in	  the	  viewer	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  
sublime.	  
	  
Of	   art,	   or	   at	   least	   certain	   examples	   of	   post-­‐war	   art	   practice	   “...sublime	  evocations	  
and	  avowals	  of	  traumatic	  history	  are	  used	  to	  reactivate	  the	  disruptive	  hit	  or	  force	  of	  
such	  history.”	  (Ray	  2005:6)	  Ray	  acknowledges	  here	  the	  argument	  for	  art	  as	  mimesis	  
of	  the	  sublime	  spectacle	  –	  as	  a	  facsimile	  of	  terror	  –	  able	  to	  regenerate	  the	  disruptive	  
trauma,	   and	   according	   to	   his	   reading,	   the	   resultant	   mourning	   that	   is	   the	   sublime	  
experience.	   Important	   to	   note	   here	   is	   that	   Ray	   is	   not	   referring	   to	   the	   non-­‐
representational	   examples	   of	   Lyotard,	   but	   to	   artwork	   which	   engages	   with	   these	  
sociopolitical	   invasions.	   This	   is	   of	   course	   significant	   in	   that	   Hugo's	   series	   Rwanda	  
2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   is	   a	   direct	   presentation	   of	   the	   terror	   and	   associated	  
trauma	   of	   genocide.	   Such	   visual	   phrasing	   of	   politically	   instigated	   societal	   disasters	  
act	   something	   like	   Kant's	   negative	   presentation	   and	   Lyotard's	   differend	   “(b)y	  
negatively	  evoking	  such	  crimes	  and	  testifying	  to	  their	  unrepresentability	  through	  the	  
positivities	  of	  traditional	  representational	  and	  narrative	  means...”	  (Ray	  2005:6)	  
	  
In	   this	  chapter	   I	  have	  attempted	  to	   trace	   in	   the	  discourse	  of	   the	  sublime,	   from	   it's	  
inception	   in	   Greek	   Philosophy	   to	   now,	   the	   development	   of	   terror	   as	   a	   primary	  
theme.	  Furthermore,	  I	  have	  outlined	  the	  manner	  in	  which,	  in	  a	  contemporary	  sense,	  
certain	  sociopolitical	  events	  may	  be	  applied	  as	  valid	  agents	  of	  terror,	  with	  reference	  
to	   the	  Burkean	   sublime	   as	  well	   as	   the	  dynamical	   sublime	  of	   Kant.	   For	   Burke,	  with	  
reference	  to	  the	  natural	  spectacle,	  “Whatever	  is	  fitted	  in	  any	  sort	  to	  excite	  the	  ideas	  
of	   pain,	   and	   danger,	   and	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   whatever	   is	   in	   any	   sort	   terrible,	   or	   is	  
conversant	  about	  terrible	  objects,	  or	  operates	  in	  a	  manner	  analogous	  to	  terror,	  is	  a	  
source	   of	   the	   sublime...”	   (Burke	   2004:86)	   In	   a	   contemporary	   sense,	   however,	   it	   is	  
argued	   that	   such	   politically	   engendered	   occurrences	   as	   the	   Holocaust,	   Hiroshima,	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9/11	   –	   and	   as	   it	   is	   my	   intention	   to	   affirm,	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   –	   qualify	   as	  
progenitors	  of	   the	   sublime.	   “A	   terror,	   an	  after-­‐awe:	   an	  anguish	  of	   ruination.”	   (Ray	  
2005:1)	  –	  the	  sociopolitical	  event	  as	  the	  source	  of	  terror.	  I	  have	  also	  presented	  such	  
events	  as	  being,	  on	  account	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  horror	  involved,	  the	  sheer	  scope	  of	  
their	  tragedy,	   intrinsically	  unpresentable.	  As	  Lyotard	  notes,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  idiom	  
that	  can	  encapsulate	  such	  events,	  so	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  phrase	  or	  represent	  must	  
by	   necessity	   be	   a	   negative	   representation,	   a	   differend.	   A	   presentation	   of	   the	  
unpresentable.	   Thus	   in	   Mofokeng's	   Landscapes	   of	   Trauma,	   a	   photographic	   essay	  
documenting	   the	   remnants	   of	   trauma	   embodied	   in	   the	   Auschwitz	   landscape,	   the	  
inexpressible	  horror	  of	  the	  Holocaust	   is	  treated	  as	   just	  that,	  as	  negative	  space.	   It	   is	  
my	  intention	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  to	  discuss	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  
2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide,	  as	  mimesis,	  presents	  something	  of	  the	  unpresentable	  
horror	  of	  genocide.	  
	  
As	  such,	  it	   is	  my	  further	  intent	  to	  explore	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  such	  a	  presentation	  
(of	   the	   unpresentable	   horror	   that	   is	   genocide)	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   regenerate	   the	  
'hit',	  evoking	  in	  the	  viewer	  certain	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  I	  have	  in	  this	  
chapter	  noted	  the	  development	  of	   these,	   from	  the	  astonishment	  of	  Burke	  and	  the	  
supersensible	   concerns	   of	   Kant	   and	   Schiller,	   to	   the	   postmodern	   radicalisations	   of	  
Lyotard	   and	  others.	   It	   is	   in	   the	   context	   of	   such	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   I	  will	  
examine	   in	   chapter	   two	   the	  work	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo,	   and	   in	   particular	  Rwanda	   2004:	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Chapter	  2:	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  Genocide	  
	  
The	  body	  of	  work	  that	  is	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  (2004)	  offers,	  as	  artist	  
Pieter	  Hugo	   	  puts	   it,	  “...a	   forensic	  view	  of	  some	  of	  the	  sites	  of	  mass	  execution	  and	  
graves	   that	   stand	   as	   lingering	   memorials	   to	   the	   many	   thousands	   of	   people	  
slaughtered.”	  (Hugo	  2004)	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  works,	  seek	  to	  
demonstrate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  embody	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime,	  of	  terror	  and	  
the	   unpresentable.	   As	   a	   necessary	   preclude,	   I	   wish	   to	   establish	   by	   means	   of	   an	  
historical	   overview	  and	   commentary,	   and	   through	   the	   thematic	   lens	   of	   terror,	   the	  
Rwandan	   Genocide	   as	   a	   valid	   sublime	   political	   event,	   located	   within	   the	   broader	  
context	  of	  postcolonial	  Africa.	  
	  
On	   April	   6	   1994,	   Habyarimana	   the	   president	   of	   Rwanda	   was	   assassinated	   –	   his	  
plane	   shot	   down	   by	   rockets.	   The	   assassination,	   the	   perpetrators	   of	   which	   remain	  
unknown	   to	   this	   day,	   triggered	   an	   event	   of	   cataclysmic	   horror,	   bloodshed	   and	  
brutality.	  In	  just	  over	  a	  hundred	  days,	  over	  eight	  hundred	  thousand	  people	  perished	  
–	   victims	  of	   the	   racial	   ideology	  of	  Hutu	  extremism.	  An	  act	  of	   genocide	  against	   the	  
Tutsi	  minority	  population	  carried	  out	  on	  a	  national	   scale	  by	   the	  military	  as	  well	   as	  
civilian	  collaborators.	  	  
	  
It	  was	  the	  Polish	  lawyer	  Raphael	  Lemkin,	  founder	  of	  the	  Genocide	  Convention,	  who	  
first	   introduced	   the	   term	   'genocide'	   –	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   conspired	   objective	   “to	  
destroy	  a	  people	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part.”	  (Melvern	  2002:2)	  The	  systematic	  execution	  of	  
Tutsi's	  (as	  well	  as	  Hutu	  moderates)	  in	  Rwanda	  was	  the	  direct	  implementation	  of	  just	  
such	   an	   intent,	   instigated	   by	   a	   racially	   motivated	   oligarchy	   in	   the	   name	   of	   'Hutu	  
Power'.	  As	  noted	  investigative	  journalist,	  and	  author	  of	  A	  People	  Betrayed:	  The	  Role	  
of	  the	  West	  in	  Rwanda's	  Genocide,	  Linda	  Melvern	  notes,	  	  
	  
The	   preparation	   for	   mass	   killing	   on	   a	   countrywide	   scale	   took	   three	   years	   and	   involved	   a	  
conspiracy	  that	  embraced	  the	  country's	  political,	  military	  and	  administrative	  leadership.	  In	  a	  
campaign	   relentless	   in	   its	   incitement	   to	   hatred	   and	   violence,	   the	   conspirators	   set	   out	   to	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destroy	   the	   minority	   Tutsi	   as	   a	   people	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	   'pure	   Hutu	   state'.	   (Melvern	  
2004:1)	  
	  
Aside	  from	  the	  actual	  killings,	  it	  is	  this	  politically	  engendered	  ethnology,	  the	  planned	  
and	  systematic	  extermination	  of	  a	  people	  group,	   that	  qualifies	   the	  event	  as	  one	  of	  
genocide.	   This	   disastrous	   enactment	   of	   a	   fundamentalist	   political	   ideal	   recalls	  
Lyotard's	  position	  on	  the	  incommensurability	  of	  idea	  and	  object,	  and	  his	  subsequent	  
insistence	  in	  regards	  to	  any	  attempted	  synthesis	  that	  if	  there	  were	  to	  be	  a	  politics	  of	  
the	  sublime,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  politics	  of	  terror.	  He	  cites	  in	  example	  the	  Nazi	  regime.	  Of	  
the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  however,	  Martin	  Meredith	  notes,	  “the	  result	  was	  slaughter	  
on	  a	  scale	  not	  witnessed	  since	  the	  Nazi	  extermination	  programme	  against	  the	  Jews.”	  
(Meredith	  2005:487)	  As	  with	  Nazism	  therefore,	  the	  embodiment	  of	  Hutu	  Power	  was	  
a	  sublime	  politic	  of	  terror.	  Pronounced	  as	  such,	  as	  “a	  campaign	  of	  terror”	  by	  General	  
Dallaire,	   the	   UNAMIR	   force	   commander	   on	   the	   ground	   at	   the	   time.	   (Meredith	  
2005:511)	  The	  embodied	  terror	  and	  methodical,	  politically	  engineered	  eradication	  of	  
men,	  woman	  and	  children	  on	  purely	  racial	  grounds,	  draws	  without	  doubt	  a	  striking	  
and	   sobering	   parallel	   with	   the	   Holocaust.	   “The	   comparison	   with	   the	   Holocaust	   is	  
impossible	   to	   resist,	   for	   the	   central	   purpose	   (of	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide)	   was	   the	  
elimination	  of	  a	  people.”	  (Malvern	  2006:1)	  The	  horror	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  is	  such	  that,	  
as	  the	  most	  studied	  and	  mediated	  example	  of	  genocide,	  we	  are	  tempted	  to	  believe	  
that	  it	  was	  a	  once-­‐off,	  never-­‐to-­‐be-­‐repeated	  instance	  of	  evil.	  However,	  the	  Rwandan	  
Genocide	  (as	  do	  the	  Cambodian	  and	  Armenian	  Genocides)	  serves	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  
ubiquitous	  nature	  of	  genocide,	  as	  a	  source	  of	  terror	  in	  the	  course	  of	  human	  history.	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  Lemkin,	  “It	  follows	  humanity	  like	  a	  dark	  shadow	  from	  early	  antiquity	  
to	  the	  present	  time.”	  (Melvern	  2002:2)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Such	   a	   comparison,	   between	   the	   Holocaust	   and	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide,	   is	  
appropriate	   in	   establishing	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   as	   a	   sublime	   political	   event,	   a	  
spectacle	   of	   incommunicable	   terror.	   Facilitating	   as	   it	   does	   the	   application	   to	   the	  
Rwandan	   Genocide	   of	   principles	   of	   the	   sublime,	   of	   terror	   and	   the	   unpresentable,	  
already	  demonstrated	  by	  Lyotard	  and	  others	  (in	  reference	  to	  the	  Holocaust).	  Of	  the	  
Holocaust,	   Lyotard	   insists	   that	   there	   is	   for	   us	   no	   single	   idiom	   of	   expression	   with	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which	   to	   communicate	   such	   an	   event.	   “In	   terms	   of	   the	   sublime,	   the	   pain	   of	   the	  
Holocaust	   is	  such	  that	   it	  exceeds	  our	  ability	  to	  supply	  a	  concept.”	   (Shaw	  2006:128)	  
On	   account	  of	   this	   scope	  of	   pain,	  we	  encounter	   his	  differend	   –	   a	   delay	  of	   sorts	   in	  
which	   any	   presentation	   of	   the	   event	   itself	   must,	   on	   account	   of	   its	   essentially	  
unpresentable	  nature,	   acknowledge	   the	  need	   for	   further	  presentation.	  That	  of	   the	  
Holocaust	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  adequately	  communicate,	  nor	  to	  grasp	  in	  its	  entirety.	  
Similarly,	  there	  is	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  no	  appropriate	  or	  comprehensive	  idiom	  
or	  manner	   of	   phrasing.	   The	   scale	   of	   terror,	   of	   tragedy	   and	  horror	   encapsulated	   in	  
such	   an	   event,	   resists	   presentation,	   as	   it	   does	   comprehension.	   We	   cannot	  
communicate	   or	  mentally	   access	   in	   any	   complete	   sense	   slaughter	   on	   such	   a	  mass	  
scale.	   Be	   it	   six	  million	   Jews,	   a	  million	   Armenians,	   or	   over	   eight	   hundred	   thousand	  
Tutsis.	  As	  with	  Kant's	  mathematical	   sublime,	   in	  our	   apprehension	  of	   such	   scale,	   in	  
the	   failure	  of	   imagination's	   grasp,	  we	  acknowledge	   in	   this	   regard	  our	   fundamental	  
inability.	  However,	   in	   this	   case	   it	   is	  not	   the	   infinity	  of	   the	   cosmos,	  or	  eternity,	  but	  
rather	  the	  magnitude	  and	  compounded	  tragedy	  of	  genocide.	  A	  shift	  which	  marks	  a	  
certain	   scepticism	   towards	   the	   compensation	   of	   the	   supersensible.	   The	  
premeditated	   and	   politically-­‐motivated	   act	   that	   is	   genocide,	   seemingly	  
compromising	   the	   Kantian	   ideal	   of	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   reason.	   (Ray	   2005:5)	   As	  
Lyotard	   suggests,	   an	   event	   like	   the	   Holocaust,	   or	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   for	   that	  
matter,	  “...is	  known	  only	  by	  what	  it	  leaves	  in	  abeyance...only	  by	  refusing	  to	  phrase	  it	  
in	   terms	  of	  a	   judgement	  of	  understanding:	   for	  what	   (the	  event)	  signifies	   is	  nothing	  
less	  than	  the	  impossibility	  of	  such	  knowledge.”	  (Shaw	  2006:128)	  In	  a	  contemporary	  
sense,	   the	   designation	   of	   the	   sublime	   to	   a	   sociopolitical	   event	   like	   the	   Rwandan	  
Genocide	  is	  appropriate	  therefore,	  on	  account	  of	  this	  resistance,	  to	  imagination	  and	  
representation.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  as	  a	  visual	  study	  of	  such	  an	  event,	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  
Genocide	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   negative	   representation,	   as	   presenting	   the	  
unpresentable.	   Rather	   than	   visually	   phrased	   'judgements	   of	   understanding',	   an	  
authoritative	  depiction	  of	  the	  event	  of	  terror,	  the	  images	  –	  which	  are	  as	  the	  body's	  
title	  states	  vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  –	  project	  this	  'abeyance'.(Shaw	  2006:128)	  Thus	  in	  
Mass	   Grave	   in	   a	   Forest,	   Murambi	   vicinity,	   Rwanda	   (2004)	   –	   one	   of	   four	   elegiac	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images	   of	   burial	   sites	   	   within	   the	   body	   –	   the	   artwork	   documents	   but	   one	   site	   of	  
many,	   and	   yet	   by	   it	   we	   comprehend	   something	   of	   the	   greater	  whole.	   That	   is	   the	  
incomprehensible	  conglomerate	  of	  pain	  and	  terror	  that	  is	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide.	  In	  
acknowledging	  the	  differend,	  within	  the	   idiom	  this	  essential	   lack,	  we	  recognise	  the	  
event,	  the	  genocide	   itself,	  as	  being	  beyond	  our	  ability	  to	  assimilate.	  This	  deference	  
of	  representation	  that	  is	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide.	  
	  
In	  regards	  to	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror,	  there	  has	  been	  in	  recent	  times	  something	  of	  a	  
displacement	   –	   within	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	   spectacle	   of	   terror	   a	   post-­‐war	  
modification.	  The	  natural	  spectacle	  superseded	  by	  the	  radical	  sociopolitical	  instance	  
of	  terror.	  Recalling	  Ray	  “After	  Auschwitz	  and	  Hiroshima...(a)fter	  this	  history,	  human-­‐
inflicted	   disaster	   will	   remain	   more	   threatening,	   more	   sublime,	   than	   any	   natural	  
disaster.”	   (Ray	   2005:19)	   In	   this	   postmodern	   review	   events	   like	   the	   Rwandan	  
Genocide	  supplant	  the	  quintessential	  spectacle	  of	   the	  Romantics	   (the	  tempest,	   the	  
precipice),	   as	   the	   source	   of	   terror.	   Terror	   being,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Burkean	  
sublime,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  dynamical	  sublime	  of	  Kant,	   the	  primary	  source	  and	  a	  ruling	  
principle	  of	  the	  sublime	  experience.	  To	  reiterate:	  “Whatever	   is	   fitted	   in	  any	  sort	  to	  
excite	   the	   ideas	   of	   pain,	   and	   danger,	   and	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   whatever	   is	   in	   any	   sort	  
terrible,	  or	   is	  conversant	  about	  terrible	  objects,	  or	  operates	  in	  a	  manner	  analogous	  
to	  terror,	   is	  a	  source	  of	   the	  sublime...”	   (Burke	  2004:86)	  As	  a	  spectacle	  of	   terror,	  of	  
privation,	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   can	   be	   considered	   therefore	   a	   sublime	   political	  
event,	  a	  source	  of	  terror,	  exciting	  'ideas	  of	  pain	  and	  danger',	  and	  operating	  thus	  as	  
an	  agent	  of	  the	  sublime	  experience.	  From	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  safety,	  that	  required	  
modification	  of	  the	  Burkean	  and	  dynamical	  sublime,	  the	  token	  threat,	  the	  deferred	  
spectacle	   is	   appreciated	   as	   sublime.	   Whether	   it	   is	   a	   live	   news	   feed	   of	   9/11,	   a	  
retrospective,	  mediated	  presentation	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  or	  Hugo's	  forensic	  memorial	  
of	   the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	   the	   viewer	   so	   confronted	  by	   the	   aesthetic	   spectacle	   of	  
terror	   feels	   something	   of	   the	   negative	   pleasure	   and	   astonishment	   that	   are	   what	  
Burke	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  These	  effects,	  examined	  
within	   the	   established	   context	   of	   the	   Romantic	   sublime,	   as	   well	   as	   subsequent	  
postmodern	  radicalisations	  thereof,	  I	  will	  further	  apply	  to	  the	  viewer's	  experience	  of	  
Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide.	   Situating	   the	   works	   as	   facsimiles	   of	   terror,	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mimesis	  of	  the	  historical	  event,	  capable	  of	  reintroducing	  these	  cognitive	  effects.	  And	  
so	  inciting	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime.	  Before	  so	  doing,	  however,	  I	  believe	  it	  important	  to	  
further	  contextualise	  the	  event,	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  within	  the	  greater	  context	  
of	  postcolonial	  Africa	  –	  and	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  terror.	  	  
	  
Whilst	   I	   have	   presented	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   as	   a	   sublime	   political	   event,	   in	  
relation	  to	  comparative	  and	  highly	  theorised	  catastrophes	   like	  the	  Holocaust,	   it	   is	   I	  
feel	   crucial	   to	   also	   allow	  a	   sociopolitical	   happening	   like	   the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	   its	  
own	   particular	   and	   significant	   context.	   The	   notion	   of	   terror	   is	   engendered	   with	  
particular	  concerns	  in	  Africa	  and	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  milieu.	  The	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  
should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  isolated	  instance	  of	  terror,	  void	  of	  historical	  context,	  but	  
rather	   as	   one	   embedded	   within	   a	   social	   narrative	   and	   cultural	   framework.	   For	  
Mahmood	   Mamdani	   “...to	   know	   the	   history	   and	   geography	   of	   the	   Great	   Lakes	  
Region	  is	  a	  sure	  way	  of	  avoiding	  the	  pitfall	  of	  giving	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  Rwandan	  
genocide	   started	   and	   ended	   in	   1994.”	   (Zegeye	   2010:310)	   Rather	   than	   an	  
“anthropological	   oddity”	   (Zegeye	   2010:309),	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   was	   the	  
ultimate	   product	   of	   a	   deeply	   ingrained	   ethnic	   rivalry,	   fuelled	   by	   political	   and	  
economic	   tension.	   A	   succesion	   of	   colonial	   imperialists	   entrenched	   and	   aggravated	  
the	   divide	   between	   the	   Hutu	   majority	   and	   Tutsi	   minority.	   Colonialism	   was	   an	  
instigating	  force	  of	  segregation,	  adopting	  a	  'divide	  and	  rule	  policy',	  adumbrating	  the	  
ethnologically-­‐driven	  conflicts	  to	  come	  –	  for	  example	  the	  Hutu	  Revolution	  of	  1959	  in	  
which	   tens	   of	   thousands	   were	   massacred.	   (Tadjo	   2010:380)	   “In	   particular	  
“postcolonial	   terror”	   requires	   that	  we	  turn	  back	   to	   the	  colonial	  archive	  of	  violence	  
and	   repression,	   to	   records	   of	   the	   colonial	   formations	   of	   sovereignty,	   policing,	   and	  
surveillance.”	   (Boehmer	   2010:7)	   Not	   limited	   to	   a	   hundred	   day	   period	   of	   systemic	  
violence,	  terror	  is	   in	  this	  sense	  an	  historically	  configured	  phenomenon.	  So	  situated,	  
and	  within	  the	  greater	  social	  and	  political	   landscape	  of	  Central	  Africa,	  the	  terror	  of	  
the	   Rwandan	   Genocide	   is	   compounded.	   Burundi,	   bordering	   Rwanda,	   had	   by	   1994	  
experienced	  already	  two	  genocides:	  one	  in	  1972	  which	  claimed	  the	  lives	  of	  200	  000	  
Hutu,	   the	   other	   in	   1993	   in	   which	   150	   000	   died	   and	   a	   further	   300	   000	   fled	   into	  
Rwanda,	   fanning	   the	   flames	   of	   racial	   antagonism.	   Directly	   following	   the	   Rwandan	  
Genocide,	  the	  1996	  invasion	  of	  Zaire	  by	  the	  Rwandan	  army	  and	  the	  subsequent	  civil	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war	   in	   that	   country	   claimed	   in	   four	   years	   the	   lives	   of	   over	   three	   million	   people,	  
“...the	   largest	   toll	   of	   any	   conflict	   in	   African	   history.”	   (Meredith	   2005:544)	   Thus	  
understood,	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  stands	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  terror,	  executed	  against	  
the	  established	  backdrop	  of	  terror	  in	  the	  postcolonial.	  	  
	  
This	  composite	  terror	  of	  postcolonial	  Africa,	  which	  amounts	  very	  easily	  to	  a	  general	  
sense	   of	   doom:	   of	   so	   many	   relentless	   dictatorships,	   coupes,	   discriminations,	  
violence,	  poverty.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Edem	  Kodjo,	  Africa	  is	  a	  continent,	  	  “on	  the	  brink	  of	  
disaster,	  hurtling	  towards	  the	  abyss	  of	  confrontation,	  caught	  in	  the	  grip	  of	  violence,	  
sinking	   into	   the	   dark	   night	   of	   bloodshed	   and	   death...”	   (Kodjo	   2005:292)	   A	   grim	  
depiction	  that	  ought	  to	  further	  qualify	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  as	  a	  sublime	  political	  
event,	   contextualising	   it	   in	   a	   continental	   framework	   of	   terror.	   However,	   when	  
applied	   in	   the	   preconceived,	   intrinsically	   prejudiced	   and	   stereotyped	   context	   of	  
'heart	  of	  darkness'	  Africa,	  that	  of	  the	  savage	  Other,	  the	  'native',	   it	  has	  the	  opposite	  
effect.	  So	  in	  1994	  whilst	  a	  genocide	  was	  underway,	  the	  response	  of	  the	  West	  and	  the	  
UN	  was	   indifferent,	   media	   coverage	   ineffective	   –	   instead	   of	   shock,	   of	   horror,	   the	  
excused	  ambivalence	  of	  a	  removed	  spectatorship.	  “No	  tragedy	  was	  ever	  heralded	  to	  
less	   effect	   than	   the	   genocide	   in	   Rwanda.”	   (Melvern	   2004:2)	   In	   an	   interview	  
conducted	  with	  the	  artist,	  Hugo	  affirms	  this	  western	  reticence.	  	  
	  
(A)	  genocide	  had	  happened	  in	  Africa	  which	  got	  written-­‐off,	  because	  it's	  Africa.	  And	  somehow	  
in	  the	  western	  consciousness	  it	  registered	  as	  'okay,	  well	  this	  is	  tribal,	  it's	  Africa,	  it's	  barbaric,	  
this	  is	  what	  happens	  there'.	  That	  is,	  instead	  of	  fully	  engaging	  with	  it	  in	  any	  positive	  way,	  or	  in	  
the	   same	   way	   in	   which	   the	   west	   engages	   with	   the	   Holocaust.	   The	   Armenian	   Genocide	   is	  
another	   example	   of	   turning	   a	   blind	   eye,	   of	   having	   such	   a	   blind	   spot.	   (Hugo	   15	   December	  
2010)	  	  
	  
“Here	  we	  see	  an	  all	  too	  familiar	  pattern	  emerging,	  in	  which	  claims	  about	  the	  Other's	  
propensity	   for	   violence	   form	   the	   foundations	   of	   a	   political	   strategy	   in	   which	  
subjectivity	  is	  grounded	  in	  an	  inverted	  image	  of	  threat	  and	  terror.”	  (Tickell	  2010:95)	  
Postcolonial	  theory	  challenges	  this	  reading	  in	  which	  the	  African	  scenario	  is	  situated	  
as	   other,	   and	   so	   predisposed	   to	   violence	   and	   terror.	   “(I)t	   becomes	   clear	   that	  
European	  aesthetic	  theory	  partakes	  in	  a	  contiguous	  foundation,	  based	  as	  it	  often	  is	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on	  the	  construction,	  and	  then	  screening	  out,	  of	  the	  non-­‐European	  other	  as	  a	  figure	  
of	   fear	  and	   terror.”	   (Boehmer	  2010:13)	  Thus	   the	  application	  of	  western	  notions	  of	  
the	  sublime	  to	  an	  African	  genocide	  must,	  in	  light	  of	  postcolonial	  concerns,	  eradicate	  
such	  'screening'.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  supposed	  otherness	  of	  'Darkest	  Africa'	  that	  establishes	  
the	  event	  as	  sublime,	  nor	  the	  savage	  inclination	  of	  the	  'native',	  but	  rather	  the	  event	  
as	   a	   politically	   engendered	   social	   catastrophe	  –	   a	  mediated	   instance	  of	   terror	   and	  
mass	  violence,	  understood	  in	  the	  relevant	  context	  of	  postcolonial	  Africa.	  	  
	  
Thus	  framed,	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  presents	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  
as	  a	  sublime	  political	  event,	  configured	  within	  “...the	  cycle	  of	  conflict	  which	  defines	  
the	  Great	  Lakes	  region”.	  (Zegeye	  2010:310)	  An	  occasion	  of	  consummate	  terror	  and	  
yet	  one	  of	  which	  we,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  pervasive	  character	  of	  genocide	  itself,	  should	  
say,	  instead	  of	  'okay,	  well	  this	  is	  tribal,	  it's	  Africa',	  rather:	  okay	  (and	  with	  the	  gasp	  of	  
complicity),	  this	  is	  humanity.	  As	  a	  body	  of	  work	  it	  seeks	  to	  present	  the	  compounded	  
horror	  and	  tragedy	  of	  the	  intrinsically	  unpresentable	  aesthetic	  phenomenon	  that	   is	  
the	  Rwandan	  Genocide.	  And	   in	   so	   doing,	   and	   in	   challenge	  of	   such	   indifference,	   to	  
affect	  in	  the	  viewer	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   photographic	   body	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   is	   principally	   an	  
aestheticising	  of	   terror.	   For,	   as	  Robert	   J.C.	   Young	  notes	   in	  his	   essay	  Terror	   Effects,	  
“To	  say	  that	  the	  terror	  effect	  is	  an	  affect,	  means	  that	  strictly	  speaking	  it	  belongs	  to	  
the	  realm	  of	  the	  aesthetic.”	  (Young	  2010:308)	  And	  of	  the	  sublime	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
terror	   and	   the	   sociopolitical,	   Young	   further	   asserts	   “The	   sublime	   is	   terror's	  
aestheticized	   translation.”	   (Young	   2010:314)	   The	   nature	   of	   terror	   is	   such	   that	   in	  
order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  experienced	  as	  a	  negative	  pleasure,	  appreciated	  as	  anything	  other	  
than	   absolute	   fear	   (terror),	   it	   must	   be	   done	   so	   at	   a	   certain	   remove,	   from	   that	  
Burkean	  position	  of	  relative	  safety,	  or	  as	  Baudrillard	  insists,	  as	  a	  primarily	  aesthetic	  
phenomenon.	   (Boehmer	  2010:12)	  Hugo's	  work	   is	   thus	  a	   translation	  of	   the	  event,	  a	  
facsimile	  of	  terror	  –	  the	  spectator	  is	  not	  involved	  but	  bears	  witness.	  And	  importantly,	  
on	   account	   of	   the	   unpresentable	   nature	   of	   the	   event,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   secondary	  
character	  of	  mediated	  spectatorship,	  a	  witness	  that	  is	  partial	  and	  fragmented.	  Of	  the	  
civil	  war	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  as	  another	  example	  of	  a	  postcolonial	  demonstration	  of	  terror,	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and	  with	   particular	   reference	   to	   the	   presentation	   or	   aestheticising	   thereof,	   Young	  
notes,	  	  
	  
Terror,	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  I	  have	  been	  describing	  it,	  is	  essentially	  a	  First	  World	  form	  of	  terror.	  
You	  fear	  it,	  you	  fear	  its	  psychic,	  somatic,	  and	  potentially	  bodily	  effects,	  but	  for	  most	  people	  it	  
remains,	   thankfully,	   always	   at	   a	   Burkean	   remove.	   Compare	   this	   with	   the	   experience	   of	  
people	  who	  actually	  live	  terror,	  suffer	  terror,	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another,	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  
(Young	  2010:323)	  
	  
Art	   in	   this	   sense,	   as	   an	   aestheticized	   translation	   of	   terror,	   facilitates	   a	   sublime	  
witness.	   Again	   Young	   notes,	   “(T)he	   sublime	   operates	   as	   a	   form	   of	   mimicry	  
throughout,	  for	  when	  distanced	  through	  art,	  the	  terror	  of	  the	  sublime	  is	  transformed	  
into	  the	  pleasure	  of	  art.	  Terror	  is	  real,	  but	  what	  is	  uncanny	  is	  that	  the	  effect	  can	  be	  
mimicked	  (and)	  reproduced.”	   (Young	  2010:315)	  As	  a	  parergon	  of	  the	  body	  of	  work	  
that	  is	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide,	  the	  four	  images	  that	  constitute	  Bodies	  
covered	   in	   lime	   to	   preserve	   the	   evidence	   of	   the	  mass	   killing	   at	  Murambi	   Technical	  
College,	  Murambi,	   Rwanda,	   I-­‐IV	   (2004)	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	  Bodies	   covered	   in	  
lime)	  demonstrate	  this	  principle.	  As	  visual	  documentation	  the	  images	  present,	  as	  the	  
title	   suggests,	   evidence	   of	   the	   killings	   –	   corpses	   of	   men,	   women	   and	   children	  
preserved	   in	   lime.	   The	   ossified	   effect	   of	   the	   terror	   event	   which	   is	   genocide.	   To	  
engage	  with	  the	  imagery	  is	  not	  to	  experience	  terror	  itself,	  but	  rather,	  from	  the	  safe-­‐
house	  of	   the	  gallery	  environment	  and	  via	   the	  aesthetic	  presentation	  of	   terror,	   the	  
removed	  terror	  of	  the	  sublime.	  Bodies	  in	   lime	  I-­‐IV	  as	  chilling	  and	  graphic	  portrayals	  
of	   victims	  of	   genocide	   transcribed	  by	   the	  photographic,	   bears	  witness	   to	  a	   ghastly	  
reality.	   The	  agonised,	   skeletal	   forms	  are	  evidence	  of	  what	  Young	   terms	   'the	   terror	  
effect',	  the	  occurrence	  itself	  –	  whilst	  the	  presentation	  of	  such	  effect	   in	  the	  artwork	  
of	  Hugo,	  allows	  in	  that	  essential	  remove	  the	  experience	  as	  affect.	  (Young	  2010:308)	  
As	  witness.	  
	  
As	  with	  Bodies	  in	  lime	  I-­‐IV,	  the	  eight	  images	  that	  are	  Genocide	  site,	  Ntarama	  Catholic	  
Church,	  Rwanda,	  I-­‐VIII	  (2004)	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  Genocide	  site	  I-­‐VIII)	  depict	  the	  
forensic	   remnants	   of	   genocide	   killings.	   Skeletal	   remains	   and	   paraphernalia;	   hair-­‐
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combs,	  bloodied	  garments,	  shoes	  and	  a	  rosary	   litter	  the	  floorspace	  of	  the	  Ntarama	  
Catholic	  Church.	  	  Eight,	  intimate	  cameo	  views	  track	  the	  dusty	  floor,	  presenting	  from	  
above	  a	  sequence	  of	  heartbreaking	   'still	   lives'	  –	  not	   the	  Flemish	  sort,	  Still	   Life	  with	  
Fruit	  or	  Still	  Life	  with	  Glassware,	  but	  the	  still	  relics,	  the	  ad-­‐hoc,	  scattered	  remains	  of	  
slaughtered	  human	  beings.	  Again,	  by	  means	  of	  such	  photographic	  phrasing,	  we	  bear	  
witness	  to	  the	  event.	  Whilst,	  as	  has	  been	  established,	  no	  single	  image	  or	  idiom	  can	  
effectively	  frame	  an	  event	  like	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  argue	  the	  case	  
for	   these	   images,	   as	  well	   as	  Bodies	   in	   Lime	   I-­‐IV,	   as	  being	  within	   such	  a	   concession	  
especially	  compelling	  and	  relevant	  aesthetic	  presentations	  of	  terror.	  Imaging	  as	  they	  
do	   actual	   remains,	   the	   as-­‐is	   forensic	   aftermath	   of	   the	   genocide,	   they	   are	   in	   the	  
retrograde	  dynamic	  of	  representational	  art	  as	  close	  as	  one	  can	  get	  to	  documenting	  
the	  occurrence	  itself,	  and	  so	  allow	  for	  a	  particularly	  convincing	  and	  demanding	  visual	  
witness.	  Véronique	  Tadjo,	  author	  of	  Genocide:	  the	  changing	  landscape	  of	  memory	  in	  
Kigali	   (2010),	   in	   her	   reconnaissance	   of	   Rwanda	   in	   1998,	   notes	   these	   untouched	  
public	   displays	   of	   human	   remains	   as	   the	   most	   potent	   and	   persuasive	   testament	  
available.	  
	  
Lack	  of	  resources	  at	  the	  time	  may	  have	  explained	  why	  the	  sites	  of	  genocide	  were	  in	  such	  a	  
state	  but	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  could	  also	  have	  been	  the	  need	  to	  show	  the	  outside	  world	  what	  
had	  really	  happened	  there,	  not	  in	  an	  abstract	  or	  symbolical	  way	  but	  in	  all	  the	  manifestations	  
of	  horror.	  When	  referring	  to	  the	  genocide,	  some	  people	  use	  the	  words	  'massacre',	   'conflict'	  
or	  'civil	  war'.	  Therefore,	  faced	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  denial	  and/or	  revisionism,	  this	  was	  the	  most	  
effective	  physical	  representation	  available	  to	  survivors.	  (Tadjo	  2010:383)	  
	  
In	  Rwanda	  2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   Hugo	   avoids	   such	   'abstract	   or	   symbolical'	  
structures.	  His	  is	  not	  a	  conceptual	  or	  allegorical	  presentation	  but	  one	  that	  is	  direct,	  
literal	   –	   executed	   in	   the	   evidential	   spirit	   of	   photojournalism	   and	   forensic	  
documentation	   (albeit	   through	   the	   subjective	   lens	   of	   the	   artist).	   Of	   this	   tradition,	  
Susan	   Sontag	   notes,	   “...most	   of	   the	   contradictory	   declarations	   of	   photographers	  
converge	  on	  pious	  avowals	  of	   respect	   for	   things-­‐as-­‐they-­‐are.”	   (Sontag	  2002:119)	  A	  
self-­‐confessed	  documentarian,	  Hugo's	  depictions	  of	  these	  remnant	  memorials,	  or	  as	  
he	  terms	  them	  vestiges,	  present	  a	  candid	  aestheticising	  of	  terror.	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Through	   what	   Kant	   called	   “negative	   presentation”,	   art	   can	   mark	   those	   points	   at	   which	  
Auschwitz,	  Hiroshima,	  and	  other	  collective	  traumas	  exceed	  conventionalised	  representation.	  
By	   negatively	   evoking	   such	   crimes	   and	   testifying	   to	   their	   unrepresentibility	   through	   the	  
positivities	   of	   traditional	   representational	   and	   narrative	  means,	   art	   can	   avow	   the	   damage	  
they	  have	  wreaked.	  (Ray	  2005:6)	  
	  
Hugo's	   work,	   as	   'traditional'	   representations	   of	   collective	   trauma,	   testifies	   to	   this	  
essential	   lack,	   this	   'unrepresentability'.	  His	  “lingering	  memorials”	   (Hugo	  2004),	  as	  a	  
photographic	  transcription	  of	  terror,	  attest	  to	  and	  in	  a	  sense	  (non)present	  the	  horror	  
and	   devastation	   of	   genocide	   in	   Rwanda.	  His	   forensic	   impressions	   of	   these	   sites	   of	  
homage,	   taken	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  event,	   invite	  the	  viewer	  through	  the	  mimesis	  of	  
art	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   witness	   of	   a	   sublime	   political	   event.	   Not	   the	   debilitating	  
experience	  of	  actual	  terror,	  for	  “terror	  (is)	  no	  aesthetic	  experience	  or	  feeling,	  but	  a	  
brutal	  material	  and	  corporeal	  experience	  of...power	  in	  the	  raw.”	  (Boehmer	  2010:12)	  
–	  but	  the	  modified	  terror	  of	  witness,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  reproductive	  operation	  of	  the	  
photographic.	   This	   aestheticising	   of	   terror,	   this	   bearing	   witness	   to	   a	   situation	   of	  
unpresentable,	  unimaginable	  horror,	  situates	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  
within	   the	   category	   of	   the	   sublime.	   The	   sublimity	   of	   terror	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  
sociopolitical.	  	  
	  
Burke,	   in	  his	  discourse	  on	  the	  sublime,	  emphasises	  the	  preeminence	  of	  the	  written	  
word	  over	   image.	   “(T)hat	   eloquence	   and	  poetry	   are	   as	   capable,	   nay,	   indeed	  much	  
more	   capable	   of	  making	   deep	   and	   lively	   impressions	   than	   any	   other	   arts.”	   (Burke	  
2004:196)	  Predating	  the	  invention	  of	  the	  photographic	  process,	  his	  reference	  to	  the	  
image,	  the	  plastic	  or	  imitative	  arts,	  is	  painting;	  in	  which	  for	  example	  an	  angel	  can	  be	  
presented	  only	  as	  a	  beautiful	  winged	  man	  –	  lacking,	  in	  his	  view,	  the	  transformative	  
dynamic	  of	  eloquent	  poetry.	  “(B)ut	  what	  painting	  can	  furnish	  out	  anything	  so	  grand	  
as	  the	  addition	  of	  one	  word,	  “the	  “angel	  of	  the	  Lord?””	  (Burke	  2004:197)	  However,	  
in	   the	   postmodern	   application	   of	   the	   sublimity	   of	   terror	   to	   the	   sociopolitical	  
catastrophe,	  the	  case	  for	  the	  photographic	  as	  a	  singular	  medium	  of	  presentation	  is	  
strengthened.	  We	  are	   in	   this	   sense,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  sublime,	   less	  concerned	  now	  
with	  the	  transcendental,	  the	  'angel	  of	  the	  Lord',	  but	  rather	  with	  the	  victims	  of	  man,	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the	  machinations	  of	  politics.	  So	   the	  Burkean	  scenario	   is	  challenged:	  what	  eloquent	  
phrasing	  of	  words	   for	   instance	  can	  so	  convincingly	  convey	  the	  terror	  and	  pain	  of	  a	  
social	   trauma	   like	   genocide	   as	   do	   the	   shocking,	   photographic	   images	   of	   Hugo's	  
Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   –	   the	   twisted	   forms	   or	   scattered	   bones	   of	  
actual	  victims?	  In	  her	  book	  Regarding	  the	  Pain	  of	  Others	  (2004),	  Sontag	  summarises	  
the	  disparate	  nature	  of	   these	   two	  –	   the	  written	  word	  and	   the	  photographic	   in	   the	  
documentation	   of	   terror:	   “Narratives	   can	   make	   us	   understand.	   Photographs	   do	  
something	   else:	   they	   haunt	   us.”	   (Sontag	   2004:80)	   This	   capacity	   to	   haunt	   is	   of	  
particular	   relevance	   to	   documentation	   of	   instances	   like	   World	   War	   I	   or	   the	  
Holocaust,	  or	   in	   this	   case	   the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  which,	  as	  established	   in	   chapter	  
one,	  we	   can	   by	   no	  manner	   of	   narrative	   or	   phrasing	   fully	   understand.	   It	   is	   only	   by	  
means	  of	   the	  partial	  witness,	  via	   (in	   this	  case)	   the	  photographic	   image,	  and	  by	  the	  
derived	   feeling	   thereof,	   this	   'haunting'	   residue,	   that	   we	   access	   the	   sublime	   and	  
essentially	  unpresentable	  nature	  of	   the	  event.	   “Let	   the	  atrocious	   images	  haunt	  us.	  
Even	  if	  they	  are	  only	  tokens,	  and	  cannot	  possibly	  encompass	  most	  of	  the	  reality	  to	  
which	   they	   refer,	   they	   still	   perform	   a	   vital	   function.	   The	   images	   say:	   this	   is	   what	  
human	   beings	   are	   capable	   of	   doing	   –	   may	   volunteer	   to	   do,	   enthusiastically,	   self-­‐
righteously.	  Don't	  forget.”	  (Sontag	  2004:102)	  
	  
Sontag	  argues	  the	  case	   for	  photography	  as	  a	  unique	  and	   important	  medium	  in	  the	  
translation	  of	  terror.	  “Photographs	  of	  atrocity	   illustrate	  as	  well	  as	  corroborate...the	  
photograph	   gives	   the	   indelible	   sample.”	   (Sontag	   2004:75)	   Furthermore,	  
photography's	  dual	  function	  as	  mechanical	  process	  and	  individual	  artistry	  allows	  for	  
“...both	   objective	   record	   and	   personal	   testimony,	   both	   a	   faithful	   copy	   or	  
transcription	  of	  an	  actual	  moment	  of	  reality	  and	  an	  interpretation	  of	  that	  reality	  –	  a	  
feat	   literature	   has	   long	   aspired	   to,	   but	   could	   never	   attain	   in	   this	   literal	   sense.”	  
(Sontag	  2004:23)	  It	  is	  this	  literalness	  (of	  transcription	  and	  interpretation),	  the	  hyper-­‐
real	  nature	  of	  photography,	  that	  haunts	  us	  –	  that	  we	  find	  so	  threatening.	  The	  direct	  
(albeit	  partial)	  visual	  illustration	  of	  a	  reality	  of	  terror.	  
	  
Bodies	  in	  lime	  I-­‐IV	  is	  just	  such	  an	  example	  of	  an	  'indelible	  sample'	  of	  history	  –	  as	  are	  
the	   strewn	   bones	   and	   artefacts	   of	   Genocide	   site	   I-­‐VIII.	   These	   images	   of	   residual	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fragments:	  bodies	  preserved	   in	   lime,	   the	  remnant	  sites	  of	  massacre,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  
mass	  graves	  documented	  by	  Hugo,	  grant	   to	   the	  viewer	  visual	  access	   to	  a	  reality	  of	  
terror.	   Not	   the	   real-­‐time,	   news-­‐feed	   witness	   of	   terror	   in	   action,	   but	   an	   archival	  
testimony	   of	   the	   terror	   effect.	   Crystallised	   in	   these	   vestiges,	   something	   of	   the	  
inexpressible	   horror	   and	   tragedy	   of	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide.	   “(T)his	   posthumous	  
reality	   is	   often	   the	   keenest	   of	   summations.”	   (Sontag	   2004:75)	   As	   a	   posthumous	  
photographic	   record	   of	   a	   past	   atrocity,	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	  
reactivates	   the	   event,	   the	   reality	   of	   such	   a	   terror	   as	   witness.	   As	   Young	   observes,	  
“experience	   in	   the	   real	   is	   reproduced	   through	   the	   shadowy	   simulacrum	   of	   art.”	  
(Young	   2010:315)	   Of	   such	   graphic	   presentations	   of	   suffering	   and	   death,	   this	  
simulacra	   of	   terror,	   Sontag	   notes	   the	   sustained	   capacity	   of	   images	   to	   shock,	   the	  
manner	   in	   which	   particularly	   harrowing	   imagery	   retains	   (or	   at	   least	   ought	   to)	   its	  
capacity	   to	   move,	   to	   appall.	   In	   her	   cutting	   diatribe,	   denouncing	   the	   passive	   and	  
ambivalent	  witness	  of	  the	  modern	  audience	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  pain	  of	  others,	  Sontag	  
emphasises	   the	   importance	   and	   appropriateness	   of	   such	   derived	   feelings	   of	   shock	  
and	  horror.	  	  
	  
Still,	   there	   are	   pictures	  whose	   power	   does	   not	   abate,	   in	   part	   because	   one	   cannot	   look	   at	  
them	  often.	  Pictures	  of	  the	  ruin	  of	  faces	  that	  will	  always	  testify	  to	  a	  great	  iniquity	  survived,	  at	  
that	  cost:	  the	  faces	  of	  horribly	  disfigured	  First	  World	  War	  veterans	  who	  survived	  the	  inferno	  
of	  the	  trenches;	  the	  faces	  melted	  and	  thickened	  with	  scar	  tissue	  of	  survivors	  of	  the	  American	  
atomic	  bombs	  dropped	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki;	   faces	   cleft	  by	  machette	  blows	  of	  Tutsi	  
survivors	  of	   the	  genocidal	   rampage	   launched	  by	  the	  Hutu's	   in	  Rwanda	  –	   is	   it	  correct	   to	  say	  
that	  people	  get	  used	  to	  these?	  (Sontag	  2004:74)	  
	  
Though	  not	  images	  of	  faces	  of	  survivors,	  the	  same	  may	  be	  said	  of	  Hugo's	  uncensored	  
portrayals	  of	  mass	  killings	   in	  Rwanda.	  As	  visual	   translations	  of	   terror,	  photographic	  
transcriptions	   of	   this	   posthumous	   reality	   of	   tragedy	   and	   death	   that	   is	   the	   terror	  
effect,	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   as	   a	   photographic	   body	   retains	   the	  
power	  to	  shock.	  Reactivating	  the	  historical	  event	  –	  the	  reality	  of	  terror	  as	  witness,	  an	  
aesthetic	  phenomenon	  –	  these	  images	  demand	  a	  certain	  response,	  come	  at	  a	  cost.	  
These	  are	  not	  comfortable	  images,	  the	  sort	  to	  be	  passively	  enjoyed.	  Recounting	  the	  
opening	  night	  of	  the	  exhibition,	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Partial	  Remains	  and	  Personal	  Affects	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(2004)	  held	  at	   the	  Michael	  Stevenson	  Gallery	   in	  Cape	  Town,	  South	  Africa,	   in	  which	  
Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  was	  first	  shown,	  Hugo	  recalls	  the	  reticence	  of	  
people	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  imagery.	  	  
	  
The	  exhibition	  was	   really	   strange,	   in	  one	   room	  they	  had	  a	  commissioned	  work	   I'd	  done	  on	  
tuberculosis.	  In	  the	  middle	  room	  were	  the	  portraits	  of	  people	  with	  albinism	  (referring	  to	  his	  
body,	  Looking	  Aside	  (2003)),	  and	  in	  the	  other	  hung	  the	  Rwandan	  images.	  The	  opening	  was,	  
typically,	  a	  huge	  party.	  Except	   for	   the	  Rwandan	  room	  –	  nobody	  went	   in	  there.	   It	  was	  quite	  
evident;	   people	   went	   in,	   and	   almost	   immediately	   came	   out	   again.	   Aside	   from	   a	  
photojournalist	  friend,	  Eric	  Miller	  (who	  had	  experienced	  first-­‐hand	  the	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda),	  
who	  found	  such	  behaviour	  equally	  disturbing,	  nobody	  approached	  me	  after	  the	  exhibition	  to	  
discuss	  or	  comment	  on	   the	  works	  –	  whether	   they'd	   found	   them	  powerful	  or	   interesting.	   It	  
was	  as	  if,	  of	  that	  room,	  there	  was	  this	  blind-­‐spot.	  People	  did	  not	  know	  how	  to	  engage	  with	  
them.	  (Hugo	  15	  December	  2010)	  
	  
By	  means	   of	   their	   power	   to	   shock,	   such	   imagery	   evokes	   in	   the	   engaged	   viewer	   a	  
certain	  psychological	  and	  emotional	  response.	  It	   is	  my	  intent	  to	  equate	  such	  to	  the	  
psychological	  effects	  of	   the	  sublime.	  Burke	  notes	  of	   the	  pleasure	  derived	   from	  the	  
sublime	  spectacle,	  that	  it	  is	  intrinsically	  negative.	  Not	  the	  pleasure	  of	  beauty	  derived	  
from	   pleasing	   form,	   balance,	   etc...	   but	   rather	   a	   delight,	   “turn(ed)	   on	   pain	   and	  
danger”	  (Burke	  2004:97)	  derived	  from	  the	  sublime	  spectacle	  of	  terror.	  The	  negative	  
nature	   of	   such	   delight,	   and	   in	   regards	   to	   an	   event	   like	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide,	  
explains	   in	  part	   this	   evasive	  non-­‐spectatorship.	   For	   to	   look,	   to	   engage	  with	   such	  a	  
presentation	  of	  woe,	  is	  to	  involve	  oneself	  mentally,	  emotionally	  –	  to	  experience	  this	  
'delight',	   this	   negative	   pleasure	   of	   the	   sublime.	   Regarding	   the	  witness	   of	   grievous	  
calamity	   and	   the	   distress	   of	   others,	   be	   it	   current	   or	   historical,	   Burke	   notes	   this	  
requirement	  of	   engagement,	   “the	  delight	  we	  have	   in	   such	   things,	   hinders	   us	   from	  
shunning	  scenes	  of	  misery;	  and	  the	  pain	  we	  feel,	  prompts	  us	  to	  relieve	  ourselves	  in	  
relieving	   those	   who	   suffer;	   and	   all	   this	   antecedent	   to	   any	   reasoning...”	   (Burke	  
2004:93)	   As	   one	   may	   feel	   a	   certain	   hesitancy	   regarding	   a	   visit	   to	   the	   Auschwitz-­‐
Birkenau	   Memorial,	   or	   perhaps	   the	   Apartheid	   Museum	   in	   Johannesburg	   –	   in	  
anticipation	  of	  the	  'emotional	  drain'	  of	  such	  an	  experience	  –	  so	  it	  is	  with	  the	  images	  
of	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide,	  which	  function	  as	  “lingering	  memorials	  to	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the	  many	   thousands	   of	   people	   slaughtered.”	   (Hugo	   2004)	   For	   as	   Sontag	   notes	   of	  
such	  commemorative	  witness,	  “But	  do	  people	  want	  to	  be	  horrified?	  Probably	  not.”	  
(Sontag	  2004:74)	  The	  nature	  of	  these	  images	  is	  that	  they	  shock,	  horrify,	  demand	  of	  
the	  viewer	  just	  such	  a	  response	  –	  the	  cognitive	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  The	  reticence	  
of	  people	  to	  engage	  with	  them,	  as	  observed	  by	  Hugo,	  is	  I	  feel	  if	  anything	  indicative	  of	  
this.	  
	  
Outlined	   in	   chapter	   one,	   Gene	   Ray	   in	   his	   book	   Terror	   and	   the	   Sublime	   in	   Art	   and	  
Critical	  Theory	  (2005)	  notes	  the	  function	  of	  art	  as	  simulacra	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  sublime	  
sociopolitical	   spectacle	   of	   terror.	   The	   manner	   in	   which	   representational	   art	   like	  
Hugo's	   can,	   in	   its	   rendition	  of	   an	  historical	   event,	   regenerate	   the	  happening	   as	   an	  
aesthetic	   experience.	   As	   Sontag	   notes	   of	   the	   photographic	   in	   particular,	  
“Cameras...transform	  history	  into	  spectacle.”	  (Sontag	  2002:110)	  Ray	  establishes	  the	  
happening,	   the	   dramatic	   and	   violent	   occurrence	   as	   the	   'hit':	   a	   disturbance	   which	  
interrupts	   and	   overwhelms	   the	   everyday.	   An	   encounter	  with	   the	   real,	  which	   is	   on	  
account	   of	   its	   overpowering,	   disruptive	   qualities,	   essentially	   missed.	   “The	   missed	  
encounter	  and	  its	  meanings	  can	  only	  be	  reconstructed	  in	  retrospect.”	  (Ray	  2005:1).	  
Ray	   notes	   the	   ability	   of	   certain	   mimetic	   art	   practices	   as	   “...avowals	   of	   traumatic	  
history...used	  to	  reactivate	  the	  disruptive	  hit	  or	  force	  of	  such	  history.”	  (Ray	  2005:6)	  
Thus	   the	  artwork,	   in	   its	  portrayal	  of	   the	   terror	  event	  as	   spectacle,	  generates	  a	  hit.	  
The	   viewer	   experiences	   something	   of	   the	  missed	   encounter	   as	   they	   reel	   from	   the	  
shock	  of	   the	   image,	   a	   suspension	  of	   reason	   activated	  by	   the	   sublime	  evocation	  of	  
terror.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of,	  to	  collate,	  thus	  happens	  in	  retrospect.	  A	  first	  
encounter	  with	  any	  of	   the	   four	   images	  of	  Bodies	   in	   lime	   I-­‐IV	  practically	  guarantees	  
such	  a	  blow	  –	  the	  violent	  and	  contorted	  horror	  encapsulated	  in	  these	  equates	  to	  the	  
punch-­‐in-­‐the-­‐guts	  factor	  of	  the	  hit.	  The	  viewer	  (unless	  problematically	  desensitised)	  
is	   left	   aghast,	   unable	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   such	   horror,	   “Overpowered,	   lacking	   the	  
means	  to	  confront	  and	  interpret	  the	  hit	  as	  experience...”	  (Ray	  2005:1)	  	  
	  
The	   shock-­‐factor	   of	   the	   aesthetically	   generated	   hit,	   as	   a	   rupture	   in	   the	   everyday	  
normality	  of	   the	  viewer,	   results	   in	   that	   suspension	  of	   reason	  proposed	  by	  Lyotard,	  
who	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   sublime	  asserted	   the	   sustained	  capacity	  of	   the	  art	  object	   to	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shock	   as	   the	   primary	   objective	   of	   the	   avant-­‐garde.	   “The	   arts,	   whatever	   their	  
materials,	   pressed	   forward	   by	   the	   aesthetics	   of	   the	   sublime	   in	   search	   of	   intense	  
effects,	  can	  and	  must	  give	  up	  the	  imitation	  of	  models	  that	  are	  merely	  beautiful,	  and	  
try	   out	   surprising,	   strange,	   shocking	   combinations.”	   (Lyotard	   1988:36)	   Lyotard's	  
artistic	   reference	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   of	   course	   quite	   unlike	   the	  work	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo;	  
devoid	   of	   the	   referential,	   completely	   abstract,	   the	   colour	   fields	   of	   Newman,	   the	  
black	  squares	  of	  Malevich.	  These	  abstractions,	  on	  account	  of	  their	  unpresentability,	  
are	   according	   to	   Lyotard	   imbued	  with	   notions	   of	   the	   sublime,	   as	   is	   the	   supposed	  
shock	  of	  the	  happening,	  the	  suspension	  of	  reason	  that	  is	  the	  conscious	  experience	  of	  
them.	  As	  Newman	  insists,	  his	  is	  a	  sublime	  of	  the	  now	  (Newman	  1948:1),	  whereas	  the	  
representational	   work	   of	   Hugo	   is	   a	   sublime	   of	   the	   then,	   now.	   The	   essentially	  
unpresentable	   subject	   of	   the	   historical	   sociopolitical	   event	   –	   the	   Holocaust,	  
Hiroshima,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  –	  reactivated	  in	  the	  now	  of	  witness	  
by	   means	   of	   the	   simulacrum	   of	   the	   photographic.	   It	   is	   for	   Rancière,	   “in	   the	  
representational	  regime	  that	  you	  can	  find	  unrepresentable	  subject	  matters,	  meaning	  
those	   for	  which	   form	  and	  matter	   cannot	  be	   fitted	   together	   in	  any	  way.”	   (Rancière	  
2007:68)	   Thus	   Hugo's	   photographic	   images	   maintain,	   as	   negative	   presentations	  
(presentations	  of	  the	  unpresentable)	  an	  innate	  capacity	  to	  shock.	  The	  revelatory	  jolt	  
of	  Hugo's	  vestiges	   is	   compounded	  however	  by	  Burkean	  notions	  of	  pain	  and	  death.	  
Unlike	   the	   non-­‐representational	   work	   of	   Abstract	   Expressionism,	   the	   pictorial	  
evocations	  of	  Hugo	  challenge,	  albeit	  from	  a	  safe	  remove,	  our	  sense	  of	  personal	  and	  
physical	  wellbeing.	  
	  
The	   shock	   of	   the	   hit	   that	   is	   the	   suspension	   of	   reason	   corresponds	   to	   the	   Burkean	  
astonishment	  applied	  by	  Weigel	   to	   the	  entranced	   spectatorship	  of	  9/11	  –	   the	   fear	  
and	  wonder	  of	  the	  sublime	  sociopolitical	  spectacle.	  “(A)stonishment	  is	  that	  state	  of	  
the	  soul,	  in	  which	  all	  its	  motions	  are	  suspended	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  horror.	  In	  this	  
case	  the	  mind	  is	  so	  entirely	  filled	  with	  its	  object,	  that	  it	  cannot	  entertain	  any	  other,	  
nor	  by	  consequence	  reason	  on	  that	  object	  which	  employs	   it...Astonishment...is	   the	  
effect	  of	  the	  sublime	  in	  its	  highest	  degree...”	  (Burke	  2004:101)	  The	  potential	  of	  these	  
images	  –	  of	  mummified	  bodies,	  of	  scattered	  bones	  and	  mass	  graves	  –	   to	  shock,	   to	  
reactivate	  as	  aesthetic	  spectacle	  the	  sublime	  happening,	  to	  astonish	  and	  achieve	  in	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the	   viewer	   this	   deferral	   of	   reason,	   qualifies	   them	   as	   invocations	   of	   the	   Burkean	  
sublime.	   In	   regards	   to	   Kantian	   notions	   of	   sublimity,	   Hugo's	   work	   is	   imbued	   with	  
notions	   of	   the	  mathematical	   sublime	   in	   that	   it	   is	   essentially	   a	   presentation	   of	   the	  
unpresentable	   –	   the	   unquantifiable	   horror	   of	   such	   a	   great	   loss	   of	   life.	   As	   Tadjo	  
categorically	  states	  of	   its	  devastating	  scope,	   it	   is	  a	  political	  phenomenon	  which	  can	  
“never	   be	   fully	   understood.”	   (Tadjo	   2010:382)	   As	   a	   body	   of	   work	   it	   is	   however	  
primarily	   aligned	   to	   the	   dynamical	   sublime,	   as	   a	   visual	   depiction	   of	   terror	   and	  
deferred	   threat.	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   allows	   the	   viewer,	   by	   the	  
modification	  of	  distance,	  the	  realisation	  of	  an	  incomprehensible	  event.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  pervasive	  influence	  of	  threat,	  of	  terror	  and	  death	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  event,	  impinges	  
upon	   their	   instinctual	   concern	   for	   self-­‐preservation,	   and	   so	   activates	   psychological	  
effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  As	  Ray	  notes,	  “Through	  the	  artistic	  mimesis	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  
trauma,	   disturbance	   is	   reinstalled	   in	   the	   scene	   and	   put	   back	   into	   play,	   spurring	  
mourning	  back	  into	  movement.”	  (Ray	  2005:6)	  
	  
The	   terror	   event,	   or	   hit,	   is	   according	   to	   Ray	   an	   experience	   of	   trauma	   –	   trauma	  
marking	   as	   it	   does,	   “...the	   limit	   of	   conventionalised,	   assimilable	   experience.”	   (Ray	  
2005:1)	  Or	  as	  trauma	  theorists	  Pumla	  Gobodo-­‐Madikizela	  and	  Chris	  van	  der	  Merwe	  
note,	  “the	  experience	  of	  trauma	  splits	  and	  fragments	  the	  self...”	  (quoted	  in	  Samuel	  
2010:367)	  Mourning	  is	  the	  term	  he	  applies,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  psychoanalytic	  theory,	  
to	  the	  panic	  scramble	  following	  trauma,	  the	  attempted	  recapitulation	  of	  the	  missed	  
encounter.	   It	   is	   a,	   “testing,	   reflection,	   analysis,	   judgement...”	   (Ray	   2005:1)	   –	   or	   in	  
regards	  to	  the	  mimesis	  of	  art,	  the	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  experience,	  
the	  shocking	  display	  of	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror.	  Of	  such	  a	  spectacle,	  the	  viewer	  seeks	  
to	   assimilate	   the	   reality	   of	   their	  witness,	   and	   yet	   can	   assimilate	   only	   this	   negative	  
impression,	   the	  missed	   experience	   of	   the	   collective	   trauma.	   Thus,	   “Reception	  will	  
now	  become	  more	  and	  more	  like	  a	  form	  of	  mourning.”	  (Ray	  2005:6)	  This	  mourning	  
in	  which	  “(t)he	  terror	  of	  the	  sublime	  becomes	  a	  permanent,	  ghastly	  latency...”	  (Ray	  
2005:5)	   marks	   for	   Ray,	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   supersensible	   faculty	   of	   Kant,	   a	  
significant	  shift	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  sublime.	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As	  previously	  noted,	  in	  his	  evaluation	  of	  the	  sublime	  experience	  Kant	  introduces	  the	  
notion	  of	   the	   supersensible.	   The	  elevated	   faculty	  of	   reason	  which	   comes	   into	  play	  
when	  the	  individual,	  confronted	  with	  a	  scenario	  of	  infinite	  size	  or	  devastating	  power,	  
recognises	   the	   insufficiency	   of	   their	   ability	   to	   apprehend	   or	   withstand,	   and	   in	   so	  
doing	  establishes	  their	  own	  moral	  transcendence.	  It	  is	  the	  triumph	  of	  human	  reason	  
over	  the	  sensible.	  In	  the	  application	  of	  the	  sublime	  to	  the	  sociopolitical	  catastrophe	  
however,	   and	   in	   the	   context	   of	   postmodernity,	   Ray	   argues	   that	   the	   compensatory	  
value	  of	  this	  supersensible	  faculty	  is	  negated.	  To	  reiterate,	  “In	  the	  wake	  of	  Aushwitz	  
and	  Hiroshima...the	   ruined	  dignity	  and	  destiny	  of	  human	   reason	  and	   its	  moral	   law	  
can	   offer	   no	   compensatory	   pleasure.”	   (Ray	   2005:5)	   Rather	   than	   the	   transcendent	  
and	  supersensible	  notion	  of	  human	  progress	  attached	  by	  Kant	  to	  an	  instance	  like	  the	  
French	   Revolution,	   we	   are	   instead	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   such	   politically	   engendered	  
incursions,	   left	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   disillusion.	   The	   horror	   and	   astonishment	   of	   the	  
sublime,	  this	  mourning,	  stripped	  of	  the	  self-­‐affirming	  dynamic	  of	  the	  supersensible.	  
Genocidal	  acts	  such	  as	  those	  depicted	  in	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide	  attest	  
to,	  if	  anything,	  a	  failure	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  catastrophic	  result	  of	  an	  embodied	  notion	  
like	   Hutu	   Power.	   A	   sublime	   politic	   of	   terror,	   rendered	   in	   the	   'now'	   by	   the	  
photographic	   image,	   reactivating	   as	   it	   were	   the	   instance	   of	   trauma,	   leaving	   the	  
viewer	  with	  nothing	  but,	  as	  Ray	  purposes,	  a	  residual	  and	  ongoing	  latency,	  the	  open	  
psychological	  wound	  of	  terror.	  	  
	  
In	   applying	   to	   the	   sociopolitical	   work	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo	   notions	   of	   the	   sublimity	   of	  
terror,	   these	   postmodern	   concerns	   must	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   In	   lieu	   of	   the	  
anthropological	   sequence	   of	   horrors	   which	   haunt	   the	   twentieth	   century:	   the	  
Holocaust,	  Hiroshima,	   the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  as	  well	   as	   their	   twenty-­‐first	   century	  
permutations,	  a	  prevailing	   scepticism	   towards	  Kantian	   ideals	  of	   the	  moral	   law,	   the	  
transcendence	  of	  reason,	  of	  human	  progress.	  In	  his	  pathetically	  sublime,	  a	  sublimity	  
of	   power	   derived	   from	   the	   dynamical	   of	   Kant,	   Schiller	   establishes	   the	   sublime	  
experience	   proceeding	   from	   the	   visual	   witness	   of	   calamity,	   the	   dramatic	   and	  
devastating	  effects	  of	   the	  displayed	  power,	   the	   token	   threat.	   Tragic	   art	  has	   in	   this	  
sense	   the	  ability,	   in	   its	   presentation	  of	   suffering,	   to	  elicit	   in	   the	   viewer	   a	   two-­‐part	  
response.	  The	  first	  being	  an	  impulsive	  emotional	  response,	  what	  Schiller	  terms	  a	  co-­‐
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suffering.	   Confronted	   by	   the	   presented	   terror	   effect,	   in	   this	   case	   Rwanda	   2004:	  
Vestiges	  of	  a	  genocide,	   the	  viewer	  experiences	  the	  event,	   the	  effect,	  as	  affect.	  The	  
unsolicited	   response	   of	   Schiller's	   natural	   law:	   the	   combined	   distress,	   sympathy,	  
indignation,	  even	  shame	  one	  feels	  in	  the	  witness	  of	  such	  suffering.	  Equatable	  to	  the	  
antecedent	  empathy	  of	  Burke	  or,	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  visual	  hit,	   to	   the	  mourning	  of	  
Ray.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  pathetically	  sublime	  is	  that	  motion	  of	  the	  supersensible,	  
a	  moral	  autonomy	  in	  which	  reason	  transcends	  the	  trauma	  of	  the	  event,	  elevating	  our	  
minds	   above	   the	   exhibition	   of	   tragedy.	   “The	   self-­‐perception	   of	   the	   subject	   as	   a	  
member	  of	  the	  supersensible	  world	  of	  Reason	  and	  Freedom.”	  (Rancière	  2007:68)	  	  It	  
is	   this	   mental	   act	   of	   rising	   above	   which	   qualifies	   for	   Schiller	   the	   experience	   as	  
sublime,	   according	   to	   Kantian	   notions	   of	   transcendence	   and	  moral	   law.	   It	   is	   here	  
where	  Ray	  and	  postmodern	  theory	  in	  general	  take	  issue.	  Do	  we	  rise	  above	  traumatic	  
incursions	  like	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  by	  the	  assertion	  of	  our	  moral	  independence,	  
or	   is	   such	   a	   gesture	   thwarted	   as	   Ray	   suggests	   by	   disillusion,	   “compounded	  by	   the	  
anguish	  of	  shame”?	  (Ray	  2005:5)	  Tempered	  by	  these	  postmodern	  modifications,	  the	  
supersensible	  aspect	  of	   the	   sublime	   is,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   sociopolitical	   spectacle	  of	  
terror,	  displaced	  by	  an	  unresolved,	  haunting	  resignation.	  	  
	  
Whether	   these	   concerns	   rob	   the	   sublime	   of	   the	  moral	   duty	   inferred	   by	   Kant	   and	  
Schiller	   is	   open	   to	   debate.	   For	   whilst	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   such	   disaster	   we	   may	   ask	  
ourselves,	  what	  can	  I	  do?	  knowing	  as	  we	  do	  the	  answer	  to	  be	  nothing,	  we	  do	  engage	  
in	  this	  latent	  'movement	  of	  mourning'	  (Ray	  2005:1).	  Essentially	  retrograde,	  an	  act	  of	  
remembrance.	   And	   as	   Sontag	   notes,	   “Remembering	   is	   an	   ethical	   act,	   has	   ethical	  
value	   in	  and	  of	   itself.”	   (Sontag	  2004:103)	  Hugo	  himself	  admits	   (with	  a	  certain	   self-­‐
effacing	  reluctance)	  to	  be	  something	  of	  a	  moralist;	  the	  stated	  intention	  of	  his	  work,	  
as	   a	   a	   forensic	   view	   of	   these	   'lingering	   memorials',	   being	   to	   remind.	   (Hugo	   15	  
December	   2010)	  Whilst	   the	   supersensible	   factor	   remains	   for	   many	   a	   problematic	  
concern,	   this	   intrinsic	   value	   and	   ethic	   of	   remembrance	   is	   what,	   in	   my	   opinion,	  
validates	  the	  application	  of	  such	  notions	  of	  sublimity	  to	  Pieter	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  2004:	  
Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide.	   His	   (partial)	   visual	   interpretations	   of	   terror,	   of	   the	  
fundamentally	  unpresentable	  historical	  occurrence	  of	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  activate	  
in	  the	  viewer	  the	  shock	  and	  horror	  of	  the	  sublime.	  This	  co-­‐suffering,	  deferred	  terror,	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this	  unabated	  sense	  of	  residual	  mourning	  is	  perhaps	  ethically	  the	  most	  appropriate	  
(if	  appropriate	  is	  indeed	  an	  appropriate	  word)	  response	  to	  such	  a	  visual	  spectacle.	  	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  my	  intention	  in	  this	  chapter	  to	  align	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Pieter	  Hugo	  notions	  of	  
the	  sublime.	  To	  posit	  the	  photographic	  documentations	  of	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  
a	  genocide	  as	  mimetic	  presentations	  of	  an	  intrinsically	  unpresentable	  reality.	  We	  can	  
by	   no	   means	   grasp	   the	   breadth	   of	   tragedy,	   the	   magnitude	   of	   suffering	   that	  
constitute	   the	   occurrence	   of	   genocide;	   nor	   can	   we	   admit	   any	   single	   attempt	   to	  
document	   or	   phrase	   such	   an	   event	   as	   a	   conclusive,	   definitive	   idiom.	   Rather,	   in	  
acknowledgment	  of	  this,	  Hugo's	  work	  functions	  as	  what	  Kant	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  negative	  
presentation.	  Furthermore	  as	  an	  aestheticising	  of	  terror,	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  
genocide	  as	  a	  visual	  spectacle	  embodies	  something	  of	  the	  Burkean	  sublime.	  That	  is,	  
as	   a	   source	  of	   terror,	   the	   token	   threat	  of	  privation,	  or	   in	   the	   language	  of	  Ray,	   the	  
reactivated	  hit	  of	  the	  traumatic	  event,	  evoking	  in	  the	  viewer	  the	  negative	  pleasure	  or	  
psychological	   effects	   of	   the	   sublime.	   The	   power	   of	   these	   images	   to	   shock,	   to	  
overwhelm,	  and	   so	  generate	   that	   suspension	  of	   reason,	   identifies	   them	  as	  graphic	  
emissaries	  of	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror.	  In	  regards	  to	  the	  dynamical	  sublime	  of	  Kant,	  as	  
well	   as	   the	   revisions	  of	   Schiller,	   I	   have	  noted	   in	   the	  postmodern	   context	   a	   shift	   in	  
focus	  from	  the	  supersensible	  to	  the	  contemporary	  disillusionment	  and	  latent	  horror	  
derived	   from	   such	  witness.	   That	   residual	   feeling	   that	   Lyotard	   notes	   as	   the	   sign	   of	  
history,	  the	  only	  true	  analogy	  of	  the	  sublime.	  This	  feeling,	  this	  mourning,	  this	  inertia	  
of	  co-­‐suffering	  is,	  as	  has	  been	  suggested,	  a	  form	  of	  remembrance,	  a	  recollection	  of	  
the	   forever	   missed	   encounter.	   The	   ethical	   benefit	   of	   such	   commemorative	  
engagement	   is	   I	   feel	   a	   form	   of	   consolation,	   and	   warrants	   the	   application	   of	   such	  
notions	   of	   sublimity	   –	   of	   terror	   and	   the	   unpresentable	   –	   to	   the	   commemorative	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Chapter	  3:	  Murder	  on	  7th	  and	  the	  Terror	  Affect	  
	  
What	  the	  detective	  story	  is	  about	  is	  not	  murder	  but	  the	  restoration	  of	  order.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  P.D	  James	  
	  
Having	   examined	   notions	   of	   the	   sublime,	   of	   terror	   and	   the	   unpresentable	   in	   the	  
work	   of	   Pieter	   Hugo,	   and	   in	   regards	   to	   such	   social	   and	   political	   upheavals	   as	   the	  
Holocaust,	  Hiroshima	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	   it	   is	  my	   intention	   in	  this	  chapter	  
to	   propose	   for	   consideration	   similar	   notions	   of	   sublimity,	   but	   in	   regards	   to	  
threatening	  social	  disorders	  like	  violent	  crime	  and	  HIV/Aids.	  In	  reference	  to	  the	  work	  
of	  various	  artists,	  including	  Pieter	  Hugo,	  but	  with	  a	  primary	  focus	  on	  my	  own	  body	  of	  
work,	  Murder	  on	  7th	   (2009),	   I	  wish	  to	  examine	  the	  manner	   in	  which	  such	  aesthetic	  
presentations	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  embodying	  such	  notions.	  
	  
Plagued	  by	  violence	  and	  crime	  –	  murder,	  rape,	  hijackings	  –	  South	  Africa	  is	  a	  country	  
caught	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux.	  Anxiety	  over	  the	  state	  of	  the	  country	  has	  created	  a	  
sort	  of	   collective	  neurosis	   in	   its	  populace,	   infiltrating	   their	  everyday.	   In	  addition	   to	  
weather	   and	   the	   general	   mundanities	   of	   'small	   talk',	   conversations	   tend	   towards	  
such	  concerns.	  Regaled	  over	  coffee	  in	  malls	  or	  the	  office	  canteen,	  stories	  of	  horror:	  
personal	   experiences	   or	   those	   of	   family	   and	   friends.	   Newspapers	   and	   television	  
newscasts	  constitute	  a	   running	  commentary	  of	  cases:	   the	  heist	  of	  another	  cash-­‐in-­‐
transit	   van,	   armed	   domestic	   robbery	   or	   xenophobic	   attack.	   The	   resultant	   fixation	  
amongst	   the	   South	   African	   public	   with	   this	   conglomerate	   notion	   of	   crime,	   this	  
continually	   unravelling	   and	   circulating	   spectacle	   of	   terror	   and	   violence,	   is	   it	  
morbidity,	   a	   macabre	   fascination?	   What	   Pieter	   Hugo	   notes	   as	   our	   preoccupation	  
with	   detritus,	   that	   'push-­‐pull'	   desire	  which	   has	   us	  milling	   around	   the	   car	   accident	  
(Hugo	  15	  December	  2010),	  or	  as	  Mark	  Seltzer	  observes,	   “(our)	  collective	  gathering	  
around	  shock,	  trauma	  and	  the	  wound.”?	  (Seltzer	  quoted	  in	  Weigel	  2010)	  Whilst	  we	  
are	  undeniably	  so	  drawn	  to	  the	  spectacle	  of	  horror,	  it	  is	  my	  feeling	  however	  that	  this	  
push-­‐pull	  dynamic	   is	   further	  motivated	  by	  what,	   in	  regards	  to	  the	  murder	  mystery,	  
best-­‐seller	  'whodunnit'	  novelist	  P.D	  James	  refers	  to	  as	  our	  desire	  for	  the	  'restoration	  
of	   order',	   for	   closure.	   	  Murder	   on	   7th	   investigates	   this	   need	   for	   closure	  within	   the	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agitated	  and	  disenchanted	  state	  of	  South	  Africa	  –	  in	  regards	  to	  violence	  and	  crime,	  a	  
desire	  for	  the	  'restoration	  of	  order'.	  It	  is	  my	  intention	  to	  align	  to	  this	  what	  Ray	  refers	  
to	   as	   the	   trauma	   of	   the	   hit	   and	   the	   retrograde	  motion	   that	   follows	   –	   the	   piecing	  
together	  of	   the	  missed	  encounter,	  assimilated	  as	   'the	  miss	   itself'.	   (Ray	  2005:1)	  The	  
proposed	  identification	  of	  this	  collective	  trauma	  and	  desire,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  witness	  
of	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  sublime.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   body	   of	   work,	   Murder	   on	   7th	   is	   styled	   according	   to	   the	   murder	   mystery	  
'whodunnit'	   tradition.	   Seven	   rooms,	   typical	   of	   the	   suburban	   domestic	   residence	  
(bedroom,	   dining	   room,	   kitchen,	   lounge,	   passage,	   spare	   room	   and	   study)	   are	  
presented	  as	  potential	  crime	  scenes,	  to	  be	  investigated	  by	  the	  viewer.	  The	  image	  of	  
each	   room,	  a	   titled	  portrait	   set	   in	   its	   corresponding	  environ,	   is	  presented	  within	  a	  
black	  CCTV-­‐like	  structure	  or	  housing.	  This	   reference	  to	  surveillance	   is	   suggestive	  of	  
the	   potential	   threat	   of	   crime,	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   pervasive	   culture	   of	   security	   in	  
suburban	   South	  Africa.	  Moreover,	   insinuating	   a	   'spying-­‐in',	   an	   investigation	   of	   this	  
private	   world.	   Accompanying	   the	   visual	   station	   of	   each	   room	   is	   a	   floor	   panel,	  
denoting	  the	  room	  in	  question:	  parquet,	  tiles,	  linoleum,	  etc...	  Referencing	  once	  more	  
the	  murder-­‐mystery	   aesthetic,	   these	   panels	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   ‘rooms’	   in	   the	  
board-­‐game	   Cluedo	   (otherwise	   known	   as	   Clue).	   Encouraged	   to	   stand	   on	   the	   floor	  
panels,	  the	  viewer	  participates,	  is	  drawn	  into	  the	  'room'.	  Murder	  on	  7th,	  through	  this	  
act	  of	  'spying-­‐in’	  on	  such	  everyday	  scenes,	  highlights	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  even	  the	  
everyday	   spaces	   that	   are	   these	   rooms	  are	  haunted	  by	   the	   threat	  of	   violent	   crime,	  
and	  how	  even	  the	  most	  ordinary	  and	  'normal'	  interactions	  in	  the	  South	  African	  locale	  
are	   infused	  with	  a	   sense	  of	  paranoia	  and	   fixation,	  an	  underlying	  neurosis.	  And	  not	  
one	  of	  morbidity	  alone,	  but	  stimulated	  further	  by	  a	  need	  and	  desire	  for	  resolution,	  
closure,	   answers,	   that	   'restoration	   of	   order.'	   Generally	   unrequited,	   the	   nature	   of	  
such	  a	  need,	   in	   view	  of	   this	   spectacle	  of	   trauma,	   recalls	   the	   residual	  psychological	  
wasteland	   accounted	   for	   by	   Ray	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   sociopolitical,	   postmodern	  
spectacle	   of	   terror,	   in	   which	   “The	   terror	   of	   the	   sublime	   becomes	   a	   permanent,	  
ghastly	  latency...”	  (Ray	  2005:5)	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  seven	  image	  stations,	  Murder	  on	  7th	  includes	  two	  ceiling-­‐mounted	  
structures,	   housing	   four	   and	   three	   image	   stations	   respectively	   –	   once	   again	  
accompanied	  by	  corresponding	  floor	  panels.	  A	  video	  piece	  entitled	  TV	  Room	  (2009),	  
a	   somewhat	  unnerving	  montage	  of	   film	  and	   television	   sequences,	   further	  explores	  
this	   notion	   of	   fixation	   and	   witness.	   TRIP	   WIRE	   (2011),	   an	   installation	   piece,	  
accompanies	  the	  show,	  acting	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  perimeter	  and	  latent	  threat.	  	  
	  
In	  chapter	  one	  and	  two	  I	  examined	  the	  manner	  in	  which,	  in	  recent	  times,	  the	  natural	  
spectacle	  of	  the	  Burkean	  sublime	  –	  the	  threatening,	  overhanging	  rock,	  the	  tempest,	  
the	  natural	  disaster	  –	  has	  been	  supplanted	  by	  the	  sociopolitical	  upheaval.	  Politically	  
motivated	   embodiments	   of	   terror,	   resulting	   in	   mass	   suffering,	   and	   for	   those	   at	   a	  
privileged	  Burkean	  remove,	  a	  spectacle	  of	  unimaginable	  horror.	  For	  consideration,	  I	  
mean	  now	  to	  present	  certain	  threatening	  social	  disorders,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  
violent	   crime	   in	   South	   Africa,	   as	   being	   similarly	   (but	   also	   uniquely)	   qualified.	   Not	  
politically	  engineered	  as	  such,	  but	  products	  of	  society	  –	  negative	  out-­‐workings	  of	  a	  
sociopolitical	   and	  economic	  environment.	  These	  disorders,	  when	  apprehended	  not	  
as	   individual	  cases	  but	  as	  abstract	  wholes,	  constitute	  a	  significant	  mental	  spectacle	  
of	  threat	  and	  terror.	  	  
	  
Commissioned	   by	   South	   Africa's	  Minister	   of	   Safety	   and	   Security,	   a	   recent	   six-­‐part	  
study	  on	  the	  violent	  nature	  of	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  conducted	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  the	  
Study	   of	   Violence	   and	   Reconciliation	   (CSVR),	   outlines	   something	   of	   the	   scope	   and	  
nature	  of	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa:	  component	  one	  being	  a	  concept	  paper	  on	  the	  violent	  
nature	  of	   crime,	   	   component	   two	  a	   study	  of	  murder,	   component	   three	  a	   study	  on	  
sexual	  violence,	  component	  four	  an	  analysis	  of	  contributing	  socioeconomic	  factors,	  
component	  five	  a	  study	  on	  perpetrators	  of	  violence,	  and	  component	  six	  a	  concluding	  
report	   of	   key	   findings	   and	   recommendations.	   (CSVR	   2009:2)	   As	   noted	   in	   the	  
publication,	  Why	   does	   South	   Africa	   have	   such	   high	   rates	   of	   violent	   crime?	   (2009),	  
“During	  the	   last	  100	  years	  several	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  Rwanda,	  Cambodia,	  and	  
Germany,	  have	  engaged	  in	  forms	  of	  mass	  violence	  or	  other	  systematic	  human	  rights	  
violations,	  such	  as	  campaigns	  of	  genocide,	  in	  which	  rates	  of	  killing	  have	  far	  exceeded	  
those	  in	  South	  Africa.”	  (CSVR	  2009:4).	  South	  Africa	  is	  however	  situated	  as	  one	  of,	  “a	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relatively	   small	   group	   of	   countries	   which	   currently	   suffer	   from	   exceptionally	   high	  
rates	  of	  violent	  crime.”	  (CSVR	  2009:4)	  The	  generally	  accepted	  barometer	  of	  violent	  
crime	   in	  any	  country	   is	   its	  murder	   rate.	   In	   the	   late	  1990's,	  South	  Africa	   recorded	  a	  
rate	   of	   60	   per	   100	   000	   –	   an	   acute	   figure,	  with	   Columbia,	   a	   country	   known	   for	   its	  
syndicated	  and	  violent	  crime,	  coming	  in	  at	  46.	  A	  post	  1994	  statistical	  low-­‐point	  was	  
reached	   in	   2007-­‐2008,	   at	   39	   per	   100	   000	   –	   though	   an	   improvement,	   still	   an	  
exceptionally	  high	  rate	  of	  murder.	  As	  mentioned,	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa	  is	  not	  
the	  engineered	  intent	  of	  a	  political	   ideal	   like	  Hutu	  Power	  or	  Nazism,	  but	  rather	  the	  
resultant	   and	   ongoing	   by-­‐product	   of	   past	   political	   and	   racist	   programmes	   like	  
Apartheid	  and	   colonialism,	   as	  well	   as	  of	   current	   socioeconomic	   factors.	   This	   is	   not	  
the	  embodied	  terror	  of	  a	  sublime	  politic,	  but	  a	   threat	  and	  terror	  which	  haunts	   the	  
democratic	  and	  humane	  structures	  of	  the	  new	  South	  Africa.	  The	  dark	  shadow	  of	  the	  
Rainbow	   Nation.	   There	   is	   as	   the	   CSVR	   notes,	   in	   reference	   to	   such	   scenarios	   of	  
genocide,	  no	  comparison	  in	  terms	  of	  loss	  of	  life	  –	  however,	  the	  state	  of	  violent	  crime	  
in	   South	   Africa,	   as	   a	   critical	   phenomenon,	   constitutes	   nonetheless	   a	   spectacle	   of	  
significant	  threat.	  	  
	  
In	  his	  Critique	  of	  Judgement	   (1892),	  accounting	  for	  the	  mathematical	  sublime,	  Kant	  
notes	  of	   the	  pyramids	   that	   the	  sublime	  spectacle	  arises	  as	   such	  only	  when	  viewed	  
from	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view.	   If	   from	  too	  great	  a	  distance,	  “'then	  the	  apprehended	  
parts...are	  presented	  only	  obscurely...and	  if	  one	  gets	  too	  close,	  then	  the	  eye	  needs	  
some	  time	  to	  complete	  the	  apprehension	  from	  the	  base	  to	  peak.'”	  (Kant,	  quoted	  in	  
Shaw	   2006:118)	   In	   regards	   to	   the	   dynamical	   sublime	   however,	   the	   spectacle	   of	  
power,	   of	   threat,	   if	   apprehended	   from	   too	   great	   a	   distance	   –	   geographically	   or	  
historically	   –	   is	   robbed	   of	   its	   capacity	   to	   astonish	   and	   overwhelm.	   If	   viewed	   too	  
nearly,	   the	  experience	  of	  witness	  becomes	   that	  of	   actual	   experience,	   the	  deferred	  
threat	  of	  the	  sublime	  becomes	  terror	  itself.	  And	  as	  established,	  when	  the	  source	  of	  
terror	  presses	  too	  nearly,	  and	  so	  compromises	  the	  relative	  safety	  of	  spectatorship,	  it	  
ceases	   to	  be	  sublime.	  Applied	   to	   the	  spectacle	  of	  violent	  crime	   in	  South	  Africa	  –	   if	  
perceived	   from	   Japan	   or	   Norway	   –	   the	   implied	   threat	   is	   reduced,	   the	   witness	  
tarnished	  by	  the	  ambivalence	  of	  so	  great	  a	  remove.	  If	  apprehended	  however	  from	  a	  
lounge	  in	  Johannesburg,	  watching	  the	  evening	  news	  from	  within	  the	  'relative	  safety'	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of	   the	  electrified	  and	  alarmed	  perimeter	  of	  a	  middle-­‐class	  suburban	  residence,	   the	  
spectacle	  of	  threat	  seems	  that	  much	  more	  imposing,	  closer	  to	  home.	  In	  reference	  to	  
this	   function	   of	   proximity,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   nature	   of	  witness,	   Sontag	   quotes	   her	  
interaction	  with	  a	  Sarajevan	  woman,	  	  
	  
In	   October	   1991	   I	   was	   here	   in	   my	   nice	   apartment	   in	   peaceful	   Sarajevo	   when	   the	   Serbs	  
invaded	  Croatia,	  and	  I	  remember	  when	  the	  evening	  news	  showed	  footage	  of	  the	  destruction	  
of	  Vukovar,	  just	  a	  couple	  of	  hundred	  miles	  away,	  I	  thought	  to	  myself,	  “Oh,	  how	  horrible,”	  and	  
switched	  the	  channel.	  So	  how	  can	   I	  be	   indignant	   if	   someone	   in	  France	  or	   Italy	  or	  Germany	  
sees	   the	   killing	   taking	   place	   here	   day	   after	   day	   on	   their	   evening	   news	   and	   says,	   “Oh,	   how	  
horrible”,	  and	  looks	  for	  another	  programme.	  It's	  normal.	  It's	  human.	  (Sontag	  2004:89)	  
	  
For	  the	  South	  African,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  violent	  crime	  is	  engrossing,	  whereas	  for	  
the	  Japanese	  or	  Norwegian	  it	  may	  be	  horrible	  but	  distant	  nonetheless,	  less	  engaging	  
than	  other	  channels.	  The	  threatening	  social	  disorder	  of	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa	  
can,	   in	   this	   sense,	   I	   feel	  be	   regarded	  by	   those	  who	   from	  such	  close	  proximity	  bear	  
witness	  to	  it,	  as	  a	  spectacle	  of	  sublime	  power.	  It	  is	  for	  them	  the	  overhanging	  cliff,	  the	  
tempest	  before	  them.	  Murder	  on	  7th	  explores	  something	  of	  the	  altered	  normality	  of	  
such	  witness,	  the	  precarious,	  localised	  remove	  of	  the	  South	  African	  who,	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
astonishment	  and	  anxiety,	  views	  within	  their	  own	  country	  the	  unravelling	  horror	  of	  
such	   a	   disorder.	   The	   disarming	   portraits	   of	   the	   seven	   image	   stations,	   or	   rooms,	  
encapsulate	  something	  of	   this.	  As	  noted	  by	  critic	  Bettina	  Malcomess	   in	  her	  article,	  
Scene	  Too	  Much:	  Gabrielle	  Goliath	   (2010)	   “The	  slightly	   foreshortened	   image	  works	  
like	   a	   mock	   mirror	   reflection	   of	   their	   own	   obsession	   with	   domestic	   security	   and	  
order.”	   (Malcomess	   2010:120)	   The	   suspended	   conglomerate	   image	   station,	  Dining	  
Room,	   Spare	   Room,	   Study	   and	   the	   installation	   of	   TRIP	   WIRE	   focus	   on	   issues	   of	  
perimeter,	   of	   security,	   the	   need	   to	   maintain	   that	   Burkean	   remove.	   Within	   the	  
threatening	   environment	   of	   a	   crime-­‐ridden	   South	   Africa,	   a	   fortified	   position	   and	  
viewpoint	  of	  relative	  safety.	  
	  
As	  Burke	  insists,	  “When	  danger	  or	  pain	  press	  too	  nearly,	  they	  are	  incapable	  of	  giving	  
any	   delight,	   and	   are	   simply	   terrible;	   but	   at	   certain	   distances,	   and	   with	   certain	  
modifications,	   they	   may	   be,	   and	   they	   are	   delightful	   as	   we	   everyday	   experience.”	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(Burke	  2004:86)	  The	  actual	  reality	  of	  violent	  crime	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  experience	  of	  
the	  sublime,	  but	  rather	  one	  of	  terror	  and	  of	  genuine	  pain.	  It	  is	  only	  be	  means	  of	  the	  
witness	  facilitated	  by	  the	  modifications	  of	  security,	  that	  the	  privileged	  few,	  the	  South	  
African	   middle	   and	   upper-­‐class,	   attain	   this	   manner	   of	   'distance',	   and	   so	   an	  
appreciation	  of	  the	  spectacle	  of	  violent	  crime	  as	  the	  deferred	  terror	  of	  the	  sublime	  
(Burke	  2004:86).	  Such	  modifications:	  electric	   fencing,	  armed	   response,	  etc...	   are,	   it	  
must	   be	   noted,	   not	   afforded	   the	   population	   at	   large,	  who	   live	   in	   this	   sense	   in	   an	  
everyday	  reality	  somewhat	  closer	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  violent	  crime.	  The	  remove	  of	  the	  
suburban	   fortress,	   presented	   as	   burglar-­‐proofed	   exteriors	   in	   Dining	   Room,	   Spare	  
Room,	   Study	   is	   however	   an	   uncertain	   one	   –	   and	   so	   the	   vulnerable	   interiors	   of	  
Bedroom,	   Kitchen,	   Lounge,	   Passage.	   For	   all	   the	  modifications	   of	   security,	   one	   still	  
threatened	   by	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   feared	   break-­‐in	   or	   hijacking.	   As	   though	   the	  
dramatic,	   romantic	   storm	   released	   over	   distant	   hills,	   by	   a	   sudden	   change	   of	  wind	  
blows	  suddenly	  nearer,	  so	  the	  spectacle	  of	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa	  may	  at	  any	  
point	  come	  bursting	  through	  the	  front	  door	  or	  over	  the	  back	  wall,	  and	  so	  actuate	  the	  
living	   nightmare	   of	   terror	   in	   the	   real.	   The	   witness,	   the	   affect	   of	   the	   spectacle	   of	  
terror	  which	  is	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  is	  thus	  underscored	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  dread	  
and	  foreboding.	  The	  acknowledgement	  that	  such	  sublime	  affect	  may	  at	  some	  point	  
of	   rupture	   manifest	   as	   effect.	   The	   remote	   terror	   of	   witness	   transported	   into	  
actuality.	   In	   this	   sense,	  Murder	  on	  7th	   investigates	   the	  anxiety	  of	   such	  a	   rupture	  of	  
this	  borderline	  between	  a	  vicarious	  witness	  and	  reality.	  As	  the	  sublime	  spectacle	  of	  
9/11,	   as	   an	   act	   of	   terrorism,	   brought	   for	   many	   into	   radical	   focus	   the	   notion	   that	  
nowhere	   is	  safe,	  so	  the	  spectacle	  of	  violent	  crime,	   for	  the	  South	  African	  witness	  of	  
relative	   safety,	   insinuates	   the	   same.	  As	   Elleke	  Boehmer	  notes,	   “the	  deep	  paranoia	  
associated	  with	  terror	  is	  that,	  once	  conceived,	  once	  entertained	  in	  the	  mind,	  terror	  
will	   inexorably	  arise,	  somewhere,	  and	  attack	  the	  body,	  whether	  national,	   social,	  or	  
individual...	  (Boehmer	  2011:1)	  
	  
Unlike	  Pieter	  Hugo's	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  Genocide,	  Murder	  on	  7th	  does	  not	  
by	  representative	  and	  mimetic	  means	  reactivate	  an	  historical	  happening,	  but	  instead	  
documents	  something	  of	  the	  affect,	  the	  agitated	  witness	  of	  a	  continually	  unravelling	  
spectacle.	   Rather	   than	   a	   horror	   of	   the	   past,	   it	   is	   the	   recurrent,	   mediated	   and	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circulated	  hit	  of	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa.	  An	  ongoing	  trauma,	  a	  forever	  missed	  
encounter,	   which	   with	   relentless	   consistency	   generates	   in	   this	   unsettled	  
spectatorship,	   a	   ghastly	   latency	   –	   the	   retrograde	   movement	   of	   mourning	   and	  
disillusion.	   (Ray	   2005:1)	   The	   seemingly	   unresolvable	   situation	   of	   crime	   in	   South	  
Africa,	   the	   feeling	   of	   it	   being	   an	   unchecked	   stream	   of	   terror	   and	   violence,	  
adumbrates	  the	  imposing	  scale	  of	  this	  threatening	  social	  disorder.	  As	  though	  without	  
end,	   the	   phenomenon	   is	   in	   a	   sense	   unquantifiable,	   and	   so	   overwhelming.	   The	  
imbued	   threat	   of	   such	   a	   spectacle	   is	   thus	   heightened,	   further	   encouraging,	   as	   I	  
propose,	  these	  psychological	  effects	  of	  the	  sublime.	  
	  
Engaging	   with	   the	   social	   disorder	   of	   her	   native	   Columbia,	   artist	   Doris	   Salcedo	  
presents	   an	   aestheticising	   of	   such	   terror.	   Jonathan	   Jones	   of	   the	   Guardian	   notes,	  
“Salcedo	   insists	   her	  work	   is	   a	   direct	   expression	   of	   other	   people's	   suffering,	   rather	  
than	  merely	  her	  own	  emotional	  response	  to	  it;	  indeed,	  each	  work	  of	  art	  she	  makes	  is	  
based	  on	  specific	  first	  hand	  accounts	  from	  victims	  of	  violence	  and	  forced	  migration.”	  
(Jones	  2007)	  Of	   interest	  here	   is	  of	  course	   the	  observations	  of	  Young	   regarding	   the	  
sublime	   as	   “...terror's	   aestheticized	   translation.”	   (Young	   2010:314)	   Her	   seminal	  
sculptural	   intervention,	  Shibboleth	   (2007),	   a	   crack	   running	   the	   length	  of	   the	  Tate's	  
Turbine	  Hall	  floor,	  is	  almost	  a	  direct	  reference	  of	  the	  natural	  disaster,	  the	  spectacle	  
of	   the	   romantic	   sublime.	   While	   other	   works	   of	   Salcedo's	   have	   more	   graphically	  
engaged	   with	   themes	   of	   violence	   and	   its	   effects,	   Shibboleth	   tackles	   the	   legacy	   of	  
exploitation	   and	   racism	   left	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   colonialism.	   Of	   her	   practice,	   the	   artist	  
insists,	   “My	   works	   are	   for	   the	   victims	   of	   violence.	   I	   try	   to	   be	   a	   witness	   of	   the	  
witness.”.	   (Salcedo	   1998:190)	   As	   an	   aestheticising	   of	   terror,	   of	   significant	   and	  
threatening	  social	  disorder,	  work	  of	  this	  nature	  is,	  I	  feel,	  imbued	  with	  notions	  of	  the	  
sublime.	  As	  with	  Murder	  on	  7th,	  their	  engagement	  with	  notions	  of	  witness,	  of	  effect	  
and	   affect,	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   spectacle	   of	   terror	   –	   be	   it	   violence	   and	   crime	   in	  
Johannesburg	  or	  in	  Bogotá	  Columbia	  –	  position	  them	  as	  representations	  of	  sublime	  
spectacle.	  Whilst	  not	  the	  mimesis	  of	  Hugo	  –	  the	  documentary	  of	  the	  photographic	  –	  
works	   like	   Shibboleth	   and	  Murder	   on	   7th	   present	   a	   less	   direct,	   more	   conceptual	  
investigation	  of	  terror,	  and	  the	  deferred	  terror	  of	  witness.	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Perhaps	  more	  so	  than	  any	  other	  social	  phenomenon,	  the	  threat	  of	  HIV/Aids	  presents	  
I	   believe	   a	   spectacle	   of	   astonishment,	  mourning	   and	   sublime	   terror.	   The	   scope	   of	  
tragedy	  and	  death	  associated	  with	  the	  pandemic	  exceeds	  even	  that	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  
and	  other	  such	  significant	  and	  violent	  historical	  incursions.	  And	  from	  nowhere	  does	  
it	   appear	   as	   ominous,	   as	   overwhelming	   as	   from	   Africa,	   and	   Southern	   Africa	   in	  
particular.	  Martin	  Meredith	  sets	  something	  of	  the	  scene	  of	  this	  unveiling	  of	  tragedy,	  	  
	  
Sub	  Saharan	  Africa	  is	  home	  to	  just	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  world's	  population	  but	  bears	  more	  than	  
70	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  world's	   HIV/Aids	   cases.	  With	   the	   pandemic	   still	   in	   its	   infancy,	   by	   2004	  
some	  20	  million	  people	  had	  died	   from	  Aids;	   30	  million	  were	   infected	  by	   the	  HIV	  virus	   and	  
their	  number	  was	  rising	  by	  an	  estimated	  3	  million	  new	  cases	  each	  year.	  Southern	  Africa	  is	  the	  
worst	  effected	  region.	  (Meredith	  2005:682)	  	  
	  
Essentially	   unpresentable,	   the	   phenomenon	   and	   spectacle	   of	   HIV/Aids	   defies	   our	  
ability	   to	  comprehend,	   to	  encapsulate	   in	   language,	   to	   represent	   in	  art.	  We	  are	   left	  
with	  the	  differend	  of	  Lyotard;	  a	   latency,	  a	   lapse,	   the	  acknowledgement	  that	  of	  any	  
attempt	  to	  phrase	  such	  a	  thing,	  more	  and	  more	  must	  yet	  be	  said.	  Every	  attempted	  
presentation	  being	  thus	  a	  negative	  one,	  a	  presentation	  of,	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  knowing	  
or	   comprehending	   of	   such	   an	   embodiment	   of	   terror,	   “the	   impossibility	   of	   such	  
knowledge”.	   (Shaw	   2004:128)	   In	   regards	   to	   the	   sublimity	   of	   terror,	   and	   the	  
presentation	   of	   the	   unpresentable,	   art	   that	   engages	   and	   seeks	   to	   aestheticise	  
something	  of	  this	  is	  I	  believe	  worthy	  of	  further	  consideration	  and	  study.	  In	  his	  body	  
of	   work	   The	   Bereaved	   (2005),	   Pieter	   Hugo,	   true	   to	   his	   documentarian	   approach,	  
captures	   in	  photographic	  portrait	  the	  faces	  of	  deceased	  victims	  of	  HIV/Aids.	  Made-­‐
up,	  wrapped	   in	  blankets	  and	  prepared	   for	  burial,	   the	   images	  have	  a	  disarming	  and	  
shocking	  value.	  They	  are	  as	  it	  were,	  portraits	  of	  death	  itself	  –	  features	  of	  trauma	  and	  
of	  mourning.	   In	   regards	   to	   the	  sublime	  and	  death,	   rather	   than	  pain	  as	   the	  primary	  
source	  of	  terror,	  Burke	  observes,	  	  
	  
“But	  as	  pain	   is	   stronger	   in	   its	  operation	   than	  pleasure,	   so	  death	   is	   in	  general	  a	  much	  more	  
affecting	  idea	  than	  pain;	  because	  there	  are	  very	  few	  pains,	  however	  exquisite,	  which	  are	  not	  
preferred	   to	  death:	  nay,	  what	  generally	  makes	  pain	   itself,	   if	   I	  may	   say	   so,	  more	  painful,	   is,	  
that	  it	  is	  considered	  as	  an	  emissary	  of	  this	  king	  of	  terrors.”	  (Burke	  2004:86)	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The	  complex	  nature	  of	   interaction	  with	  such	   imagery	   falls	   therefore,	   I	  believe,	   into	  
the	  category	  of	  the	  sublimity	  of	  terror.	  As	  an	  aestheticising	  of	  terror,	  of	  the	  emissary	  
of	  pain	  and	  death	  that	  is	  HIV/Aids,	  The	  Bereaved	  presents	  a	  harrowing	  presentation	  
of	  such	  incommensurable	  horror.	  	  
	  
It	   has	   been	  my	   intention	   in	   this	   chapter	   to	   propose	   for	   consideration	   and	   further	  
dialogue,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   sociopolitical	   spectacle	   of	   terror	   (the	   Holocaust,	   the	  
Rwandan	  Genocide,	  etc...),	  certain	  threatening	  societal	  disruptions	  as	  valid	  sublime	  
evocations.	  And	  art	  that	  engages	  with	  these	  –	  be	  it	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  turmoil	  and	  
syndicated	   violence	   in	   Columbia,	   or	   the	   devastation	   of	   the	   Aids	   pandemic	   –	   as	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Conclusion	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  my	   intention	   in	   this	   study	   to	  apply	   to	   the	  work	  of	  Pieter	  Hugo,	  and	   in	  
particular	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  Genocide	  (2004),	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime.	  As	  an	  
aestheticising	  of	  terror,	  a	  visual	  witness	  of	  a	  spectacle	  of	  politically	  motivated	  mass	  
violence	   and	   horror,	   I	   have	   sought	   to	   align	   his	  work,	   in	   a	   contemporary	   sense,	   to	  
Burkean	   notions	   of	   the	   sublimity	   of	   terror.	   Having	   noted	   the	   succession	   of	   the	  
sociopolitical	   tragedy	   over	   the	   natural	   spectacle,	   as	   a	   source	   of	   terror	   and	  
astonishment,	  I	  have	  established	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  as	  a	  valid	  evocation	  of	  this	  
sublimity	  of	  terror.	  The	  simulacrum	  that	  is	  Rwanda	  2004:	  Vestiges	  of	  a	  Genocide	  thus	  
elicits	   from	   the	   viewer	   certain	   psychological	   effects,	   the	   negative	   pleasure	   of	   the	  
sublime;	  shock,	  horror,	  helplessness.	  As	  Lyotard	  notes,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  such	  witness,	  a	  
'suspended	  privation'.	  (Lyotard	  1991:100)	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  themes	  of	  terror,	  I	  have	  in	  an	  examination	  of	  Kant's	  mathematical	  and	  
dynamical	  sublime,	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  notions	  of	  the	  unpresentable.	  In	  relation	  to	  
Lyotard's	   revision	   of	   this	   Kantian	   theory,	   I	   have	   further	   sought	   to	   establish	   the	  
Rwandan	   Genocide	   as	   an	   essentially	   unpresentable	   event	   –	   like	   the	   Holocaust,	  
resisting,	  on	  account	  of	   the	   immeasurable	   tragedy	   involved,	  any	  comprehensive	  or	  
conclusive	   representation.	   As	   for	   Lyotard	   there	   is	   no	   single	   idiom	   with	   which	   to	  
describe	   the	   Holocaust,	   but	   only	   the	   acknowledgement	   that	   such	   knowledge	   is	  
impossible,	  so	  too	   I	  have	  argued,	  any	  presentation	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  must	  
be	   in	   this	   sense	   a	   negative	   one.	   Being	   as	   it	   is	   a	   presentation	   of	   an	   essentially	  
unpresentable	   event.	   Though	   directly	   representational,	   I	   have	   thus	   sought	   to	  
establish	  the	  photographic	  works	  of	  Hugo,	  as	  mimesis	  of	  genocide,	  as	  presentations	  
of	  the	  unpresentable,	  and	  so	  of	  the	  sublime.	  I	  have	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  
acknowledgement,	  that	   in	  our	  engagement	  with	  such	  work	  we	  are	  engaging	  with	  a	  
scenario	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  absolute	  means	  of	  communication,	  one	  which	  we	  will	  
in	  fact	  never	  entirely	  comprehend.	  	  
	  
The	  application	  of	  such	  Kantian	  notions	  confirms	  something	  of	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  
reason	   in	   regards	   to	   the	  sublime.	  The	  elevated	  and	   transcendental	   state	  of	   reason	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that	  constitutes	  his	  supersensible	  faculty	  has	  however,	  as	  I	  have	  noted,	  been	  thrown	  
into	  question.	  Derrida,	   Lyotard	  and	  others	   seeking	   to	   strip	   from	  such	   theory	   these	  
noumenal	   notions.	   Of	   relevance	   to	   our	   witness	   of	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	  
genocide,	  I	  have	  outlined	  this	  shift,	  as	  observed	  by	  Ray,	  in	  which	  the	  compensatory	  
pleasure	  offered	  by	  Kant's	  supersensible	   is	   in	  a	  sense	  nullified	  by	  disillusion.	   In	   the	  
wake	  of	  such	  politically	  engendered	  disasters	  –	  manifestations	  not	  of	  progress,	  the	  
triumph	  of	  reason,	  but	  of	  terror	  –	  the	  psychological	  rupture	  of	  trauma.	  
	  
It	  is	  my	  feeling	  that	  the	  application	  of	  such	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime	  –	  of	  terror	  and	  the	  
unpresentable	   –	   to	   Pieter	   Hugo's	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   is	  
appropriate.	  As	  an	  aestheticising	  of	  terror,	  shocking	  and	  able	  to	  reignite	  as	  witness	  
something	  of	  what	  Ray	  terms	  the	  'hit',	  the	  dramatic	  and	  devastating	  incursion	  of	  the	  
happening,	   and	   furthermore	   as	   a	   presentation	   of	   an	   essentially	   unpresentable	  
calamity,	   Rwanda	   2004:	   Vestiges	   of	   a	   genocide	   evokes	   in	   us	   something	   of	   the	  
trauma,	  the	  mourning,	  the	  astonishment	  of	  the	  sublime.	  	  
	  
In	   referencing	   Murder	   on	   7th	   (2009),	   I	   have	   proposed	   for	   consideration	   the	  
application	  of	  similar	  notions	  of	  the	  sublime	  to	  social	  disorders	  like	  violent	  crime	  in	  
South	   Africa.	   Though	   not	   on	   the	   scale	   of	   sublime	   political	   events	   such	   as	   the	  
Rwandan	  Genocide,	   I	  have	  explored	  in	  regards	  to	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  
implications	   of	   place	   and	   perspective,	   the	   latent	   threat's	   proximity	   determining	  
something	  of	  its	  stature	  as	  a	  spectacle	  of	  terror.	  Does	  violent	  crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  
as	   witnessed	   by	   	   South	   Africans	   from	   the	   relative	   safety	   of	   their	   suburban	  
'fortresses',	  not	  constitute	  for	  them	  the	  unravelling	  of	  a	  sublime	  spectacle	  of	  terror?	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   exceeding	   even	   the	   death	   toll	   of	   the	   Rwandan	   Genocide,	   does	   the	  
HIV/Aids	   pandemic	   not	   qualify	   as	   just	   such	   a	   sublime	   social	   disorder,	   with	   sixty	  
million	  people	  infected	  and	  claiming	  as	   it	  has	   in	  excess	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  million	  lives?	  
(UNAIDS	  2009)	  
	  
Whilst	  I	  am	  wary	  of	  attempting	  to	  attach	  to	  any	  and	  every	  event	  of	  horror	  or	  threat	  
these	   notions	   of	   the	   sublime,	   I	   do	   believe	   that	   overarching	   scenarios	   like	   violent	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crime	  in	  South	  Africa,	  witnessed	  from	  a	  certain	  proximity,	  as	  well	  as	  such	  universal	  
phenomena	  as	  HIV/Aids,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  sublime	  spectacles	  of	  power	  and	  threat	  
on	  account	  of	   their	   capacity	   to	  overwhelm.	   In	   the	   face	  of	   such	  we	   feel	  powerless,	  
incapacitated,	  rendered	  dumb.	  
	  
The	  qualification	  that	  the	  power	  should	  be	  experienced	  as	  practically	  unlimited	  is	  necessary	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  is	  felt	  in	  the	  experience	  and	  as	  a	  contrast	  to	  the	  less	  intense	  feeling	  of	  
mere	  excitement	  that	  can	  arise	  from	  specific	  vicarious	  threats	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	  less	  than	  
annihilating	  (fights,	  car	  chases).	  It	  is	  the	  nature	  and	  function	  of	  this	  sense	  of	  unlimited	  power	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